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September, 2005
International Association of Fire Fighters – Canadian
Office
Submission to federal Emergency Preparedness Act
Review
Comment 1
The International Association of Fire Fighters submits that the scope of
the Emergency Preparedness Act should be revised to formally and
specifically recognize that Canadian cities are potential targets for
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) attack, and also that
municipal fire fighters and other first responders are a critically
important element in ensuring the survivability of Canadians in the
aftermath of a CBRN attack or any other kind of major disaster.
Military-based teams are hours, if not days from deployment to the scene
of a CBRN attack or any other kind of emergency. Fire fighters, however,
will be on the scene in minutes and are Canadians’ first line of defense
against the aftermath of a CBRN attack.
The federal government informally acknowledges that first responders have
a critical role to play in emergency preparedness, but historically has
assumed that front-line fire fighters are properly trained and equipped to
safely and effectively protect citizens. This is a serious flaw in Canada’s
emergency preparedness plans that puts the lives of fire fighters and
Canadian citizens at risk.
Until the critical role of first responders is formally acknowledged and
resourced by the federal government and CBRN and hazardous materials
response training is delivered to a significant number of front-line,
rank-and-file fire fighters in cities in towns all across Canada, millions
of Canadians will remain vulnerable to the aftermath of a terrorist attack
of a CBRN nature. Continuing to bolster military-based CBRN or other teams
will do nothing whatsoever to protect Canadians from the immediate aftermath
of a CBRN attack or other major disaster.
A survey of Canada’s professional fire fighters conducted by the IAFF in
early 2005 revealed the shocking truth: not only is CBRN response training
non-existent in a vast majority of Canadian cities, but many professional
fire fighters also lack the ability to respond safely and effectively to
even the most basic hazardous materials incidents.
The IAFF survey indicated that only 19 per cent of Canadian affiliates
have the training and equipment necessary to respond to a CBRN incident in
their city. A shocking 75 per cent have little or in fact no CBRN response
training at all. And that means millions of Canadians remain vulnerable to
the potentially-devastating aftermath of these kinds of attacks.
The federal government has acknowledged its responsibility to protect
Canadians from the aftermath of terrorist attacks by creating a federal
Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and allocating
billions toward initiatives designed to improve disaster mitigation and
emergency response. Yet it has failed miserably in terms of delivering
widespread CBRN response training to front-line first responders such as
fire fighters.
The need for first responder CBRN training in Canada is immediate, and it
is real, as illustrated by at least two frightening incidents: in March
2005, a van transporting anthrax and other viral agents to a research centre
was involved in a serious traffic accident in downtown Winnipeg, causing
serious alarm in the city until emergency crews were able to verify that the
deadly packages had not ruptured. This incident mirrored a May, 2003
situation in Guelph, Ont., where a van carrying six cases of radioactive
materials was involved in a traffic accident at an intersection and
overturned.
These incidents demonstrated that biological and radiological materials
are being transported on our city streets, and that accidents involving
these materials do in fact happen, anytime and anywhere. In the case of the
Guelph accident, none of the fire fighters who rushed to the scene had
received any radiological or other CBRN response training at all.
Fortunately, none of the materials leaked, otherwise the situation could
have been deadly for fire fighters and members of the public. What is just
as shocking is that in 2005, two years after this incident, Guelph fire
fighters have still not receive any radiological or other CBRN training.
What is more disturbing is that a 2004 request from the Guelph Fire
Department for federal CBRN response training was denied. The department was
told that existing teams have priority for federal training and that it
would be years before any space would be available.
The Winnipeg and Guelph incidents also serve to illustrate that incidents
of a CBRN nature can and will happen anywhere, and not just in Ottawa,
Toronto or another of the small number of other Canadian cities that have
CBRN response teams in place.
Comment 2
In December 2001, the federal government allocated $7.7 billion for
national security. Canadians expect and deserve to know exactly what their
investment has yielded in terms of protecting their safety and
infrastructure. Accordingly, the Emergency Preparedness Act should be
revised to indeed include an accountability requirement for annually
reporting on the progress made in the areas targeted by this investment.
For example, Canadians in every city deserve to know what they would
endure in terms of initial response to a CBRN attack or another kind of
major disaster. They deserve to know how long they will wait before the
arrival of emergency personnel who are trained to a recognized level of CBRN
or hazardous materials response. This is a key element in ensuring a
consistent level of preparedness in provinces and cities across Canada. It
would allow the government to identify those cities and citizens who are at
risk and quickly and specifically target first responder training in those
areas.
Comment 3
It is surprising to see such a casual acknowledgement in this question
about the need for the federal government to work with “Canadian emergency
management communities” on a complementary framework for dealing with
emergencies. The only thing that can be said is that the federal government
has failed miserably at this in the past, if we are to give any credence
whatsoever to the March, 2004 report of the Senate Committee on National;
Security.
The Committee’s report reads like a recipe for disaster – federal
agencies ignoring the needs of municipalities and first responders, local
caches of emergency supplies unknown to local authorities and provincial
governments gobbling up emergency preparedness funds intended for
municipalities. Time and time again, the report details jurisdictional
squabbles and communication breakdowns at the federal level when it comes to
national security. And in the meantime, more than four years after the
events of 9-11, the federal government still does not have an effective plan
to protect Canadians from the aftermath of a terrorist attack of a CBRN
nature.
The discussion on this issue proposes revising the Emergency Preparedness
Act to ensure there is harmonization within federal government departments,
and secondarily with provincial and territorial governments. Again, with no
provision contemplated for coordination with local authorities and first
responder activities, there is therefore no provision for harmonizing action
or even information on the critically-important point protecting Canadians
from the immediate aftermath of a CBRN attack or another kind of major
disaster. The federal government has no idea which municipal first
responders have CBRN or haz-mat training; neither does the provincial
government.
An individual CBRN attack, for example would not happen in a single
jurisdiction. It would happen in a municipality, which is also in a province
or territory, which is also in Canada. Regardless of where it happens, it is
automatically in three jurisdictions simultaneously.
We recommend the Emergency Preparedness Act be revised to formally and
specifically recognize the role of fire fighters and other municipally-based
first responders as a first line of defense in the event of a terrorist
attack. We further recommend that the act be revised to contemplate some
mechanism for formally tying the element of initial response (i.e. first
minutes) into the overall idea of the federal government’s acknowledged role
in national security and emergency preparedness.
Comment 4 (Effective Partnerships)
For four years, the International Association of Fire Fighters has
proposed an example of a partnership to the federal government, one that
could have significantly boosted the number of first responders trained in
CBRN response in an extremely cost effective manner. Every MP is aware of
our proposal, and so is the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
preparedness. Yet our proposal has never been acted upon by any federal
government department or agency.
The IAFF Hazardous Materials Training for First Responders Program and
Emergency Response to Terrorism Operations Programs have successfully
trained tens of thousands of first responders in the U.S. to a recognized
level of response.
But because the funding for these programs comes from the U.S.
government, Canadian first responders are prevented from receiving this
urgently-needed training. IAFF analysis shows that annual funding of just
$500,000 would reach approximately 1,667 first responders a year. Because
they are train-the-trainer programs, the effects of the training are
multiplied as participants deliver the course to first responders in their
home community.
The $500,000 funding proposal represents a tiny fraction of the $7.7
billion that was allocated over a five-year period by the federal government
in December, 2001 for enhancing national security. And because the
curriculum administration for these IAFF programs are already in place,
virtually 100 per cent of federal funding would go directly toward
instruction.
The IAFF has been told again and again, by sources inside and outside of
government, that our proposal, at a cost of $500,000, is simply too small to
be noticed; in other words it’s “flying under the radar.” We are told that
if we tack on a zero at the end of our cost projection, we’ll get more
attention from the federal government. But we refuse to upwardly revise the
estimated cost of our proposal for this or any other reason. It is simply
not necessary.
In September 2003, after discussions with the IAFF, the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities (FCM) endorsed the IAFF position on federal funding
for hazardous materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction training for first
responders. The FMC represents hundreds of Canadian municipalities, from the
largest cities to the smallest townships and villages, in every province in
Canada.
Years and years are passing while this cost-effective opportunity to
significantly increase the number of first responders trained to safely and
effectively protect Canadians from CBRN incidents goes untapped.
The IAFF has continuously called on the federal government to fully
recognize its responsibility for national security and the protection of
Canadians and immediately provide funding to enable Canadian first
responders to participate in the IAFF Hazardous Training for First
Responders Program and the IAFF Emergency Response to Terrorism Operations
Program.
This funding could be provided by the federal government through existing
budgetary allocations through the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness (PSEPC), or jointly between PSEPC and Health Canada, National
Defence and Foreign Affairs.
The origin of the funding is not important. The need to implement
widespread first responder CBRN training in Canada is extremely important.
In light of this example, we would certainly agree with the statement
that “a coordinated approach – through collaboration, agreements, and
arrangements with other Canadian jurisdictions, NGOs, the private sector and
other countries is required for modern emergency management.”
The consultation paper for the Emergency Preparedness Act review states
that “The national Security Policy recognizes that addressing many threats
and emergencies requires a coordinated approach with provinces, territories,
NGOs, the private sector and international partners. The policy sets out
processes for engaging these partners in the development of coordinated
plans to support the overall framework.” A study of the National Security
Policy, however, indicates that it specifies no such process through which
the IAFF or another non-governmental group could participate in the
discussion about national security.
We further recommend that the Emergency Preparedness Act be revised to
specify a formal mechanism through which stakeholders such as fire fighters
can provide input and submit proposals on the subject of national security
and emergency management.
Comment 5 – Information Sharing
The IAFF agrees that information collected for the purpose of enhancing
national security should be protected from unauthorized use, and we
recommend the Emergency Preparedness Act and any other related regulatory
instrument be revised to prevent this from occurring.
The consultation paper for this Emergency Preparedness Act review states
on this issue: “For first responders, incidents evolve rapidly and their
impact can be widespread. Obtaining timely and accurate information from
reliable sources would enable accurate situational awareness, assessment and
remedial action during an emergency.”
This is an extremely curious statement in that it supposes that first
responders should arrive on the scene of an emergency without any training
or preparation and then wait for some unspecified authority to provide
information about how to respond safely and effectively.
The reality of emergency response is that time is of the essence, and
therefore the best way to protect the lives of Canadians and first
responders themselves is to provide them with adequate CBRN training before
an incident takes place, therefore fire fighters can safely and immediately
perform their duty to rescue citizens as soon as they arrive on the scene
without the need to wait. This is the purpose of first responder training
and again we reiterate that it is a critical element in the ability of
citizens to survive a CBRN event. The Emergency Preparedness Act should be
revised to specify this point, if necessary.
Comment 6 – Reliable and resilient Critical Infrastructure
We agree that infrastructure is vulnerable and that the issue of
infrastructure protection should be addressed within the scope of the
Emergency Preparedness Act. The question in this consultation paper deals
with the issue of improving infrastructure so that it is more resistant to
damage; specifically whether standards for doing this should be voluntary or
mandatory under any legislative regime.
This is a worthwhile discussion but we submit that infrastructure should
also be considered in terms of emergency response after an incident occurs.
Railways, roadways, universities, laboratories, power facilities, hospitals
all handle or store materials that are chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear in nature and therefore present attractive targets to those who
would seek to commit an act of terrorism on Canadian soil.
Again, the ability of first responders to deal safely and effectively
with these kinds of incidents is related to the ability of Canadians to
survive their aftermath. This also points to the need for widespread haz-mat
and CBRN training across Canada.
We recommend that the discussion of infrastructure in the Emergency
Preparedness Act extend beyond protection and include the issue of response
and mitigation.
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