District of Columbia
Fire & Emergency Medical Services
Department

Report From the Reconstruction Committee

Fire At
400 Kennedy Street, NW
Washington, DC

October 24, 1997
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In Memory and Honor of Sergeant John M. Carter

District of Columbia
Fire & Emergency Medical Services Department
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Executive Summary

On the morning of October 24, 1997, a basement fire in a neighborhood grocery store at 400 Kennedy Street, NW, in Washington, D.C. claimed the life of Sergeant John M. Carter of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department. Fire Chief Donald Edwards appointed a Reconstruction Team to investigate the circumstances contributing to Sergeant Carter’s death.

Sergeant Carter responded to the Kennedy Street fire as the officer in charge of the third due engine company, E-14. The first due engine company, E-22, was operating on the ground floor with the initial attack line when E-14 (Sergeant Carter and his lineman) entered the structure to provide backup support. E-14 advanced to the middle of the store and stopped to extinguish fire advancing across the ceiling. Conditions changed dramatically, and the area in which E-22 and E-14 were operating became extremely hot. These two companies never joined together. Sergeant Carter ordered his lineman to back out. At the same time, the crew from E-22 also moved to exit the structure. Immediately after the fire fighters exited the building, flames rolled through the first floor of the structure and an orange ball of flame shot out the front door. After exiting the building, E-14’s lineman reported to E-22’s officer that he could not find Sergeant Carter.

Because of the confusion at the front entrance and the failure to appropriately implement the Incident Command System, the Incident Commander was not notified that Sergeant Carter was missing for approximately 14 minutes. During this period, crews re-entered the first floor in an attempt to locate Sergeant Carter but, by this time fire had burned through the floor in several locations. There were also indications that the floor was in imminent danger of collapsing into the basement. They were unable to locate Sergeant Carter.

The Reconstruction Committee concluded that Sergeant Carter fell through the floor into the basement while the interior crews were attempting to withdraw from the grocery store. The evidence indicates that Sergeant Carter was conscious after he fell into the basement. He moved from the location from which he fell and utilized all the air in his self-contained breathing apparatus. He also attempted to contact the Incident Commander to request assistance but his transmissions were neither completed nor received. His radio had been reported as malfunctioning the previous shift. Sergeant Carter was equipped with a PASS device, but it was not turned on.

Medical evidence, including normal carbon monoxide levels in his blood, indicates that Sergeant Carter did not remove his self-contained breathing apparatus facepiece as he ran out of air. Accordingly, he was unconscious, from non-traumatic but medically nonconclusive reasons, as his air supply ran out. The condition of his protective clothing and burns to the body indicates that Sgt. Carter was face down while unconscious. He asphyxiated by drowning in water from fire streams which filled the basement during the course of fire fighting operations. The water entered Sergeant Carter’s facepiece through a break in the facepiece seal as he ran out of air and positive pressure in the facepiece was no longer maintained.

The Reconstruction Committee has made recommendations in order to prevent future death or injuries within the District of Columbia Fire and EMS Department.
Reconstruction Committee

The following individuals were appointed to the DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department’s Reconstruction Committee by Fire Chief Donald Edwards:

**Chairman**
Martin A. Hemmerich, Deputy Fire Chief, Training Division, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department

**Members**
Robert C. Bingham, Deputy Fire Chief (retired), Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
Edward Comeau, Chief Fire Investigator, National Fire Protection Association
Richard M. Duffy, Director, Department of Occupational Health and Safety, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC
Richard D. Fleming, Lieutenant, Fire Prevention, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
Carlton E. Ford, Battalion Fire Chief, 6th Battalion #3, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
Joseph A. Herr, Deputy Fire Chief, Fire Fighting Platoon #1, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
Andrew Levinson, Occupational Health and Safety Department, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC
Gordon Routley, Health & Safety Committee, International Association of Fire Chiefs
John E. Thumann, Captain, Safety Officer, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department

The Reconstruction Committee acknowledges the following individuals and organizations who assisted the Committee in completing this report.

Ross Arends, Special Agent, U.S. Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
Carroll Elliot, Communications Division, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
Fred Hollis, Lead Fire Investigator, Fire Prevention Division, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
Paul Jones, Sergeant, Safety Office, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
K. Long, Detective, Homicide, Washington DC Metropolitan Police Department
Greg Mutchler, Lieutenant, Training Academy, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
James Seavey, Sergeant, Safety Office, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
Craig Thorne, MD, MPH., Medical Director, PFC Associates, LLC
Terry Williams, Sergeant, Safety Office, Washington DC Fire and EMS Department
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Information Resources Division, Washington, DC
On the morning of October 24, 1997, a basement fire in a neighborhood grocery store at 400 Kennedy Street, NW, in Washington, D.C. claimed the life of Sergeant John M. Carter. Sgt. Carter had been assigned to the First Battalion of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Service Department (DC Fire and EMS Department). He responded to the Kennedy Street fire as the officer in charge of the third due engine company, E-14.

The first due engine company, E-22, was operating on the ground floor when E-14 (Sgt. Carter and his lineman) entered the structure through the front door to provide backup support. E-14 advanced to the middle of the store, stopped to extinguish fire advancing across the ceiling, and consequently never joined E-22. A member of Rescue Squad 2 who had been separated from his crew joined E-14. Conditions then changed dramatically, and the area in which E-22 and E-14 were operating became extremely hot. Sgt. Carter ordered his lineman to back out and tugged on the lineman’s self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) cylinder to guide the lineman’s movements towards the front door. The crew from E-22 also moved to exit the structure through the front door. Immediately after the lineman from E-14, the member of RS-2 and the crew from E-22 exited the building, flames rolled through the first floor of the structure and an orange ball of flame shot out the front door. After exiting the building, E-14’s lineman reported to E-22’s officer that he could not find Sgt. Carter.

In an attempt to rescue Sgt. Carter, crews re-entered the first floor with two attack lines; a 2-1/2 inch line and a 1-1/2 inch line. By this time, however, the fire had burned through the floor in several locations and there were indications that the floor was in imminent danger of collapsing into the basement. They were unable to locate Sgt. Carter.

It took approximately two hours to extinguish the fire. Additional rescue attempts during this time had to be aborted because of the unsafe condition of the first floor. A fourth alarm and Mutual Aid Units from Montgomery County were necessary to provide adequate resources to the Kennedy Street fire scene. It was not until after the fire was extinguished that Sgt. Carter’s body was found in the water-filled basement. He was pronounced dead at a nearby hospital.

On October 25, 1997 Fire Chief Donald Edwards requested that the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms’ (ATF) National Response Team assist in determining the cause of the Kennedy Street fire. Investigation by the DC Fire Investigation Unit was delayed 24 hours until the ATF National Response Team was assembled. The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) secured the structure after termination of the incident until the investigation was completed. Fire Chief Edwards launched the investigation on October 26, 1997, and coordinated the work of each of the investigating agencies: the DC Fire Investigation Division, the DC Fire and EMS Department Safety Office, the ATF National Response Team, and the MPD Homicide Branch. The cause of the fire was later determined to be faulty electrical wiring in the basement.
In addition, Chief Edwards appointed a Reconstruction Committee to investigate and evaluate the emergency response activities surrounding the Kennedy Street fire and the circumstances of Sgt. Carter’s death. To ensure that the evaluation of this incident would be objective and thorough, representatives from the International Association of Fire Fighters, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the National Fire Protection Association were included on the Committee.

The Reconstruction Committee reviewed written records of the incident, audio tapes of radio transmissions, incident photographs, and incident videotapes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (through a request by the MPD) assisted the Committee by attempting to improve the quality of the audio tapes. Although the FBI laboratory filtered some of the background noise and otherwise enhanced the quality of the tapes, the enhanced version yielded no additional information. Incident photographs were taken early in the incident during predawn hours, so the darkness limited the visibility of activities. Incident videotapes were taken later during the incident and did not provide any pertinent information. Sgt. Carter’s SCBA was sent to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health for evaluation.

The Reconstruction Committee sought to interview all personnel who might have pertinent information about the Kennedy Street fire scene. The Committee invited all members of the DC Fire and EMS Department to speak to the Committee. Personnel who were interviewed by the Committee gave candid and detailed recollections of the events surrounding the Kennedy Street fire, as well as suggestions for future policies and procedures.

This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the Reconstruction Committee. The resources and procedures of the DC Fire and EMS Department are described first, followed by an overview of the structure at 400 Kennedy Street, NW. A detailed account of the Kennedy Street fire is presented next, along with a timeline of the incident. Finally, the report provides the Reconstruction Committee’s recommendations for each of five major areas of concern. Additional information concerning the DC Fire and EMS Department Incident Command System, protective equipment, responsibilities of chief officers, and dispatch log are included in Appendices.
The District of Columbia Fire and EMS Department protects the lives and property of the 550,000 residents of the District of Columbia as well as the approximately one million visitors and workers who are in the city each business day. The area served by the DC Fire and EMS Department covers 69 square miles and is bordered by the states of Maryland and Virginia. The Department had 110,966 incidents in fiscal year 1997, requiring 149,672 responses by fire units and 124,666 responses by EMS units.

The DC Fire and EMS Department is comprised of 1,263 professional fire fighters and 327 EMS personnel. The District of Columbia maintains 33 fire stations with 32 engine companies, 16 aerial ladder truck companies, 3 heavy-duty rescue squads, 1 hazardous materials company, 2 fireboats, 14 basic life support units, and 14 advanced life support units. Engine companies and ladder companies are each staffed with an officer and 3 fire fighters. Each heavy-duty rescue squad is staffed with an officer and 4 fire fighters.

There are four shifts (platoons) providing coverage, with each platoon working a 24-hour day that begins at 7:00 a.m. On each platoon there are six Battalion Fire Chiefs and a Deputy Fire Chief assigned to the Fire Fighting Division. A lieutenant or a captain is assigned to each engine, truck, and rescue squad on each shift. A sergeant is assigned to each of the six battalions to replace a regularly assigned officer who is on leave, such as annual leave, training, or sick leave.

**Alarms**

The standard local alarm for a report of smoke with no additional information and a first alarm (box alarm) for confirmed reports of smoke and/or a specific address or a report of a structural fire are as follows:

- Local Alarm – 1 engine and 1 aerial ladder truck
- First Alarm (Box Alarm) - 4 engines, 2 aerial ladder trucks, 1 battalion fire chief and 1 heavy duty rescue squad

The request for additional resources by the Incident Commander may be as follows:

- Working Fire Dispatch – Safety Officer, 1 engine assigned as a safety company, 1 Air Unit, 1 Ambulance & 1 Fire Investigator
- Task Force Alarm - 2 engine companies, 1 aerial ladder truck and 1 battalion fire chief (BFC only dispatched on first requested Task Force)
- Second Alarm - 4 engines, 2 aerial ladder trucks and 1 battalion fire chief
- Third Alarm - 4 engines, 2 aerial ladder trucks and 1 battalion fire chief
- Special Alarm - Any specific additional assistance the Incident Commander requests

**Personnel Accountability**

The DC Fire and EMS Department uses a personal accountability system that requires each member at the beginning of each shift to carry the Personnel Accountability Tag (PAT) assigned to that member. The PAT displays the member's picture, name, rank, height, weight, blood type, and allergies. The PAT for each crew member is attached to a Unit Designator Card that normally remains on the dashboard of the apparatus.
The DC Fire and EMS Department specifies that the Incident Commander must conduct a “roll call” 30 minutes after the arrival of the first unit, then every 20 minutes thereafter. Rolls calls are also taken following a change in strategy, such as changing from offensive to defensive operations. In addition, roll calls may be taken for any reason upon the request of the Incident Commander. The Incident Commander notifies all units to prepare for roll call, then calls each company. Each company gives the known status of personnel as even, plus, or minus.

If the operation changes from an offensive mode to a defensive mode, all PATs are collected from the vehicles and brought to the Command Post. A roll call is taken immediately to ensure that all personnel have exited from the structure.

The DC Fire and EMS Department uses the Incident Command System to manage emergency incidents. The Incident Command System consists of standard operating procedures and clearly defined responsibilities that enable effective management and control of the emergency scene. The Incident Command System is intended to allow personnel accountability, adaptability to incident changes, resource flexibility, manageable span of control, and unity of command for all those operating at the emergency scene. The DC Fire and EMS Department standard operating procedure for Incident Command is included in Appendix A.

The DC Fire and EMS Department uses the following four frequencies for emergency communications.

- Channel 1 (154.190) Main fire channel
- Channel 2 (154.400) Medical channel
- Channel 3 (154.280) Mutual Aid
- Channel 4 (154.205) Fire ground channel

“Bleed over” or interference between Channel 1 and Channel 4 has been noted because the frequencies are too close to one another.

The DC Fire & EMS Department standard operating procedures designate the address side of a structure as Side 1. Other sides are designated 2, 3, and 4, going clockwise from Side 1. The interior of the building is divided into quadrants A, B, C, and D going clockwise from the corner of Sides 1 and 2 (quadrant A). The central part of the structure is designated “Quadrant E.” The exterior exposures are the structures adjacent to the outside walls of the building of origin. For example, the structure attached to Side 3 of the original building is designated “Exposure 3.”

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**INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM, COMMUNICATION AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES**

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**Quadrant and Exposure Layout**
The first arriving company officer is in charge of the incident until relieved by a command officer. The Battalion Fire Chief assumes command upon arrival and maintains overall responsibility for operations on the fire ground until relieved by a higher ranking officer.

The DC Fire and EMS Department standard operating procedure’s specify placement of apparatus and company assignments for structure fires. On a Box Alarm assignment for a structure fire, the order of dispatch determines the assigned position and task for each company.

The first and third due engines report to the front of the building to form the Attack Sector. The first due engine lays a supply line from a hydrant going into the fire block, and the third due engine connects their apparatus to the hydrant to supplement the first due engine’s water supply. The first due engine then attacks the fire and the third due engine provides a back-up line.

The second and fourth due engines report to the rear of the structure. The second due engine lays a supply line from a hydrant and the fourth due engine supplements the water supply. The second due engine is responsible for checking the basement and reporting findings to the Incident Commander. If possible, the second due engine also shuts off utilities and notifies Incident Command of their actions.

The first due truck company places their apparatus in the front of the building and is responsible for the control of utilities and for laddering the front of the building. If the aerial ladder is not needed for rescue work, the truck company raises the aerial ladder to the roof for ventilation purposes.

The second due truck company places their apparatus in the rear of the building and is responsible for the laddering the rear. The second due truck company likewise raises the aerial ladder to the roof if no other tasks take priority.

The Rescue Squad reports to the front of the building, unless ordered to a different location by the Incident Commander. Four of the Rescue Squad’s five personnel form Search Teams A and B, each with two members. One team advances to the fire floor, and the other team goes to the floor above. The Rescue Squad driver assists the search teams by forcing entry, venting the structure from outside, monitoring the Rescue Squad Search Team’s progress in locating victims, and assisting with first aid, if necessary.

Ideally, the Battalion Fire Chief positions the Command Post so he can have an unobstructed view of the entire incident. The Battalion Fire Chief uses his vehicle, as the Command Post until the arrival of the Field Command Unit.

Many buildings in the District of Columbia have a main entrance on the street level and direct exterior access to the basement at the rear. When a basement fire is discovered, the DC Fire and EMS Department’s standard operating procedures specify that, if feasible, the attack line should enter on the basement level, rather than from the first floor and then down the interior basement stairway. The Incident Commander must verify that the first and third due engine companies can maintain tenable positions before directing the second due engine to attack the basement fire from the rear. If the Incident Commander orders an attack by the second due engine, the fourth due engine provides a back-up line. The first due engine company, in order to protect rescue operations on upper floors, then attempts to contain the fire to the basement by operating at the top of the basement stairs, if this can be accomplished from a tenable position.
The Incident at 400 Kennedy Street

THE BUILDING

The structure was a two-story, brick building with a basement built in 1932. The first floor was occupied by a neighborhood grocery store, and the second floor was an apartment occupied by the store’s proprietors. The basement was used mainly for storage, but there was also a small office at the bottom of the interior stairs. The exterior of the building measures approximately 92 feet, 8 inches along Kennedy Street (Side 1) and approximately 24 feet, 8 inches along Fourth Street (Side 2). There was an approximately 2-foot drop in grade along the Kennedy Street side with the lowest point at the corner of Fourth and Kennedy Streets. A two-story apartment house is attached to the south side of the building (Side 3).

The first floor grocery store had two main floor entrances, a front door at the corner of Side 1 and Side 2 and a storeroom door on Side 1. The front door, located at the corner of Fourth and Kennedy Streets, had a roll down steel door in front of the main entrance door. The storeroom door located at the west end of the building on Kennedy Street provided access to a one-story storage area behind the first floor deli counter. The storage area was connected to the grocery store by a steep concrete ramp descending at approximately a 30-degree angle.
The first floor had large window openings located close to the front door of the store on both Kennedy Street and Fourth Street sides, which had been covered by plywood. The window bays had been extended out from the building approximately 3 feet on each side, over hanging light well openings that were originally provided for basement windows. The Kennedy Street (Side 1) window was approximately 20 feet long, although the opening was narrowed with masonry block. The Fourth Street (Side 2) window opening was approximately 14 feet long. Wood flooring had been placed over the light well openings in the window bays.
There was an outside basement entrance on Side 4, leading into the rear alley, however, the entrance was rendered inaccessible by a security gate with several pipes interwoven through the bars. The basement was accessible only through an interior staircase from the first floor. There were two means of access to the second floor apartment: an outside doorway on the Fourth Street (Side 2) of the building, leading to an interior staircase, and an outside metal staircase in the rear of the building (Side 4), leading to the alley.

The flooring on the first floor was tongue and groove hardwood, which had been covered over the years with several layers of linoleum tile. The floor was supported by 2" x 9" wood floor joists that ran from north to south (Side 1 to Side 3). The joists were supported by a metal I-beam that ran from east to west (Side 2 to Side 4) in the center of the basement. The span was approximately 11’ 8” on either side of the I-beam. The joists were occasionally doubled, and in at least two places tripled, to provide additional support for the first floor. The ends of the joists were built into the brick basement walls on the north and south sides, while the metal I-beam was built into the brick wall on the east end of the building (Side 2) and the furnace room wall at the west end. The I-beam was supported by two round metal columns that were 4” to 5” diameter.

The gas service was located on the southeast outside wall on the Fourth Street side (Side 2). The gas meter was located in the basement at the bottom landing of the interior basement stairs.

The building was supplied with a 3-Phase, 200 Amp, electrical service protected by 200 Amp cartridge fuses. The service drop is below grade on Side 2 in the southeast corner of the basement at the bottom landing of the interior basement stairs. The basement had exposed incandescent bulb lights with ceramic bases. The first floor had fluorescent ballast lights. In the basement, armored BX electrical cable ran through holes that were cut in the floor joists. Investigators found three and two conductor BX cable in the basement. The two-conductor BX cable had wires wrapped in cloth and paper material. Inspectors also found a metal conduit that ran from the main electrical service to the I-beam, then ran the length of the I-beam to a circuit breaker box near the door to the furnace room. This breaker box apparently serviced all or some of the compressors, as well as some of the utilities on the first and second floors.

A summary of the fire cause and origin are included in Appendix D.
On October 24, 1997, the occupant of the second floor apartment at 400 Kennedy Street, NW was awakened by smoke. He descended to the first floor landing on the Fourth Street side (Side 2). He noticed smoke coming through the wooden floor, believed there was a fire in the basement, and went to investigate. The occupant was also the proprietor of the grocery store that occupied the first floor. He knew the only access to the basement was via an interior stairway through the first floor grocery store. In order for him to investigate, he had to go outside, walk down the sidewalk and unlock the door from the outside. When he lifted the roll-up door and opened the interior front door, he entered, but was driven back due to the heavy smoke. He yelled for help and a neighbor dialed 911. At 0619 hours, the DC Fire and EMS Department Communications Division (CD) received a 911 telephone call reporting smoke in the area of Fourth and Kennedy Streets, NW. The Communications Division dispatched E-22 and T-11 to investigate. These two units are housed together in the 5700 block of Georgia Ave., NW, approximately 7 blocks from Fourth and Kennedy Streets.

Between 0619 and 0623 hours, Communications Division received three additional telephone calls reporting fire in the grocery store at the corner of Fourth and Kennedy Streets. At 0623, Communications Division filled out the Box Alarm assignment. At that time, E-22 was three blocks away and could see smoke banking down into the intersection. The Box Alarm assignment consisted of the following units.

- E-22 (first due engine)
- E-24 (second due engine)
- E-14 (third due engine)
- E-11 (fourth due engine)
- T-11 (first due truck)
- T-6 (second due truck)
- Battalion Fire Chief 4
- Rescue Squad 2

All units responded from their respective stations and arrived within five minutes from time of dispatch.
E-22 arrived at 0624 hours. E-22’s layout man laid a 3” supply line and attached an Akron hydrant valve to the hydrant at the northwest corner of Fourth and Kennedy Streets. E-22 positioned their apparatus in front of the building on the Kennedy Street side (Side 1), approximately 30 feet from the front entrance. Truck 11 arrived with E-22. T-11 positioned their apparatus directly behind E-22.

E-22’s officer conducted an initial size-up and radioed to Communications Division that smoke was showing from the first floor grocery store. E-22’s officer and lineman stretched 200 feet of pre-connected 1-1/2” line to the front door. While the line was being stretched, E-22’s driver forced open the front door by breaking through a Plexiglass security enclosure. He did not realize that the store owner had unlocked the door prior to their arrival.

E-22’s lineman and officer each donned their Scott 4.5 one-hour self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and walked/crawled into the store. Smoke conditions were light at the front door and moderate in the rear of the store. Heat was not a factor at that time. E-22’s crew, believing that the fire was in a store room in Quadrant D, entered the store, turned right and continued down the aisle parallel and nearest to the Kennedy Street side (Side 1). When they were mid-way through the store, E-22’s officer radioed E-22’s driver to charge the attack line, and water came immediately. E-22’s crew continued to move toward Side 4.

When they reached the deli counter and were unable to move further, E-22’s crew turned left, moving toward Side 3, where they were stopped by a wall. E-22’s officer ordered the lineman to remain at this location while he investigated along the Side 3 wall, moving to the east toward Side 2. After advancing about 15 to 20 feet, E-22’s officer found a small fire at the ceiling level. The flames were in the vicinity of the basement stairs and may have burned through the upper part of the door at the top of the stairs. He ordered the lineman forward to extinguish the flames, and the fire was quickly knocked down. The nozzle was opened in 5-second bursts to knock down the flames that repeatedly flared up.

Battalion Fire Chief-4 had assumed command during E-22’s entry. E-22’s officer radioed to Battalion Fire Chief-4 with a priority message that the fire was gas fed and the gas should be shut off immediately. The flames were described as lazy blue flames. Battalion Fire Chief-4 acknowledged E-22’s transmission and ordered T-11 and T-6 to cut off the gas supply to the building.

T-11 radioed that they were on the scene at 0625 hours. As the T-11 hook/axe man was donning his SCBA he noticed smoke pushing through the concrete sidewalk at the front door threshold. The T-11 hook/axe man went inside with the crew from E-22.

T-11’s officer raised a 30’ portable ladder to the second floor of Side 1 and entered a bedroom window. He donned his SCBA because of smoke conditions, but noted no apparent heat. He performed a quick search of the second floor, then came down via the interior stairway that exited on the Fourth Street side (Side 2).

T-11’s officer then entered the front door and followed E-22’s line until he came upon E-22’s officer, lineman, and T-11’s hook/ax man.

T-11’s driver and tillerman positioned their apparatus on Side 1 and began vertical ventilation by raising the aerial ladder to the roof. They opened two skylights and noted smoke from only one of the skylights. They then broke out the top floor windows by leaning over the roof’s edge and striking them with a tool, but no smoke came out of the second floor windows.
E-14, with Sergeant John M. Carter as the officer, arrived on the scene at approximately 0628 (arrival on scene not transmitted) and positioned their apparatus at the hydrant that supplied E-22. E-14’s crew was getting off the apparatus as E-22’s crew was entering the front entrance of the structure. Sgt. Carter ordered E-14’s lineman to take 200 feet of pre-connected 1-1/2" line from E-22. Sgt. Carter and E-14’s lineman donned their Scott 4.5 one-hour SCBA. Sgt. Carter and his lineman then entered the building to backup E-22. They followed E-22’s line around the Plexiglass security enclosure and turned to the right. Midway across the store, at approximately the same location that E-22 requested that their line be charged, E-14 stopped because they could see flames coming across the ceiling. The flames were described as lazily traveling across the ceiling from Side 3 toward Side 1. E-14’s lineman opened the nozzle and knocked down the flames. The nozzle was shut off because the flames had disappeared. During this time, Sgt. Carter had his hand on the lineman’s air cylinder and gave him the orders to open and close the nozzle.
E-24, the second due engine company, arrived on scene at 0625 hours, dropped a split-lay at the alley entrance and positioned their apparatus in the alley running south along Side 4 of the structure. E-11 picked up this supply line and completed the hose lay to the hydrant at the corner of Fifth and Kennedy Streets. E-24 then attempted to enter the structure through the rear basement door. A steep narrow outside stairwell led down to the basement entrance. A commercial air conditioning unit was positioned over the entrance, forcing fire fighters to crouch down to reach the landing at the bottom of the stairs. There was an exterior barred door as well as an interior door at the basement entrance. On the exterior door, there were 1” pipes inter-woven through the bars from the inside to the outside and then back through the bars to the inside. E-24’s crew believed these were natural gas pipes. Inside the barred door was an interior door made of wood on the bottom and metal on the top, and inset with an exhaust fan on the top half. At 0630, E-24’s officer notified Command that they could not gain access to the basement due to the security bars on the rear door.

Command requested a Special Alarm for an additional Truck company to assist with ventilation and other truck operations because T-11 and T-6 were assigned to shut off the gas service.

RS-2 arrived on the scene at 0628 hours and positioned the rescue squad on the northeast corner of Fourth and Kennedy Streets. At the front door, RS-2’s crew was met by the occupant who informed them that the building was unoccupied and that there was a fire in the basement. Command was not notified.

Typically, the Rescue Squad crew is divided into two search teams, with one team, Team B, going to the fire floor and the other team, Team A, going to the floor above the fire. Team A, consisting of RS-2’s officer and a fire fighter, remained on the fire floor because the building was known to be unoccupied. The two fire fighters from Team B entered the building through the front door and were quickly separated. One fire fighter from Team B followed E-14’s hose line and joined Sgt. Carter and E-14’s lineman, while the other member of Team B became lost in the smoke filled building. RS-2’s officer and the other Team A fire fighter were also quickly separated. The Team A fire fighter became disoriented and lost contact with other personnel for a couple of minutes, then came upon the second Team B fire fighter who was also alone. The two fire fighters joined together and exited through the front door.

At that time, RS-2’s driver attempted to use a rescue saw to cut open the plywood-covered windows of the first floor, but the saw malfunctioned. He then used a chain saw to remove the plywood on the storefront windows first on Side 2, then on Side 1.

The crew of T-6, the second due truck, attempted to cut the bars off the rear basement door with a rescue saw. At 0635, E-24 notified Command that E-24 was still unable to enter the basement from the rear. Command (Battalion Fire Chief-4) ordered E-24 to come around to the front and attempt to gain access to the basement from another entrance. E-24’s crew proceeded toward the front of the building attempting to locate another access to the basement. The reports of the delayed entry into the rear basement door prompted Command to request a Task Force Alarm.

Shortly after E-24 left the rear, a member from T-6 was able to open the bottom half of the basement door, but was unable to force open the top half of the door. It was later learned that the occupant had placed a metal bar across the door on the inside and had secured the bar into the brickwork with padlocks. A T-6 crew member crawled through the bottom of the door, encountering smoke, but no heat. He then moved in
approximately 5 feet and was stopped by a wall, compressors and BX cable that led from the basement floor to the ceiling, creating an entanglement danger. There did not appear to be any fire in that area of the basement at that time.

E-11, the fourth due engine company, was standing by in the rear of the building in the event that T-6’s crew successfully forced entry. When the T-6 crew member entered the basement, E-11’s crew started down the steps to enter the basement. E-11’s officer notified Command that E-11 had made it into the basement. A member of E-11 would later recall seeing smoke being drawn into the basement through the opening in the bottom half of the door. Command contacted E-24 and redirected them to back up E-11 in the rear of the basement.

T-6’s personnel then crawled back out of the basement and informed E-11 that it was not a viable entrance. E-11’s officer withdrew his crew and walked over to the Command Post to notify Command face-to-face that the rear basement door did not provide access into the basement. The exchange between E-11’s officer and Command was interrupted by radio traffic. The Incident Commander held up his hand for E-11’s officer to wait. E-11’s officer interpreted this signal as an acknowledgment of his statement; however, the Incident Commander had not heard E-11’s officer’s report.

The heat in the center portion of the grocery store was increasing. Sgt. Carter discussed the situation with both E-14’s lineman and the member of RS-2 who was with them. Sgt. Carter ordered his lineman to get down, but the heat at the floor level was even more intense. E-14’s lineman attempted to kneel on the hose line to prevent burns to his knees. When E-14’s lineman stood up again to knock down the flame, he felt burning as the heat penetrated his protective clothing. Sgt. Carter again ordered E-14’s lineman to get down. Sgt. Carter and the member of RS-2 discussed the situation and concluded that something was wrong. Sgt. Carter ordered E-14’s lineman to back out, pulling on the lineman’s air cylinder, and he ordered RS-2’s member to assist in repositioning the line. RS-2’s member turned around, picked up the hose, and began to walk out towards the front door. The hose line followed with no resistance.

It is believed that Sgt. Carter dropped through the first floor into the basement at this point. During the self-evacuation, E-14’s lineman became entangled in stock that had fallen into the aisles, and he had to turn around to free his feet. E-14’s lineman then felt a sudden, sharp tug on the line. At the same time, the hose line was pulled out of the hands of the RS-2 member. The RS-2 member could not relocate the hose to assist in his exit, and he became disoriented. Although he was only three feet from the front door, he did not see the exit. He was pulled to the outside by a fire fighter who reached into the building.

E-14’s lineman was disoriented and began to go back into the building. The officer from T-11, who had previously joined the entry team from E-22, found E-14’s lineman and directed him to the front door. At 0641 hours T-11’s officer radioed to Command

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**DETERIORATION OF CONDITIONS AND EVACUATION OF FIRST FLOOR CREWS**

E-11’s crew then stretched an 1-1/2” line from E-24 down the sidewalk along Side 1 to the front door. During this time, the crews of T-11 and RS-2 were removing the plywood covering the windows on the Fourth Street side. E-11 entered the store through the front door, but instead of following E-22’s and E-14’s lines, E-11 proceeded south along the Fourth Street side (Side 2), then turned right. E-11’s lineman stated that, at this location, the smoke was heavy but the heat was bearable. E-11 found a large hole in the floor and saw flames in this general area. When E-11’s crew opened their nozzle, they were unable to knock the fire down. The members of E-11 were only in the building a short time when they heard someone shouting, “Get out!” from the front door. E-11’s crew immediately backed their line outside.

The crews of T-11 and RS-2 then entered the building through the front door. As they advanced into the building, they encountered heavy smoke and a heavy fire. E-11’s officer notified Command that E-11 had made it into the basement. E-11’s officer later recall seeing smoke being drawn into the basement through the opening in the bottom half of the door. Command contacted E-24 and redirected them to back up E-11 in the rear of the basement.

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E-14’s lineman was disoriented and began to go back into the building. The officer from T-11, who had previously joined the entry team from E-22, found E-14’s lineman and directed him to the front door. At 0641 hours T-11’s officer radioed to Command
that he was with E-14, that there was extreme heat build-up, and that they were backing out. This radio transmission was partially muffled and was not understood by the Incident Commander. Radio traffic indicates the situation was deteriorating rapidly, however radio communications were difficult to follow. T-11’s officer then lifted his face piece and yelled to determine if anyone else was in the area. He heard no answer and exited the building.

The heat buildup in the area where E-22 was operating had become so intense that bottles and cans began to explode and floor tiles began to melt and pop loose from the floor. Yet, E-22’s crew saw only the lazy blue flames crossing the ceiling. E-22’s officer, prompted by the possibility of fire in the basement, a radio report of no basement access, and the extreme heat in the area, ordered E-22’s lineman and T-11’s hook/ax man to back out. As they backed out around the deli counter, stock from the shelves began to fall on them. An object, possibly a soda can, exploded, hitting T-11’s hook/ax man in the head. He yelled out and E-22’s officer assisted by directing him out of the building. While E-22’s officer was helping T-11’s hook/ax man out of the building, E-22’s lineman yelled that his foot had gone through the floor. E-22’s officer returned to assist E-22’s lineman in freeing his foot from the hole in the floor. E-22’s officer and lineman then rapidly exited the building.

All companies evacuated the building at about the same time, approximately 0641, with some personnel diving onto the sidewalk as steam came off their protective clothing. As personnel exited the building, a roll over occurred, and flames came out the front door filling the space between the ceiling and chest height. Since the ceiling height of the first floor was 12 feet, it is estimated the first floor was engulfed by an 8-foot wall of flame. Personnel outside the structure attempted to immediately remove the SCBAs from the fire fighters exiting the building, but the SCBA fasteners and harnesses were extremely hot. This occurred during the time period that command of the incident was transferred from Battalion Fire Chief-4 to the Deputy Fire Chief. Command was not notified of this self-evacuation and was unable to see the front door of the building due to apparatus positions and the location of the Command Post.

RS-2’s officer notified Command at 0642 hours that there was fire showing on the first floor and that the primary search was complete and negative. At 0643, Command requested a Special Alarm for the Haz Mat Unit to respond as a Rapid Intervention Unit because of the lack of progress reports from interior units. The units on the first Task Force Alarm were assigned to the second floor to cover the exposure in the fire building. Command then requested a second Task Force Alarm to refill the staging area.

Immediately after exiting, E-22’s officer took a head count of his personnel. After realizing Sgt. Carter was not with him, E-14’s lineman searched the exterior areas and notified E-22’s officer that Sgt. Carter had not exited the building. When questioned, E-14’s lineman indicated that their last location in the building was Quadrant C. Thinking that Sgt. Carter might have exited the building, personnel quickly searched outside the building. When the search outside the building failed to locate Sgt. Carter, E-22’s officer decided that E-22’s crew would attempt an interior rescue.

E-22’s driver had observed that the intensity of the smoke and fire was increasing, so he had pulled a 2-1/2” attack line and placed it by the front door. E-22’s officer and several other fire fighters made an aggressive rescue attempt, entering through the front door with the 2-1/2” attack line and a 1-1/2” attack line. The first group went to the right, encountered a hole in the floor and could not advance. The second group went straight and traveled the entire width of the first floor along Side 2. When the second group encountered a wall and attempted to turn right, they found a large
gaping hole in the floor. E-22’s officer later stated, “There wasn’t any floor there.” The second group attempted to sweep the area with their feet, but the floor was gone and their boots were dangling in mid-air. No further forward progress could be made, so the second group backed out.

At 0646, the Incident Commander (DFC) observed the conditions were changing rapidly with fire reported in the basement and on the first floor. He requested a Second Alarm.

While the rescue attempt was being made, Battalion Fire Chief-5 arrived on the scene and was assigned as the Interior Sector Officer at 0646 hours. He assumed a position at the building’s front door at 0648 hours. Interior Sector was not aware of the self-evacuation, Sgt. Carter’s missing status, or the rescue attempt.

Rescue Attempts - First Floor
At 0652, E-24’s officer radioed to Command that E-24 had made it into the basement. Command ordered E-4 to backup E-24. E-24’s crew had entered through a side door located on Side 1 near the northwest corner of the building and advanced down a very steep concrete ramp (approximately a 30-degree incline) which gave them the impression they had entered the basement. E-24’s crew was actually on the first floor behind the deli counter. E-24’s crew was hit by a 2-1/2” hose stream which came from the front door. They mistakenly believed the hose stream was coming through a hole in the first floor, so they requested that the line be shut down. This position was held until approximately 0700, when E-24 and E-4 were forced to back out. At 0700 hours both E-24 and E-4 notified Command that their personnel were out of the basement.

At 0655, Command asked Communications Division which units were dispatched for the Second Alarm assignment. However, since the initial request for a Second Alarm at 0646, Communications Division confused the request for the Second Alarm with a request for a Second Task Force. At 0656, Command again requested a Second Alarm and also requested a Special Alarm for an additional Rescue Squad to report to the rear of the building to assist in forcible entry. At 0657, Communications Division informed Command that an equivalent to a Third Alarm is being dispatched.

At 0657, Battalion Fire Chief-5 informed Command that Sgt. Carter was missing. Command made several attempts to contact Sgt. Carter by radio and asked if any unit on the scene was aware of his location.

Command questioned Communications Division as to who was dispatched as the Rapid Intervention Unit. The Haz Mat Unit had been requested 13 minutes prior, but had not reported to the Command Post. Communications Division had dispatched the Haz Mat Unit to the incident but did not give them the assignment. Communications Division then assigned E-9 from the Second Alarm to be the Rapid Intervention Unit and Command requested that E-9 be replaced on the Second Alarm.

At 0704, Command announced that the strategy was being changed to an exterior attack and that all units were to clear the building. Evacuation tones and air horns were sounded. The fire on the first floor was knocked down quickly by heavy streams and at 0708 Command directed that a rescue attempt be made through the front door. Two 4-member teams were formed, one to search and one to stand by as a back-up team. The Interior Sector Officer coordinated the entry. The entry search team advanced only a short distance before they found that the floor was burnt through. Since further progress was not possible, the search team backed out at 0712.

Command ordered that the exterior attack be resumed to extinguish the large fire in the basement. It was not until 50 minutes later that the flames were knocked down sufficiently to allow entry into the building. Command then directed crews to attempt another interior search. The team entered the storeroom door on Side 1, advanced down the ramp to approximately the middle of the grocery store, and stopped where the floor had collapsed into the basement. The search team then backed out. The building was deemed to be in an unsafe condition, and further entry was prohibited.

Sgt. Carter was found at 0830 hours when a Sergeant assigned to the Safety Office saw Sgt. Carter’s SCBA cylinder floating in the water-filled basement on the Fourth Street side (Side 2). Personnel used a chain saw to cut through the first floor and access the basement area where the SCBA cylinder had been seen. Sgt. Carter was lifted out of the basement and transported by Medic 17, with cardiopulmonary resuscitation in progress, to the Washington Hospital Center’s Med Star Unit. He was pronounced dead at 0852 hours.
BASEMENT PLAN

Suspected Area Where Sgt. Carter Fell

Glove

Point of Origin

Helmet
Radio
Body Found

Point of Fire Origin and Body Location - Basement
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<th>0621</th>
<th>0622</th>
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<td>Box Dispatched</td>
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<td>Fire at top of basements stairway...moderate heat...hot floor...heavy smoke.</td>
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### BC4

### DFC
- Responding.

### BC5
- Responding.

### E22
- Operating interior attack line.

### T11
- Second floor search... (no fire)... roof ventilation.
- Working on gas roofman.
- Lt. Brooks enters store.

### E24
- Coming to Front.
- Looking for basement access at front.

### E14

### E11
- At rear door.
- Made Entry to Basement.
- Unable to advance in Basement.
- Enters store with line.
- Exit from Store.

### T6
- Working on exterior ventilation & forcible entry.

### RS2

### T14
- Responding.

### E12

### E4
- On Scene.

### T12

### HMU
- Responding.

### N/C
- O/S In Command.

### BCS
- Disp 2nd TF BCS take Interior.
**FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT**

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**INTERIOR/EXTERIOR ATTACK**

- Heavy fire ground floor
- Evacuation started from front door
- Heavy fire in basement
- FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT EVACUATION INTERIOR/EXTERIOR ATTACK
- BC5 attack side
- Concern Basement
- Nobody in front door
- Holes in floor
- Size-up & 2nd alarm
- T14 & T12 to roof
- T9 to CP
- Kennedy Street Side
- E24 & E24 back-up E24 in rear
- E4, E24 & Squad get ready/BSMT

**EVACUATION**

- Evacuating personnel from inside
- Everybody outside now
- Waiting at front door
- Carter is missing
- Re-entry to search for Sgt. Carter
- Withdraw from interior
- In basement with fire
- Operating line at rear of ground floor
- Skylights open

**FIRE ABDICATION**

- Making entry Kennedy Street Side
- Exterior ventilation & forcible entry
- Going to roof
- Backup E24
- On the roof
Heavy Fire & Floor Collapse

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The purpose of investigating this incident is to identify and propose remedies to problems and deficiencies that occurred at the Kennedy Street incident in order to prevent reoccurrence. After conducting thorough research and more than 98 hours of interviews with members of the DC Fire and EMS Department, the Reconstruction Committee has identified five major areas of concern and developed recommendations in each of these areas. These areas are: accountability, command procedures, communications, operations, and safety.

The Reconstruction Committee concluded that Sergeant Carter fell through the floor into the basement while the interior crews were attempting to withdraw from the grocery store. The evidence indicates that Sergeant Carter was conscious after he fell into the basement. He moved from the location from which he fell and utilized all the air in his self-contained breathing apparatus. He also attempted to contact the Incident Commander to request assistance, but due to his malfunctioning radio, his transmissions were neither completed nor received.

Medical evidence, including normal carbon monoxide levels in his blood, indicated that Sergeant Carter did not remove his self-contained breathing apparatus facepiece as he ran out of air. This indicates that he was unconscious as his air supply ran out. There was no conclusive evidence of the time or cause of his loss of consciousness. Additionally, there was no evidence that his loss of consciousness was caused from a traumatic injury. The location of Sgt. Carter’s body and his personal equipment indicated that he moved to the Fourth Street side (Side 2) of the basement from the area where he landed after falling through the first floor.

The condition of his protective clothing and the location of burns to the body indicate that Sgt. Carter was face down while unconscious. He asphyxiated by drowning in water from fire streams which filled the basement during the course of fire fighting operations. The water entered Sergeant Carter’s facepiece through a break in the facepiece seal as he ran out of air and positive pressure in the facepiece was no longer maintained.

The Incident Commander was not advised that the interior attacking crews had been forced to evacuate the building or that several members had reentered the building in an attempt to rescue Sergeant Carter. Because of the mass confusion at the front entrance, the Incident Commander was not notified that Sergeant Carter was missing for approximately 14 minutes.

**Accountability**

**Problem:**

Although, some accountability checks were conducted informally at the company level, the required formal accountability checks were not done.
Recommendation:

The existing requirements for formal accountability checks should be increased and enforced. An accountability check must be required 10 minutes after command is established, and every 10 minutes thereafter. An accountability check should also be conducted whenever units have to evacuate and go to a defensive attack. Command will require branch and sector leaders to conduct accountability checks and communicate the results to the Incident Commander, along with the positions of units operating in the Sector. Being responsible for accountability will cause the branch/sector leaders to keep companies together and be more responsible for group safety.

In addition, the Department should consider the possibility of encouraging Sectors to give an accountability check each time they give progress reports to Command.

Currently, accountability roll call checks are required 30 minutes after the arrival of the first unit and every 20 minutes thereafter. Since most incidents are under control within 30 minutes, the checks are rarely done under the current system. As a result, few Chief Officers or companies are familiar with accountability checks. Requiring an initial 10-minute accountability check will increase familiarity with the tracking procedures and clearly demonstrate the importance that the Department places on accountability checks.

Pursuant to current Standard Operating Procedures, the Communications Division is required to make time announcements every 10 minutes, until the Incident Commander communicates that the incident is under control.

The Incident Commander has the total responsibility for accountability. If the roll call cannot be done by the Incident Commander, then he or she should assign this task to someone. This should be accomplished from the onset of the incident. Procedures must allow the Incident Commander to assign this task to either the Deputy Fire Chief’s Aide or the Safety Company assigned to the Working Fire dispatch. It is preferable to assign the roll call task to the Safety Company because it is certain that they will be on the scene. Accountability roll calls can be conducted by two members of the Safety Company while the remaining two members are responsible for scene safety.

Problem:

Department members and companies were “freelancing” on the fireground by not following established Standard Operating Procedures and the Incident Command System. Members were entering and leaving the building as individuals and operating on their own, rather than operating under the supervision of a company officer and under the direction of the Incident Commander.

Recommendation:

Any deviation from established Standard Operating Procedures and the Incident Command System must be brought to the attention of the Incident Commander immediately.

Company units must enter, work and leave the structure, hot zone, or other area of operations as a team. Company officers must enforce that members under their
command operate with their unit so that these members can be accounted for at all times. Routine usage of the Standard Operating Procedures and the Incident Command System as well as frequent accountability checks will require company officers to track the status of company members.

Company officers must ensure that company integrity is maintained. Engine Companies must enter together, work together and leave together as one team. Truck and Rescue Squad companies should operate in teams of 2 or more members.

**Problem:**

There were no means to visually identify officers (especially Sergeants) and members of a company operating on the fireground.

**Recommendation:**

Company unit designation stickers should be placed on helmets and kept current. New stickers should be purchased and distributed. The system must provide a means to identify an individual who is temporarily assigned to a company.

**Problem:**

This incident occurred at the change of a shift. Several fire fighters arrived at the fire ground, after being relieved, and simply went to work. Also, members of the oncoming shift reported to the fire ground and relieved off-going shift members without being assigned to do so. Many of these relieved members remained on the fire ground. All of these factors made accountability impossible.

**Recommendation:**

Enforce the current departmental rule that no one is relieved on the fire ground unless permission is received from the Incident Commander. If the Incident Commander gives permission for shift relief, members reporting to the incident scene must report directly to the Command Post, and Personnel Accountability Tags must be collected before oncoming shift members are assigned to any fireground functions.

**Problem:**

The Command Post was in a position that did not furnish the Incident Commander an adequate view of the building. An attempt was made to move the Command Post but apparatus placement prevented relocation.

**Recommendation:**

The Incident Commander must position the Command Post with an adequate view of the fire building. This decision must be made in consideration of placement of additional apparatus. The first consideration should be given to positioning to provide a clear view of the front entrance. As the incident evolves, relocation of the Command Post may be necessary.

A check-off box should be added to the tactical work sheet, to indicate the position of the Command Post, which will be used as part of the after fire critique.
Problem:

Not all required information was being recorded by Incident Commander.

Recommendation:

The Incident Commander must record assignments, progress reports and other pertinent information, in a standard format, on a tactical worksheet. The tactical worksheet should be a standard part of the transfer of command. The tactical worksheets must be mandatory for all working fires. After the incident the tactical worksheet must be submitted to the Deputy Fire Chief/FFD with an after action report. It must also be made part of every critique.

A diagram of the incident site must be available at the Command Post as soon as possible. The Incident Commander must delegate the task of gathering and recording information to a company or individual of his choice. The tactical worksheet and diagram must be given to the next Incident Commander when command is transferred.

Problem:

The Incident Commander handled most of the radio transmissions while, at the same time, attempting to manage the incident. As a result, he was overwhelmed with information.

Recommendation:

The position of Battalion Chief Aide must be restored immediately. This position should be at the rank of Captain to assure that the individual has the experience and authority to conduct the required tasks. Additionally, it could provide on-the-job training for Captains who may be promoted to Battalion Fire Chief. At an escalating incident, the Incident Commander must have assistance to handle radio communication, record information and maintain the command charts.

When the Deputy Fire Chief assumes command of an incident, the initial Battalion Fire Chief should be assigned to the position of Operations Officer. If the incident does not escalate, it may not be necessary to have an Operations Officer, however, the Incident Commander should be prepared for a large incident, rather than a small one.

Problem:

Each company on the fireground attempted to communicate directly with the Incident Commander, even when assigned to a sector. This required the Incident Commander to handle excessive radio and face-to-face communications. The Incident Commander’s span-of-control was excessive.

The information supplied in many cases was of poor quality and was not effectively communicated.

Recommendation:

Sectors must be established in the early stages of all emergency incidents. Routine use of sector assignments will reduce the risk of exceeding the span-of-control and increase Command competency in the use of sectors, allowing an easier transition if an incident requires additional resources.
After sectors have been established, the Incident Commander should communicate with Sector Officers who, in turn, are responsible for communicating with units under their command. If possible, communication within sectors should be conducted face-to-face.

Training in the use of the Incident Command System, the use of sectors and branches, and effective communications procedures is needed for all Department personnel. The Training Academy must conduct scheduled refresher training courses on an ongoing basis.

**Problem:**

The Incident Commander’s span-of-control was excessive. The command staff did not expand in proportion to the scale of the incident. There were 28 companies operating at the Kennedy Street fire with a command staff of two Battalion Fire Chiefs and a Deputy Fire Chief.

**Recommendation:**

The dispatch of additional units at an incident must also automatically trigger the dispatch of additional command staff. Sectors must be established to reduce the span of control. Sector Officers are responsible for personnel accountability for all companies and individuals operating in their sectors.

An additional Battalion Fire Chief must be assigned to each additional alarm to improve span-of-control and assist with coordination and safety. An additional Battalion Fire Chief should also be dispatched on a Working Fire Dispatch alarm or a Task Force alarm. The appropriate Battalion Fire Chief should continue to be dispatched on Special Operations Task Forces such as the Haz-Mat, Foam and Cave-In task forces.

To increase the number of Battalion Fire Chiefs available, the Department may call back off-duty Battalion Fire Chiefs or increase the number of Battalion Fire Chiefs on duty. Assigning two personnel in each Battalion Fire Chief’s vehicle, such as a Battalion Fire Chief and a Captain as an Aide would also expand the capability of command officers. During major incidents, additional Captains may be temporarily assigned as acting Battalion Chiefs.

**Problem:**

Transfers of command procedures were not followed.

**Recommendation:**

There must be a formal transfer of command. The existing Incident Command System requires that the officer assuming command must be briefed thoroughly on the status of the incident prior to assuming command. A higher ranking officer must not assume command until this process has been completed.
Problem:
The incremental requests for assistance during the early stages of the incident indicate an escalating situation. The lack of reports from interior companies did not provide the Incident Commander with adequate information to appropriately size-up the conditions and request sufficient resources in time to get ahead of the developing situation.

Recommendation:
Incident Commanders must request adequate resources early in the incident to address immediate tactical needs and to stage reserve apparatus and companies.

Task Force Alarms should be limited to one per incident. Subsequent requests for assistance should be in increments of full additional alarm assignments except when requests are for special units or to maintain a specified level of resources in the staging area.

The Incident Management System must be modified to incorporate this approach to requesting resources. Post-incident critiques must address the timing and adequacy of all additional alarm assignments.

Problem:
There are no procedures in place to notify the Incident Commander that a member is lost, in trouble, or seriously injured. The Incident Commander was not informed that Sergeant Carter was missing for approximately 14 minutes.

Recommendation:
“MAYDAY” procedures must be developed, implemented and incorporated into radio procedures. A MAYDAY radio transmission must have the highest priority on the radio. This universal code for distress will mean only one thing: A FIRE FIGHTER IS IN TROUBLE. When a MAYDAY transmission is made, only the unit sending the signal and Command are to be on the radio. The Incident Commander will then establish a Fire Fighter Rescue Sector which should be staffed by at least the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) and a Battalion Fire Chief to command.

The procedures must specify how supervisors, operators, and dispatchers are to recognize and manage high priority messages, as well as a MAYDAY call.

Problem:
Engine 14 was operating with a radio that had been reported as defective on the previous day. Sergeant Carter was unable to contact the Incident Commander to request assistance after he fell into the basement. More detailed information on Sgt. Carter’s radio is included in Appendix E.

Recommendation:
Every team working inside a structure must have a working portable radio and the capability to maintain contact with the Incident Commander. Companies with an inoperable portable radio must be placed out-of-service. There must be sufficient
radios available in the department to replace a defective radio. In the short term, the
Department should place a high priority on having all portable radios and batteries
professionally tested to determine their reliability and condition.

Spare portable radios should be placed in the Battalion Fire Chief and Deputy Fire
Chief vehicles to reduce the time needed to replace a unit.

There are obviously many problems with the old radios and batteries the Department
is currently using. Replacement radios are needed to maintain the essential reliability
of the radio system.

Additional research is needed to investigate the reliability of radios and the specific
problem that was noted with Sgt. Carter’s portable radio. This information must be
referred to the appropriate federal government agency. Any findings must also be
distributed to other emergency service organizations.

Problem:

Radio discipline during this incident, both on the fireground and by the
Communications Division, was poor.

Recommendation:

The Incident Command System must be implemented at every incident when Level
I staging is not implemented. Consistent use of the Incident Command System will
reduce radio traffic. Units should be assigned to Sectors, and Sector Officers should
communicate with the Incident Commander. This will reduce the number of radio
transmissions to the Incident Commander and allow more effective management of
the incident.

Standard terminology must be used in all radio transmissions, including transmissions
regarding strategic modes of operations, situation reports, unit identities, locations,
and emergency notification of imminent hazards. All Communication Division
supervisors, operators and dispatchers must receive initial and refresher training in
the Incident Command System, Standard Operating Procedures, Personnel
Accountability System, fire ground procedures, and standard terminology.

Problem:

The Incident Commander had to switch back and forth between Channel 1 and 4 to
communicate with the Communications Division and units operating at the incident.

There was excessive radio traffic generated by companies responding and going off
the air during the Kennedy Street fire. Units operating at a second incident, near the
Kennedy Street fire, initially used Channel 4. This resulted in messages unintentionally
being transmitted from one incident to the other.

The Incident Commander often missed Channel 4 transmissions when Channel 1 was
active. Fire Channel 1 (154.190MHz) and Fire Channel 4 (154.205MHz) are so close
in frequency that there is interference when either channel is operated on the
fireground.

Some units were unable to give progress reports during the incident, indicating that
the radio system is severely overloaded.
Recommendation:

All communications should be on the same radio channel, particularly during the early stages of the incident.

There must be a minimum separation of at least 25 MHz between channels.

Since the Department currently has the capability to use the 800 MHz frequencies, the Department should purchase 800 MHz portable radios for use by all units while on the fireground or at the scene of an incident. While on the fireground, the Incident Commander should then operate on only the 800 MHz frequency to both Communication Division and units on the fireground to avoid missing transmissions from either.

Each member operating on the fireground should have a portable radio.

To immediately reduce the interference problem experienced between Channels 1 and 4, Channel 2 should replace Channel 4 as fire ground channel.

Consideration should be given to having companies wait until the Communication Division calls them to acknowledge their response. Also, having companies go off the air by utilizing land-line telephone should assist in reducing radio transmission traffic on Channel 1.

Mobile and portable radios must be equipped with an emergency button that will transmit a tone alert signal on all channels; 800 MHz radios have this feature. The signal alerts all personnel that a priority or “MAYDAY” message is about to be transmitted.

Problem:

Companies did not provide status reports during the 12 minutes that they were operating inside the structure. Additionally, the Incident Commander never asked for progress reports. Confusion on the fireground caused a 14-minute delay in notifying Command after it was apparent to several individuals that Sergeant Carter was missing.

Recommendation:

Personnel must use the Incident Command System at every incident. The Incident Command System requires that units operate cohesively within Sectors and provide progress reports to Incident Command through the Sector Officers. Sectors operating within the interior of the building should give progress reports at least every 5 minutes. If progress reports are not received, the Incident Commander should request them.

Problem:

There were delays and confusion in dispatching requests for additional resources and alarm assignments.
**Recommendation:**

Communication Division must dispatch all alarm requests from the Incident Commander promptly.

After assigning units, the Communications Division must inform the Incident Commander of the units that are responding. This will enable the Incident Commander to keep track of the companies or direct approaching units to a specific assignment.

It can not be overemphasized that all members of Communications Division be provided continuous and scheduled training on the Standard Operating Procedures, the Incident Command System and the Personnel Accountability System.

**Problem:**

Mutual aid units responding from Montgomery County had to go directly to the Command Post to receive face-to-face instructions from the Incident Commander because radio frequencies of mutual aid fire departments are not compatible with the Department.

**Recommendation:**

Mutual aid units responding into the District of Columbia should be equipped with a fireground channel, to allow communication with the Command Post while en route to the incident. This must also be considered in the configuration of the 800 MHz system.

Consideration should be given to having all outside mutual aid units initially provide fire station coverage while DC units are committed to long duration incidents. When used at emergencies, mutual aid units must be able to function within the DC Fire and EMS Department’s Standard Operating Procedures, Incident Command System and Personnel Accountability System. Mutual aid units must be trained, equipped and staffed to meet these requirements. If they cannot, they should not be used for mutual aid assignments within the District of Columbia.

Accordingly, all mutual aid agreements should be reviewed by the Department and specific modifications established in accordance with this recommendation.

**Problem:**

The location of the fire was unknown to the Incident Commander for an extended period of time. The fire initially appeared to be in quadrant C or D on the ground floor. Several individuals soon recognized or observed indications that the fire was actually in the basement. However, this information was never transmitted to the Incident Commander.

The attack plan was not modified to account for the basement fire. Progress reports were sporadic and, for the most part, omitted any recommendations. There was little communication between companies, between companies and Sector Officers, or between Sector Officers and Command.
Recommendation:
The Incident Commander must obtain information about the location and extent of the fire and the progress, or lack of progress, being made by the companies working inside a building. Significant observations must be reported immediately. If sectors do not provide adequate information, the Incident Commander must ask for reports.

Problem:
There was confusion with some companies at the scene as to which side of the building was Side 1.

Recommendation:
If the building faces more than one street, the Incident Commander must clearly and immediately designate Side 1.

Problem:
Although the number of units on scene was the equivalent of a Third Alarm, the Planning and Logistics Officers positions were never assigned.

Recommendation:
When an incident reaches the equivalent of a Third Alarm, or sooner if needed, the Incident Commander should assign a Planning Officer and a Logistics Officer.

Problem:
Battalion Fire Chief-5 was assigned as the interior sector, but was never aware of the companies in the sector and the companies were not aware of his presence as the interior sector leader. An effective sector was never established.

Recommendation:
Sectors must be established from the beginning of the incident. All sector leaders must know what companies are in their sector and their assignment. When additional alarm chiefs are assigned to a sector, they should relieve the existing sector leader.

Problem:
The Incident Commander was not provided with critical information. The Incident Commander was not told:

- The building was unoccupied,
- The fire was in the basement,
- The interior companies were forced from the building, or
- A fire fighter was missing.

In fact, there was a 14 minute delay between the time it was known a fire fighter was missing and when the Incident Commander was notified.
Recommendation:

The Incident Commander must be informed of all significant information by company officers and sector leaders. Incident Commanders must recognize that fires in nonresidential structures present great risks to interior fire fighting forces. Activities that present significant risks to the safety of members must be limited to situations in which there is the potential to save an endangered life.

When offensive operations cannot quickly control the fire, particularly when the fire’s location is in doubt, strong consideration should be given to changing to a defensive operation. This philosophy must be incorporated in all emergency operations.

Problem:

On fires that appear to be routine, the Department does not enforce the existing Standard Operating Procedures or effectively utilize the Incident Command System and the Personnel Accountability System.

Recommendation:

The Department must use the same Standard Operating Procedures, Incident Command System and Personnel Accountability System at all fires. There cannot be one operation for “routine” fires and another for “major” fires.

Problem:

The effectiveness of truck company operations is limited by the reduction of crews to four personnel and the lack of coordination among crew members and between crews when multiple tasks must be accomplished simultaneously. Truck officers were heavily involved with hands-on work rather than supervising units. Due to the considerable tasks dictated by this emergency, truck company officers on the initial assignment did not team-up with their crew member as required by current SOPs. Additionally, truck company operations vary among truck companies, shifts, and geographical areas of the city.

Recommendation:

Truck company staffing must be restored to five members. This would improve truck operations including search and rescue, ventilation, laddering the building, utility control, setting up lights, and other required operations and tasks. With a staffing level of five, the officer would have the ability to coordinate the tasks of his or her crew and account for individual members. Additionally, the officer is able to assess and communicate situations to the Sector Officer and/or the Incident Commander.

Re-evaluate the current truck company SOPs to determine their effectiveness, efficiency, and safety. Revise and enforce Standard Operating Procedures to ensure that truck operations are standardized for all truck companies and across all shifts. All personnel must be properly trained for their positions. “Back to Basics” training for all suppression units could help in addressing this issue.
Problem:

Interior conditions (zero visibility and increasing heat) indicated an urgent need for ventilation. However, the status of ventilation tasks was neither verified by interior engine companies and understaffed truck companies nor was it transmitted to the Incident Commander. Venting of the plywood-covered openings was slow, in part, because the truck companies are understaffed. Conducting truck operations with four members significantly slows the work and increases the physical stress on the crew. Also, inoperable power saws delayed this operation.

The deteriorating conditions caused the situation to become critical, requiring a rapid and uncoordinated retreat. Due to the lack of visibility, no one observed that Sergeant Carter fell through the floor.

Recommendation:

The Incident Commander, prior to committing resources, must be aware of truck company limitations, especially with reduced staffing.

Additionally, equipment checks must be performed at the beginning of each shift. Malfunctioning equipment must be placed out-of-service immediately and reported to the Battalion Fire Chief and Fleet Maintenance. The Battalion Fire Chief must immediately determine if the company remains in-service. An entry must be made in the company journal regarding any malfunctioning equipment.

A Repair/Replacement schedule should be established and maintained by each affected company and Fleet Maintenance. Fleet Maintenance should have in stock adequate spares to replace defective or malfunctioning equipment.

Problem:

Fire fighters do not learn from previous incidents because fires are not routinely critiqued.

Recommendation:

All working Box Alarms and greater should be critiqued. This would allow members to quickly identify early indications of problems with tactics, procedures, or equipment. A system for holding critiques and distributing results to line fire fighters must be developed, thus allowing members to learn from the positive and negative actions of each incident. The objective of these critiques should be to improve operational effectiveness based upon shared experience.

Problem:

The Walter Reed Fire Department was requested on a Special Alarm through the present mutual aid agreement. A Walter Reed truck company was requested to aid in venting the building. The unit did not respond due to insufficient staffing. The Communications Division did not notify the Incident Commander of the delay in filling the assignment with a substitute truck company.
Recommendation:

If the Walter Reed Fire Department, as well as the Naval District of Washington Fire Department, are to be routinely dispatched as automatic mutual aid companies, they must keep the DC Fire and EMS Communication Division informed of their status.

Mutual aid units must be fully staffed, trained, and adequately equipped before they can be dispatched. The Department’s mutual aid agreements with the Walter Reed Fire Department, the Naval District of Washington Fire Department and all local jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia must be reviewed to assure that they can provide proper coverage and/or assistance when requested.

Problem:

The EMS Supervisor failed to report to the Command Post.

Recommendation:

The Incident Command System requires the EMS Supervisors to report to the Command Post for assignments. This procedure must be enforced.

Problem:

The majority of Department members interviewed reported not having activated their PASS devices before entering the building, which is against department policy. Furthermore, Sergeant Carter’s PASS device had not been activated when his body was recovered.

Recommendation:

Company and Chief Officers must insist that all personnel manually activate their PASS devices at all alarms when SCBA are used, as required by Standard Operating Procedures.

The Department should purchase SCBA units with integrated PASS devices. With integrated units, the PASS device is activated automatically when the SCBA is turned on. The PASS devices now in use by the Department do not meet the revised NFPA standard and are no longer being produced.

Problem:

The lens of Sergeant Carter’s self-contained breathing apparatus separated from the face-seal at the top left corner and along the right vertical side of the facepiece. His facepiece had not been retrofitted with the required lens retaining clips.

When tested by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Sergeant Carter’s self-contained breathing apparatus failed to meet the positive pressure requirements of federal standards, including 29 CFR 1910.156 and 42 CFR Part 84. Even though the unit failed to maintain the required positive pressure, NIOSH found that there was sufficient airflow to the facepiece to support moderate breathing requirements.
Furthermore, in certain positions the elbow fitting connecting the low pressure hose to the regulator allowed a small but constant flow of air into the facepiece. The constant air leak could have reduced the duration of the air supply. More detailed information on Sgt. Carter’s self-contained breathing apparatus is included in Appendix E.

**Recommendation:**

The SCOTT-O-VISTA facepiece has been required to be retrofitted with lens retaining clips by the manufacturer and NIOSH since May 1989. This retrofit was necessary to maintain the integrity of the bond between the lens and face-seal, especially at elevated temperatures.

All SCOTT-O-VISTA facepieces that are not retrofitted with the proper lens retaining clips must be removed from service and retrofitted immediately.

The Department must review the current policies and procedures for inspection and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatus. All policies and procedures must be in compliance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and should comply with federal OSHA regulation 29 CFR 1910.134, NFPA 1404, *Standard for a Fire Department Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Program* and NFPA 1500, *Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program*.

**Problem:**

During non-business hours the Safety Officer must respond from home, creating a long delay before arriving at an incident. The Safety Officer arrived approximately forty-five minutes after the first arriving units reported on the scene.

**Recommendation:**

Assign Safety Officer on a 24-hour duty status. Training must be provided for each individual. There must be a job description and requirements in place for this position before this is accomplished.

**NOTE:** On April 20, 1998 the DC Fire and EMS Department staffed the Safety Officer Position on a 24-hour basis.

**Problem:**

In the low light conditions, with low visibility, many members either operated without hand lights or relied on others to be able to see. This is a very dangerous practice and should not be allowed to continue.

**Recommendation:**

A personal light must be issued to each member. All new apparatus should be ordered with rechargeable hand lights, as backups, should personal lights malfunction or be damaged during fireground operations.
**Problem:**

Sergeant Carter was rendered unconscious, by a non-traumatic event, prior to exhausting the air supply in his SCBA. The physical examination received by Sergeant Carter, three months prior to his death, failed to detect any pre-existing medical conditions.

**Recommendation:**

Fire fighting activities are very demanding. Physically and medically fit personnel have a greater chance of surviving the hostile fire environment. The Department should consider implementing a comprehensive wellness and fitness program in conjunction with medical and physical examinations. The IAFF/IAFC Fire Service Joint Labor Management Wellness-Fitness Initiative is an appropriate model to implement. The Department should establish a Labor/Management Committee to address this issue.

1. The Department must develop a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) Standard Operating Procedure. A RIT unit must be dispatched with Working Fire dispatches. Companies assigned to this task (preferably Truck Companies or Rescue Squads) must be properly trained and equipped. This is required in federal OSHA regulations, 29 CFR 1910.134, and NFPA 1500, *Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program*.

2. The Committee recommends that the Department purchase thermal imaging equipment and place a unit on each of the Rescue Squads. At the Kennedy Street fire, thermal imaging devices could have alerted the units that the thermal layers on the first floor were changing prior to the heat build up. It could have also alerted the units that there was a fire in the basement because the image would have revealed heat traveling through the floor. Also, the location of holes in the floor would have been seen through the thick smoke. Thermal imaging devices could have been helpful in locating Sergeant Carter or, possibly the hole through which he fell.

3. The Department must develop a standard operating procedure for the investigation of the death or serious injury of fire fighter. The procedure should designate committee members by position prior to an incident. Outside experts should be included for objectivity. The committee must be formed immediately after an incident and complete the investigation and report as soon as feasible to assist department members and families with closure and ensure safety of future operations. The committee should issue monthly progress reports. A complete final report should be completed within 90 days. A small staff must be assigned to the committee to assist in meeting these deadlines. For example, secretarial support can be used to transcribe radio recordings. The department must also develop a “Go Bag” with all the information needed to preserve the scene of incident. The International Association of Fire Fighters has developed a fire fighter fatality and serious injury investigation program and manual. The Department should establish a joint labor/management committee to implement such a program.
4. If it appears a heavy-duty exterior attack will be ordered, the Incident Commander should establish a Water Supply Sector.

5. Training must reinforce current Standard Operating Procedures regarding the special hazards in basement fires with no outside entrance and the risk to fire fighters during such incidents.

6. Members temporarily detailed to Rescue Squads often lack the proper training to function effectively in this role. The Department must specify minimum qualifications required before members can be detailed to a rescue squad. Rescue Companies without adequately trained staff must be immediately placed out-of-service. The Department should consider cross-training members of engine companies that are housed together with the Rescue Squads.

7. The Department must install Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) in all Battalion Fire Chief and Deputy Fire Chief vehicles. Information from the Communication Division can then be sent directly to the Incident Commander, thus reducing radio traffic while confirming that the Incident Commanders requests for assistance are being met.

8. The air supply units must have a hand cart to assist in moving the air bottles to the scene. The air unit should be placed as close to the incident as possible without interfering with fire fighting operations.

9. The Department should procure battery chargers for portable radios that can be located on apparatus and will accommodate radios with handy-talk microphones. This would assure that the portable radio is fully charged and always on the apparatus when the company leaves quarters.

10. The Department should consider funding a pilot program to test Exit Devices and other safety devices. These devices can provide members operating in the buildings interior with audio and visual aids if they have to evacuate the building in case of an emergency.

11. The Field Command Unit must have a better response time to assist in organizing the command post operations. The unit should be dispatched to any incident greater than a Box Alarm.

12. First due companies should maintain current pre-fire plans on all major buildings within their first due response area. Preplans of commercial and business establishments must reflect a thorough understanding of the structure. While a preplan would not necessarily have been done for the Kennedy Street fire, it is doubtful that good information would have been available if it had been a major building. Fire Prevention and Informative Inspection polices must be enforced. If possible, smaller buildings, such as this corner grocery store should also be given consideration for preplanning.
13. The DC Fire and EMS Department, Fire Prevention Division does not have policies or procedures to ensure that all violations of the Fire Prevention Code are remedied or that significant information about occupancies is provided to emergency responders. The Fire Prevention Division must revise its policies to ensure that these deficiencies are corrected.

It is vital that the highest levels of the Department support these recommendations and provide the leadership that will result in cultural changes throughout the organization. It is difficult to change old habits. The Reconstruction Committee understands that the Department has traditionally utilized an organizational culture to help fire fighters build and maintain knowledge of their work environment. New procedures and policies must be incorporated into that culture and vigorously enforced for change to work.

The Reconstruction Committee recommends that the Fire Chief appoint an Implementation Committee which will be charged with making the necessary changes. This group should be given a deadline for completion of the project.

Implementation has many facets:

- Developing or modifying procedures
- Training
- Enforcing of existing policies
- Involving other divisions

The Implementation Committee’s final report to the Fire Chief should be submitted within one year after this report is issued to document progress and changes made to improve the performance of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department.

The Reconstruction Committee believes that Sergeant Carter, his family, the members of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, and the citizens we protect deserve no less.
Appendix A

DC Fire and EMS Department’s Standard Operating Procedures Incident Command System and Personnel Accountability System
This appendix includes those relevant sections of the Washington DC Fire and EMS Department’s Standard Operating Procedures, Incident Command System and Personnel Accountability System. The items that are omitted from this report are noted below.

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Positioning Apparatus
Fireground Radio Communications
Exposure Designations and Coverage
*Elevator Operations* (not included)
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Policy
General Engine Company Operations
Staging
Safety for Engine Companies
Fire on 1st or 2nd Floor in Row or Detached Dwellings with Exposed Floors Above
Fire on Top Floors (not attic) of Row Houses and Detached Dwellings
Attic and Cockloft Fires
Basement Fires in Row and Detached Buildings
Rear Porch Fires
High Rise Apartment and Office Building Fires
Fall Back Position within a High Rise Building
Abandon Building Procedures
Heavy Duty Operations
General Truck Company Operations
*Hazardous Materials Standard Operating Procedures* (not included)

SECTION II INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

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Primary Features of the Incident Command System
The Five Major Functions of the Incident Command System
Companies Operating on Fires and Other Emergencies
Sector Accountability
Sector Leader Responsibilities
Communications
Command Procedures
Establishing Command
Transfer of Command
Working Fire Dispatch
Calling for Assistance
Staging
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Conclusion
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*Terrorist Attacks* (not included)
SECTION III PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM

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Purpose
Scope
Definitions
System Components
Unit Designator Card
Chief Officer’s Command Board
Make—Up PAT
Responsibility
Implementation
Levels of Accountability
Compliance
SECTION I
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

RESPONDING

Response to alarms shall be made by companies when they receive the alarm over the Vocalarm or telephone. Companies will be dispatched in the order in which they are due on the box alarm assignment.

Companies operating by radio shall not respond to alarms unless directed by the Communications Division.

Company officers shall insure that all members are seated in the jump seats before responding (if not equipped with a crew cab). All members are responsible for using seat belts while vehicle is in motion.

Before responding, officers should check with drivers so that both know the address and the position due. If there is a doubt verify with the Communications Division.

First due units that are responding from locations where they cannot arrive first shall promptly change their position due.

POSITIONING APPARATUS

The first due engine should layout and assume a position in the front of the building allowing room for the truck company.

If it is known that the truck company will enter the block from the opposite direction as the first due engine, the engine should stop short of the building.

Engines responding to rear positions should leave room for truck companies. Hoses will bend, ladders will not.

Engines and rescue squads should leave room for truck companies to remove ground ladders from the rear of the apparatus.

Responding rescue squads shall not block companies.

FIREGROUND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

The first arriving unit in the front of a building or incident site will give a size-up report to Communications on Fire Channel 1 and then switch to the Fireground Channel for all subsequent fireground communications.
Example: (Fire Channel 1) “Engine 1 (first due) on the scene side 1 of a three story brick detached apartment building, ordinary construction, with heavy smoke showing from one window on the second floor, side 1, quadrant A”.

At this time, all responding units will monitor the Fireground Channel to hear reports between units on the scene and the responding battalion chief. The responding units will be aware of the fireground situation before arrival. Also, responding units shall monitor the Fireground Channel for it’s possible that they may be contacted by the battalion chief or a “Sector Leader” for assignment prior to arrival on the fireground.

The first arriving unit in the rear of a building or incident site will give the required size-up report to Communications on the Fireground Channel.

Example: (Fireground Channel) “Engine 2 (second due) on the scene side 3, fire showing from a second floor window, quadrant B”.

The Fireground Channel is an informal radio channel to report what you see, what you don’t see and what you think. It is to be used for fireground communications between units, between units and sector leaders, and between sector leaders and the Incident Commander (“COMMAND”).

On large, complex incidents, Fire Channel 5 can be utilized among the Incident Command Staff.

Radio communications between EMS units will be conducted on 800 MHz channels, as per established procedures.

Except in cases of emergency, all communications from the incident site to Communications on Fire Channel 1, exclusive of layout information and the first arriving unit’s size-up report will be made by the Incident Commander.

Units dispatched to an incomplete or incorrect address shall give correct information on Fire Channel 1 for the use of other responding units.

Examples:

1. The corrected address is 2622 13th Street, N.W.
2. The fire is on the odd side of the 1600 block of Monroe Street, N.W.
3. The fire is on the N.W. corner of 14th and Girard Sts. N.W.

The first company arriving on the scene gives a complete “size-up” report including any possible life or rescue problems.

Example: “Engine 11 on the scene, side 1, with a 3-story row brick, ordinary construction, fire showing on the top floor and a report of people trapped.”

If the first arriving company does not give a complete “size-up” the next arriving company is responsible for giving the necessary “size-up” report, but in every case, the first unit to arrive in the
rear of an address shall report what is observed from that location, even if the report is “nothing evident”, as this may assist in determining the location or extent of a fire problem when combined with other reports.

Report all known or possible life problems. Examples:

1. “People are evacuating the building.”
2. “People are at the windows.”
3. “People are on the balconies.”

While any single report may not be significant, multiple reports may indicate a rescue problem.

Report when assistance is needed and what is needed. Examples:

1. “Engine 12 to Command, we need a back up line”
2. “Engine 10 to Engine 8, we need help extending our line”.
3. “Truck 9 to Command, we need another truck for ventilation”.
4. “Truck 1 to Truck 2, we have rescues in front, open the roof”.
5. “Rescue Squad 2 to Command, we need another unit for searching”.

Examples of Informal size-up reports:

1. “It smells like trash”.
2. “There is an electrical odor”.
3. “We have heavy smoke”.
4. “Nothing found, we are checking”.
5. “I think we have an apartment off”.

It is better to report a possible condition immediately than a confirmed report later (but do both).

If upon reaching the reported fire floor, you find no smoke or odor, notify Command. It is obvious to you what the conditions are, but Command doesn’t know if you’re crawling down the hall or looking for an apartment number. This is an example of reporting what you don’t see.

If you are to check the top floor of a building and work your way down, checking for smoke conditions, report the conditions on the top floor as soon as you know. Other floors can be grouped.
Do not wait until all floors are checked to give a report. Examples:

1. “Truck 2 to Truck 1, the top floor, number 9, has light smoke” (always report the number of the top floor)

2. “Truck 1 to Command, floors 6, 7, and 8 are clear”.

If you are assigned as the “Exposure Sector Leader”, notify Command as soon as you complete each primary check. If you are assigned to the Exposure Sector, notify the Exposure Sector Leader of each primary check of exposures. In either case, give progress reports at least every ten (10) minutes.

It is the company officer’s responsibility to report their location and progress to their sector leader or Command. Command should not have to ask for status reports.

Sector leaders will report the status of all units in their sector. Example: “Engine 1 to Command, Engine 1 and Engine 2 are attacking the fire, and appear to be making progress”.

Always report to Command or your sector leader when you change position or function, or if you leave the building for air, breaks, etc.

Notify Command or your sector leader when you complete your assignment and are available for another.

After the fire is knocked down:

1. Notify Command. Example: “Engine 22 to Command, fire appears to be knocked down”.

2. Keep SCBA on.

3. Vent the area.

4. Always check and report on:
   a. Ceilings
   b. Ducts.
   c. Attic.
   d. Walls.
   e. Smoke conditions on all floors.

**BE SURE:** If you do not know all the above, call in what you do know.

Before notifying Command that you can handle it alone or with the truck, consider the rest of the building. The fact that you have trash in the basement with little smoke doesn’t mean that there is no smoke on the upper floors. Always be sure of conditions throughout the building before returning units. Example: “We have trash in the basement and can handle it with the truck, but we don’t know about the smoke conditions on the upper floors”.

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When reporting that you can handle a situation, be specific. Examples:

1. “Engine 1 can handle it with Truck 1.”
2. “We can handle it with Truck 1 only.”
3. “We can handle it alone.”
4. **NOT:** “We can handle it”.

It is imperative that companies perform their duties as described in the Standard Operating Procedures unless directed by, or with notification to, and approval of, the Incident Commander.

When emergencies arise making it necessary to deviate from Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or directives, company officers shall take action and report that they are not doing what they are normally expected to do. The Incident Commander can then have another unit cover the assignment. Example: “Engine 4 to Command, we are unable to back up attack. We are involved in a rescue on the first floor rear, quadrant C”.

**Typical Working Fire Radio Sequence**

After layout information is given on Fire Channel 1:

- “Engine 1 on the scene, side 1, of a two story row brick, ordinary construction, with heavy smoke showing from the second floor, quadrant A” (Fire Channel 1).
- “Engine 2 on the scene in the rear with fire showing 2nd floor, quadrant B.” (Fireground Channel)
- “Engine 4 to Command, we’re on the scene, 4th due.”
- “Command to Engine 4, take command of the Exposure Sector and cover exposure 4. The fire is in quadrant B, second floor of the fire building. Engine 2 is covering exposure 2.”
- “Engine 2 to Command the basement is clear. We’re covering exposure 2.”
- “Command to Engine 2, Engine 4 is your Exposure Sector Leader”.
- “Engine 2 OK”.
- “Engine 2 to Engine 4, the 1st floor of exposure 2 is clear. We are covering the second floor. Heavy smoke”.
- “Roof team to Truck 1. The hatch is open, heavy smoke is coming out. Both sides look OK”.

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• “Rescue Squad 1 to Command, primary search complete. Results negative”.
• “Truck 1 to Truck 2 we’ve got the fire floor, check below for salvage operations”.
• “Truck 2 to Truck 1, we’re throwing covers on the first floor, there is a lot of water”.
• “Engine 2 to Engine 4, exposure 2 cockloft has heavy smoke but no heat”.
• “Engine 4 to Command, exposure 4 has only light smoke. Exposure 2 has heavy smoke but no heat”.
• “Engine 1 to Command, fire appears knocked down, checking overhead”.
• “Rescue Squad 1 to Command, secondary search complete. Results negative”.
• “Truck 1 to Command, electricity has been cut off”.
• “Engine 1 to Command, sending Engine 3 out for a break”.
• “Command to Rescue Squad 1, come out for a break also”.
• “Engine 4 to Command, exposure 4 is clear”.
• “Command to all units, Drager results negative. ‘All clear’. OK to take masks off”.
• “Truck 2 to Truck 1, 1st floor’s covered, basement OK”.
• “Truck 1 to Command, no extension”.
• “Engine 4 to Command, exposures 2 and 4 clear”.

**Portable Radios**

On the fireground report any portable radio problems immediately to Command. Examples:

• No radio,
• No Roof Team radio,
• Reception/transmission problems, etc.
EXPOSURE DESIGNATIONS AND COVERAGE

Normally, side 1 of a structure will be the address (street) side. Facing side 1 of the structure, sides 2, 3, and 4 are numbered in a clockwise manner.

**Interior Quadrants**

Interior quadrants are identified by a standard identification system to show portions of a fire building. Utilizing interior quadrants allows the exact fire location to be identified and assists in determining magnitude. It also greatly enhances rescue efforts and improves personnel safety. Better knowledge of the location of the fire or other emergency is important to every sector working on the incident.

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<th>QUADRANTS</th>
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Company officers shall report the quadrant in their radio transmissions. Examples:

1. “Fire showing top floor quadrant B.”

2. “We have a room off in quadrant C”.

3. “We have located several trapped civilians, 3rd floor, quadrant D, need assistance”.
Exposure Designations

Smoke is showing from Side 4 not Exposure 4

This is Exposure 3 NOT Side 3
SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS POLICY

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices shall be promptly placed in service for smoke, electrical fires, hazardous materials incidents, or unknown odors located inside or outside structures.

During mask operations, Drager readings will be taken as quickly as possible. Following the Drager tests, Command will notify all units that either:

1. The atmosphere is “all clear” or;
2. Continue to keep SCBA and facepieces on because of the hazardous atmosphere.

For safety and protection of all members, SCBA and facepieces will not be removed until the “all clear” has been broadcast.

Insulation in ceilings, walls and around pipes should be considered to contain asbestos. When opening up these areas or handling this material in an overhaul operation, SCBA will be worn.

It is the personal responsibility of each member to comply with the SCBA policy. Command officers shall insure compliance.
GENERAL ENGINE COMPANY OPERATIONS

Engine companies shall operate as one team towards achieving the goals of rescues, water supply, exposure protection, and extinguishment. In general engine companies perform rescues by placing their hoselines in a position to protect rescue operations, and/or by extinguishing the fire. RECEO, an acronym coined by author Lloyd Laymon, stands for Rescue, Exposure protection, Confinement, Extinguishment, and Overhaul. These functions, in the order listed, along with salvage and ventilation, are the priorities that should be considered to successfully mitigate fire situations.

When an engine company is operating on the fireground the pump operators shall remain with the apparatus.

Command shall be notified of any water supply problem right away. An engine company may back up their first line with a second line, if necessary, provided both lines are operating together in the same attack area and under the direct control of the officer in charge of that company. Engine companies will operate as one team in one location.

The first and second due engine companies shall hook up to the standpipe and/or sprinkler system if equipped. Charge system when ordered, or if there are indications of fire. (See Pump Manual for proper pressure information). Pre-planned buildings and Metro Incidents will require additional engine companies to make connections to these systems.

Companies shall not go blindly to the reported fire floor. Use judgement. Smoke will usually rise up, not seek lower areas. Check lower floors as the line is advancing up stairways.

Backup hose lines

Most fires can be extinguished with one hose line. However, it is a good practice to back up the first attack line with a second company’s attack line to the same position. The backup line provides protection for the initial attack line crew, increases knockdown power, and is insurance against burst lines and other problems that may arise.

Fires in large buildings, or of such magnitude that two lines will not control the fire, require strict adherence to the Standard Operating Procedures. Effective communication between companies and the Incident Commander will increase safety for all members.

Exposure Coverage - Row House

When a company is assigned to check both exposures, they work as one team, staying together and checking each exposure in turn. The company shall:

1. Check the exposure in fire quadrant first. (Consider: hose line, ceiling hook, halligan bar, and stepladder.)
2. Report conditions to Command. If the situation is not critical in the first exposure checked, proceed to the other exposure.

3. Give periodic progress reports (at least every ten (10) minutes) and remain covering exposures.

**First Due Engine Company Operations**

First due engine companies will layout and take a position in the front of the building leaving room for truck companies.

Give a complete size up report on Fire Channel 1. Information contained in this size up report will be:

1. Hydrant information, laid out from, split lay, or unit has own hydrant (soft sleeve connected to hydrant or laid out with 4" hose).
2. Engine ( ) on the scene,
3. Side 1,2,3,4,
4. Height (in stories),
5. Type of building and occupancy,
6. Type of construction,
7. Fire location with quadrant A, B, C, D, E.

Example: “Engine 6 laid out at 4th and H Sts. NW. On the scene, side 1 of a 2 story row house, ordinary construction, fire showing first floor quadrant A.” (This report is on Fire Channel 1.)

Example: “Engine 16 laid out in the middle of the 1000 block of Ninth St. NW, on the scene, side 1 of an 8 story brick apartment building, fire resistive, smoke showing fourth floor quadrant D.”

Charge supply line as soon as possible. Hook up to the standpipe and/or sprinkler system if equipped. Charge system when ordered, or if there are indications of fire. Advance pre-connected line and or standpipe packs into building to attack fire.

Preliminary reports from companies to the Incident Commander are critical for tactical deployment of companies. For example, “Engine 11 to Battalion 4 the fire is in apartment 920 and the ninth floor is full of smoke”. This information assists the Incident Commander in the direction of companies for tasks of search and rescue, exposure protection, fire attack and extinguishment, ventilation, salvage and overhaul.
Give Command a report if necessary of any changing conditions. For Example:

1. “Engine 6 to Command, we have a report of people trapped on the second floor.”
2. “Engine 3 to Command, the fire is extending into Exposure 2.”
3. “Engine 1 to Command, we have a pile of trash around the window, it is out, we are checking for extension, I’ll call you right back.”

These reports shall be given on the Fireground Channel. These are the reports that help both Command and other units to take appropriate actions and are very valuable.

The first due engine shall notify Command when the fire is knocked down or when conditions change. For example:

1. “Engine 4 to Command, fire appears to be knocked down we are checking for extension.”
2. “Engine 12 to Command, we need a back up line on the first floor.”

Second Due Engine Company Operations

Second due engine companies shall lay out, take a rear position and not pass the front of the fire building or enter the block that is in front of the fire building.

Exceptions:

1. The street is wide and the first due unit is on the scene.
2. The second due unit has circled the block and found no rear access.
3. Unusual situations (Pre-Planned Building, critical rescue problem requiring immediate action, etc.)

The second due engine company will give their layout information on Fire Channel 1, then switch to the Fireground Channel and give their size-up report from a rear position. **Note the Difference between first and second due engines.**

For Example: “Engine 11 is split laying at 13th and Spring Road, NW.” This transmission will be given on Fire Channel 1. Switch to the Fireground Channel and give their size up report from the rear. For example: “Engine 11 on the scene side 3, smoke showing from the second floor, quadrant C.”

The second due company is responsible for **CHECKING THE BASEMENT ON ALL STRUCTURE FIRES** regardless of where the fire is or seems to be. The report on the status of the basement must
be give right away to the Incident Commander. (If the second due engine company is unable to check the basement from a rear position they must notify the Incident Commander.)

Charge supply line as soon as possible. Hook up to the Standpipe and/or Sprinkler System if equipped. Charge system when ordered, or if there is any indication of fire. Advance pre-connected line and/or standpipe packs into position of deployment.

On known working fires, the second due engine company should consider cutting off the utilities if possible.

If the fire is above the first floor, the second due engine company (after checking the basement) will check each floor and report the status to the Incident Commander.

Examples:

1. “Engine 2 to Command - the basement is clear.”

2. “Engine 2 to Command - floors 1, 2 and 3 are clear.” (Group floors above the basement in blocks of 3 when reporting identical conditions.)

If the fire is above the first floor, the second due engine company may provide the backup line if they have checked the basement and all floors below the fire, and the third due engine company has not backed up the first attack line. In this case the second due engine company shall advise the Incident Commander.

**Third Due Engine Company Operations**

On box alarms the third due engine company will report to the hydrant of the first due engine company. Connect apparatus soft sleeve to the 4" male connection and 3" supply line to the 2 1/2" female intake on the hydrant valve. The third due engine will engage pumps and operate valve only when requested by the first due engine. Pump at an engine discharge pressure of 150 psi, unless otherwise ordered.

If the first due engine company has split their lay out the third due engine company will complete the lay out and charge the supply line on request from the first due engine company.

If the first due engine has their own hydrant on a box alarm (soft sleeve connected to hydrant or laid out with 4" hose), the third due engine company will lay out from an independent hydrant and report to the front of the building. Notify Communications of the location of the hydrant that they laid out from, on Fire Channel 1. Switch to the Fireground Channel and follow Standard Operating Procedures for the type of structure.

If the third due engine company has responded on a Local Alarm, they will monitor the lay out locations of the first and second due engine companies and remain flexible to cover the water
supply needs of either of these companies. Notify the Incident Commander when you arrive on the scene and await orders.

The third due engine company will operate the majority of the time to provide a backup line or exposure protection. However, Command can assign this company to any sector if needed.

When operating in the Attack Sector the third due engine company will supply a back up line to the position of the first due engine company.

When operating in the Exposure Sector the third due engine company may be assigned to the fire floor, floors above or below the fire, or to exposures 2 and/or 4.

Third due engine companies should consider using their own apparatus’ pre-connected lines if in a location that is advantageous.

On high rise and large building responses the third due engine company shall bring their standpipe racks, along with a gated wye. This is necessary for water supply from, or independent of, the standpipe system.

**Fourth Due Engine Company Operations**

On box alarms the fourth due engine company will report to the hydrant of the second due engine company. Connect apparatus soft sleeve to the 4" male connection and 3" supply line to the 2 1/2" female intake on the hydrant valve. The fourth due engine will engage pumps and operate valve only when requested by the second due engine. Pump at an engine discharge pressure of 150 psi, unless otherwise ordered.

If the second due engine company has split their lay out, the fourth due engine company will complete the split lay out and charge the supply line when requested by the second due engine company.

If the second due engine company has their own hydrant, the fourth due engine company will stage and notify Command. (Note the difference from the third due engine company.) The exception to this rule is reported basement or rear porch fires. In these cases the fourth due engine company would lay out from a hydrant and report to the rear. They would notify Communications of the location of their lay out on Fire Channel 1 and switch to the Fireground Channel and resume Standard Operating Procedures for the type of structure.

If the response is on a box alarm that was filled out after units had responded on a local alarm, the fourth due engine company shall get the lay out information necessary to complete the water supply needs of the first or second due engine company. Contact Command for orders after completing water supply needs of the first or second due engine company.

The fourth due engine company will normally operate in either the Exposure Sector or Attack Sector. However, Command can assign this company to any sector if needed.
When operating in the Exposure Sector the fourth due engine company may be assigned to the fire floor, floors above or below the fire, or to exposures 2 and/or 4.

Examples of exposure assignments:

1. Row houses - cover exposures 2 and 4 in turn as one team. DO NOT SPLIT COMPANY

2. Semi-detached - cover exposure 2 or 4.

3. High rise/apartment building - cover floor/apartment above the fire.

4. Detached building - cover adjacent exposures.

When operating in the Attack Sector the fourth due engine company will supply a back up line to the position of the first attack line.

Fourth due engine companies should consider using their own apparatus’ pre-connected lines if in a location that is advantageous.

On high rise and large buildings the fourth due engine company may have to bring their own standpipe racks, along with a gated wye. This is necessary for water supply from, or independent of, the standpipe system.

Companies will be considered as having their own hydrant if their soft sleeve is connected to the hydrant, or if they have laid out from a hydrant using 4" hose. Having your own hydrant is not one you have laid out from with 3" hose.

**COMPANIES UNABLE TO CONNECT SOFT SLEEVE:** If a company is unable to connect its soft sleeve to the hydrant valve because a hydrant is blocked and the soft sleeve will not reach, there are two options to solve this problem:

**First Option** - The preferred method of getting in service requires the company with water supply responsibilities to connect the supply line to the intake of the hydrant valve and layout to a different hydrant and pump back into the hydrant valve. **NOTE:** This will require a higher discharge pressure by the water supply company depending on the length of the layout.

**Second Option** - The less favorable method would be to extend the reach of the soft sleeve using hard sleeves.
STAGING

The Three Levels of Staging are defined as follows:

**Level I Staging**

The first and second due engines will layout and report to their position unless directed otherwise by the Incident Commander. The first due truck will report to the front. These companies will follow Standard Operating Procedures. The second due truck will position apparatus to cover the rear position. Personnel will remain on apparatus unless directed otherwise by the Incident Commander. The remaining companies will slow their response, stage in line of approach, remain on apparatus, and monitor both Fire Channel 1 and the Fireground Channel.

In order for Level I staging to be effective company officers must give complete, accurate size up reports, preliminary reports, and progress reports as they acquire information.

A size-up report of nothing showing (front and rear), an odor of food, trash outside of a building, or fire out on arrival are examples of situations where the Incident Commander shall utilize “Level I Staging”.

Until the Incident Commander advises companies of “Level I Staging,” it is imperative that companies perform their duties described in the Standard Operating Procedures. Deviation by companies from the SOPs is only acceptable when directed by, or with notification to, and approval of, the Incident Commander.

If Level I staging is in effect, the Incident Commander will advise companies via the Fireground Channel when they should resume Standard Operating Procedures, giving the verified location of the fire and if necessary directing companies to specific assignments.

**Level II Staging**

The Incident Commander designates a staging area where companies are to report. Companies arriving at the staging area will notify Command by radio of their arrival, on the Fireground Channel, and await instructions from the Incident Commander.

**Level III Staging**

The Incident Commander assigns a location and staging officer. When Level III Staging is in place Communications will be notified, and an announcement will be made on the Vocalarm, Fire Channel 1, and the Fireground Channel that Level III staging is in effect for the incident and giving the location of the staging area. In Level III Staging companies arriving at the staging area will make no radio transmissions. Radios shall monitor the Fireground Channel. The officers of companies dispatched to the staging area will report in person to the Staging Officer.
The Staging Officer will perform the following duties:

1. Notify the Incident Commander upon arrival at the staging area, and verify the companies and units available thereat.

2. Determine if the Incident Commander would like a minimum complement of units maintained in the staging area. If so, the Staging Officer will contact Communications on Fire Channel 1 for additional companies and units.

3. Give assignments to companies and units. Companies and units should be given the following information:
   a. Where and to whom they are to report.
   b. The sector or branch to which they are assigned.
   c. Other special instructions.

4. Maintain a list of units currently in the staging area, and a list of units (and their instructions) sent to the incident from the staging area.

SAFETY FOR ENGINE COMPANIES

When hose lines are not advancing and conditions are deteriorating - back out.

Never operate above a fire without a hose line for protection and never operate above a fire without having assurance that the fire below is being attacked.

On basement fires cut the fire off by closing the door to the basement. Use the hose line for protection of the search operation and the containment of the fire to the basement while the floors above the basement are being searched. Upon completion of the search, backing out to the front door is an acceptable practice as long as the company members operating this line are the last ones to leave the building.

Do not operate in unvented attics.

Do not pass fire by - never let fire get behind you.

It is always a sign of true professionalism to follow orders promptly. It becomes increasingly important as the incident conditions deteriorate to communicate and maintain fireground discipline.

For example, if there has been a partial collapse, notify Command, take what actions you feel are immediately necessary, and notify Command of actions taken and any further recommendations.

“Engine 5 to Command, we have a partial collapse on the second floor. We are holding our position to protect the search operation. Recommend the removal of all units from the building.”
In this case Command knows Engine 5 wants to abandon the building when the search is completed. He/she can start removing those units not involved in the search operations.

Remember that most cases of improper action occur when there is no life to be saved, and most of the property loss has occurred. Frustration leads to poor decisions. Before recommending action on problem fires, weigh the consequences of offensive vs. defensive attack modes. If fire has gained considerable headway in a vacant building, and there is a question about the structural stability of the building, the risk/benefit ratio of an aggressive interior attack is extremely high. In this instance the only acceptable course of action is to initiate a defensive exterior attack.

Here are some other examples of actions where the risks do not match the gains.

1. Operating within the collapse zone of a building during exterior operations.

2. Operating hose lines from the exterior without permission from Command.

3. Not leaving the structure when ordered out.

4. Taking hose lines into windows for firefighting purposes when other companies and Command are unaware of this action, leading to the possibility of opposing hose streams.

5. Members separating from their companies for independent action or to attach to another company.

6. Attacking basement fires by going down the basement stairs.

7. Operating hand lines from a roof position down into the roof area when the opening is for ventilation.

When taking these types of risks, companies or individuals are risking their lives and/or those of their fellow fire fighters as well as the lives of those who may have to rescue them when they get in trouble.

**FIRE ABOVE THE FIRST FLOOR OF ROW OR DETACHED DWELLINGS WITH EXPOSED FLOORS ABOVE**

The first due engine company attacks the fire.

The second due engine company covers the rear, checks the basement, and reports the basement status to Command. If the fire is not in the basement, the second due engine company will check each floor as they go up, and notify Command of the status of the lower floors. After checking the basement and the lower floors, the second due engine company will backup the first due engine company, if they have not already been backed up.
The engine company not backing up the attack line (either the 2nd or the 3rd due engine) will cover the floor or floors above the fire, providing the stairway is tenable. This company will be operating in the Exposure Sector. Before attempting to go up the stairs, they should observe the fire location, size of fire, and progress of the attack line(s).

If the stairway is not tenable, this company will prepare to backup the two lines operating, and they will advance, as necessary, and notify Command that they will be working in the Attack Sector. When they can safely ascend to the floor above they will notify and be directed by Command.

The third and fourth due engine companies will take care of the water supply for the first and second due engines respectively. After completing the water supply requirements, resume Standard Operating Procedures. The third due engine shall backup Attack or cover the floor(s) above the fire. The fourth due engine shall contact Command for assignment (normally Exposure Sector).

**FIRE ON TOP FLOORS (NOT ATTIC) OF ROW HOUSES AND DETACHED DWELLINGS**

The first due engine company attacks the fire on the top floor.

The second due engine company covers the rear, checks the basement and reports the basement status to Command.

If the fire is not in the basement, the second due engine company will check each floor as they go up, and notify Command of the status of the lower floors.

After checking the basement and lower floors, the second due engine company will backup Attack (1st due engine), if they have not already been backed up, notifying Command.

The engine company not providing the backup line (either 2nd or 3rd due engine) will cover exposures row or detached, unless the fire is of such magnitude that an additional line may be needed. It is a good idea to remain flexible on a lower floor of the fire building to assist with an additional line if needed or directed by Command. In all cases where a third company is going to operate in the Attack Sector, Command must be notified.

The third and fourth due engine companies will take care of the water supply needs of the first and second due engine companies, respectively. After completing this assignment, the officers in charge shall communicate with Command prior to becoming involved in activities.
ATTIC AND COCKLOFT FIRES

The first due engine company goes to the top floor and looks for an inside entrance/stairway to the attic area.

The second due engine company covers the rear, checks the basement and reports the basement status to Command.

Engine companies should consider bringing a Revolving Distributor Nozzle with Extension Pipe and a ceiling hook to the top floor on attic and cockloft fires. Having this equipment available early in the fire could prove valuable if lines cannot advance into attics or if the fire is in the cockloft.

If there is no fire in the basement, the second due engine company will check each floor as they go up. When they have reached the top floor, they will thoroughly check this floor because many attic/cockloft fires originate on the top floor and extend into the attic. The second due engine company will notify Command of the status of the top floor and the floors below.

After checking the basement and the lower floors, the second due engine company will backup the first due engine company, if not already being done.

The engine company not providing the backup line (either the 2nd or 3rd due engine) will cover interior exposures, row or detached, operating on the top floor. This engine company’s job will be to monitor the top floor for possible fires caused by burning material falling from the attic or cockloft. It will also be responsible for maintaining a clear stairway for attacking forces in the attic. Command may assign this company to the Exposure Sector or Attack Sector. Their main assignment is to provide a controlled and safe operation for the Attack sector.

The key to attic fires is roof ventilation. If the roof is not vented quickly, interior attack lines will generally not be able to advance.

When conditions are such that attack lines are not advancing, back out. DO NOT OPERATE IN UNVENTED ATTICS. Attack lines will regroup on the top floor and prepare to attack from below with Revolving Distributors and Extension Pipes.

The fourth due engine company shall cover exposures, row or detached. If there are no exposures or exposures are already covered, notify Command of availability.

Definitions:

ATTIC - will be considered to have a stairway that ascends from the top floor and is of a height sufficient for most people to stand.

COCKLOFT - will be considered to be an area above the top floor ceiling and the underside of the roof. This area will not have a stairway and will not be of sufficient height for most people to stand.
BASEMENT FIRES IN ROW AND DETACHED BUILDINGS

Basement fires are extremely dangerous. Basement fires require coordination and teamwork between companies and Command. Radio reports must be given by both the first and second due engine companies before the fire can be attacked. Officers should give these required reports as soon as possible to allow Command to coordinate the attack on the basement fire.

Engine companies will operate as one team towards the goal of extinguishment or exposure protection.

The first due engine company will lay and charge a hose line into the first floor of the fire building to the area of the interior basement stairway. The first due engine company will not attack the fire using the interior stairs, unless the stairway is free of smoke and the fire is obviously minor. Notify Command for approval before descending the steps.

THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRST DUE ENGINE COMPANY’S HOSE LINE IS TO PROTECT THE SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATION AND TO CONFINE THE FIRE TO THE BASEMENT.

When the first due engine company reaches the interior basement stairway, they shall close the door to confine the fire. If they are unable to close the door and the fire is coming out of the doorway, they shall put the nozzle on fog and aim it at the ceiling of the stairway to prevent the fire from spreading.

The first due engine company shall use care not to direct a line into the basement or attempt to extinguish the basement fire via the basement stairs.

If the first due engine company is unable to hold a position on the first floor, notify Command for the protection of units that may be operating above the fire.

If the primary search and rescue operation is completed, and the basement fire is not under control (basement units have not reported knockdown), the first due engine company shall back out of the building and remain ready to advance from a safe position.

The second due engine company shall attempt to locate a rear or side basement entrance. Upon finding an entrance, they shall prepare to attack the fire.

The second due engine company will not attack the fire without clearing it through Command, or in his absence, by coordinating with the first due engine company.

When attacking through an outside basement entrance, consider using the nozzle on straight stream, which will have more penetration into the fire area. Also, it will not push as much heat or fire onto the units operating upstairs.
The fourth due engine company takes care of the water supply requirements for the second due engine company. From a rear position, backs up Attack (second due engine company). This can be done without the Incident Commander being on the scene.

As the fire is attacked, windows on the sides of the house should be opened. This will allow the fire and heat to be vented to the outside and not up the interior steps.

If the fire building has a front basement entrance, it may be possible for the third due engine company to attack the fire from this position providing:

1. The first due engine company has secured the entrance on the first floor.
2. The second due engine company cannot attack from the rear.
3. The attack is coordinated by Command.

The third due engine company will take care of the water supply needs of the first due engine company. From a position in the front, the third due engine company shall advance a line to the front of the fire building and remain flexible. **This line is to protect any ongoing firefighting operations in the front of the building.** It can be used in several ways:

1. It can be used as a back up line in the fire building
2. It can be used to extinguish any fires that come out of the basement in the front and endangers escape routes for companies inside the building.
3. It can be used to attack the fire through the front basement entrance if ordered by Command. (Bear in mind that when this type of attack is made there will not be an engine company available to provide a back up line on a standard box alarm assignment.)
4. This line can be used to cover exposures as the fire is brought under control.

If the third due engine company commits to one of these assignments Command must be notified, so that another protection line can replace the third due engine company’s line.

**REAR PORCH FIRES**

**Row Houses**

There are generally two options for attacking rear porch fires in row houses.

The **first option** is to initiate the fire attack from a front position through the interior of the row house.

The first due engine company will advance a line to attack the fire.
The second due engine will position in the rear of the building. Check the basement and report the status of the basement to Command. If the rear of the house is too involved to check the basement, notify Command right away. This will allow Command to assign the basement check to another company. The second due engine company will cover the exposure that is in the most jeopardy and notify Command of the exposure they are covering and any changing conditions in the rear.

Example: “Engine 24 to Command, we cannot check the basement due to the volume of fire on the first floor. The fire is extending to the second floor of the fire building and Exposure 2. We will cover Exposure 2.”

Command now knows coverage is needed for the second floor and possibly Exposure 4. From this report Command would realize assistance is needed.

The third due engine company will cover the water supply requirements of the first due engine company. The officer in charge of the third due engine company must communicate with Command before deploying the company, because Command can use the third due engine company either in the Attack Sector as a back up company or in the Exposure sector.

The fourth due engine company will cover the water supply requirements of the second due engine company. The officer in charge of the fourth due engine company must communicate with Command before deploying the company, because Command can use the fourth due engine company either in the Exposure Sector or as a back up in the Attack Sector. Depending on the time required for the completion of the water supply requirements, Command may have to use the third and fourth due engine companies differently. The timing of an interior attack could force Command to deviate from the normal procedures of third due engine as back up and fourth due as exposure protection. This is why it will be necessary for the third and fourth due engines to call Command before deploying.

The **Second Option** is to attack the fire from the exposures. This option will require strong coordination between Command and companies. Care shall be taken when the attack is made from the exposures that **NO** companies are inside the building or on the roof.

The first due engine company will position themselves to be protected from an attack from the exposure. (The best position is most likely in front and outside, so when the fire is knocked down and when ordered by Command, they can attack from the front of the fire building.)

The second due engine company will be positioned in the rear of the building. Check the basement and report the status of the basement if possible. In any case notify Command of the situation in the rear and tell Command which exposure you can best cover.

The third due engine company will complete the water supply for the first due engine company. The officer in charge of the third due engine company will communicate with Command prior to deploying the company. Command may assign the third due engine company to either the Attack or Exposure Sector as needed.
The fourth due engine company will complete the water supply for the second due engine company. The officer in charge of the fourth due engine company will communicate with Command prior to deploying the company. Command may assign the fourth due engine company to either the Attack Sector or the Exposure Sector as needed.

The rear engine companies will cover the exposures on both sides to limit the spread, using caution not to drive the fire into the houses.

It may be necessary for these engine companies to use their lines as a water curtain, in which case they should direct their lines on the exposures, keeping the surface area covered with a film of water.

It may be necessary for these engine companies to use their lines in a sweeping action to permit removing of trapped occupants.

**NEVER DIRECT EXTERIOR LINES OR HOSE STREAMS INTO ANY FIRE WHERE MEMBERS ARE INVOLVED IN INTERIOR FIREFIGHTING.**

Always keep in mind that on rear porch fires, engine companies in the rear of the building should give good reports to Command as to what they see and what they are doing. On rear porch fires it may be necessary for engine companies in the rear to stand by, ready to check the basement when the fire is extinguished on the first floor.

**HIGH RISE APARTMENT AND OFFICE BUILDING FIRES**

**Four or More Floors In Height**

The first due engine company goes to the fire floor and promptly reports conditions to Command. As you ascend the stairs, quickly check the conditions in each hallway by opening the stairwell doors. Be certain to close the doors after checking conditions on each floor. This will preserve the integrity of the stairwell for evacuation, smoke removal, etc.

The second due engine company covers the rear, and checks the basement. If the basement is not accessible via the rear entrance, find an entrance (using the front if necessary), check the basement and report the basement status to Command.

If the basement is clear, the second due engine company will check each floor as they go up. Upon reaching the fire floor, report the status of the lower floors to Command. The second due engine company will then back up the attack line (if not already done) or cover exposures on the fire floor, notifying Command of which sector they will operate in.

The third due engine company will complete the water supply requirements for the first due engine company. After this task has been completed, notify Command that they are ready for deployment. The third due engine company will either back up the attack line (if not already done) or cover exposures on the fire floor, as directed by Command.
Examples of covering exposures:

1. Fire in an apartment - cover the apartments on both sides.

2. Fire in the hallway - Cover apartments on both sides of the hall.

The fourth due engine company will complete the water supply requirements for the second due engine company. After completing this task, notify Command that they are ready for deployment. The fourth due engine company will operate normally in the Exposure Sector and on the floor above the fire, as directed by Command.

**FALL BACK POSITION WITHIN A HIGH-RISE BUILDING**

In some situations it may be reasonable for companies to retreat to a safe position within the fire building (usually two floors below the fire) while a rapid exterior knockdown is attempted.

The fallback position is not used in dwellings and buildings of ordinary construction.

When companies are ordered to a fallback position, they will notify their sector officer or Command that they are accounted for, as well as their location within the building. *

*NOTE: The fallback position is not an option when units are ordered out of the building.

**ABANDON BUILDING PROCEDURE**

When the Incident Commander has determined that all members must abandon the building because of unsafe conditions such as an anticipated collapse, or because of the tactical change from an interior offensive mode to an exterior defensive mode, the following procedure will be used:

1. Command will notify all sectors via the Fireground Channel, indicating the safest way out. Example: “Command to all sectors — abandon the building, do not exit via the rear because of an unstable wall.”

2. All sector leaders will notify all companies assigned to their sectors using “face to face” communications if possible.

3. After all radio announcements have been made and acknowledged, Command will order all apparatus to sound their air horns continuously for 30 seconds.

Companies ordered out will promptly leave and units leaving will stay together.

The Incident Commander will use the accountability system to verify all members have exited the building. Company officers will conduct a head count of their entire crew. DO NOT TAKE THE WHEREABOUTS OF ANY MEMBER FOR GRANTED. VERIFY EVERYONE.
Company officers will notify their Sector Leader or Command when their company is out and give the results of the head count.

No exterior operation will begin until all companies and all members are verified out of the building.

In exterior operations it may be necessary for companies to re-locate apparatus, lay additional supply lines, etc.

**HEAVY DUTY OPERATIONS**

Consider using the Wagon Pipe supplied from the apparatus tank for quick knockdown in unoccupied structures that are heavily involved with **NO EXPOSURE PROBLEMS**.

The portable wagon pipe/monitor nozzle is usually used where a heavy duty device is needed in a location where apparatus can not be positioned.

When setting up for Heavy Duty Operations, anticipate structural collapse. Do not work in the potential collapse zone, **a distance from the building of at least 1 times the building height**. Collapse zones should be marked with yellow tape.

Example: A 40' high building can collapse out to a distance of 60' from the base of the walls. Do not operate or work within this area.

When heavy duty appliances are operating, do not use exterior handlines at the same time unless:

1. Heavy Duty Devices cannot reach the area.
2. There are no risks to members on the handlines.
3. Protecting exposures.

Engine companies preparing for heavy duty operation should lay dual lines.

Engine companies should consider laying dual lines or a 4" supply line if they suspect an incident will require heavy duty devices. Laying dual lines early in the fire allows greater flexibility. With dual lines or a 4" line laid from a hydrant, a ladder pipe and wagon pipe can be supplied. Large diameter attack lines can be more rapidly placed in service.

It is important to remember that having adequate water supply to the front and rear of the building will aid in the deployment of heavy duty devices.

In heavy duty operations on exposures a key factor is to get well ahead of the fire and stop the extension.
When involved in heavy duty operations in one story commercial buildings having a wide roof span (such as supermarkets, large stores, auto repair shops and dealerships, etc.), anticipate and beware of roof collapses due to lightweight steel truss or bar joist roof construction. If there is fire impingement on these types of roof construction do not enter the building. Retreat to a position outside the collapse zone and set up for heavy duty operations.

GENERAL TRUCK COMPANY OPERATIONS

Four Person Truck Company
Structures 3 Stories or Less and High Rise below the 4th Floor

Truck work is rarely predictable, always physically demanding, and requires constant reevaluation of the situation. Most activities need to be carried out simultaneously and close supervision by one person is not possible. In some instances two or more functions may be accomplished by one act. Size up and personnel safety must be an ongoing process done by all members but particularly by the officer in charge. The steps below will meet most typical situations but adjustments will need to be made depending on the conditions presented and must be based on experience and good judgement.

These steps apply to first and second due positions unless otherwise indicated.

For basement fires the 2nd due truck assumes the duties of the first due truck and vice versa.

Officer

- Start generator (enroute if possible)
- Size up (front and rear if possible)
- Evaluate safety of personnel
- Assist in laddering the building
- Assist with obvious rescues
- Attempt to locate entrapped victims
- Insure forcible entry is completed and assist if necessary prior to performing horizontal ventilation as needed
- Assist or supervise with interior overhaul in fire area*

*(If second due, assist or supervise setting up lights and fans where needed)
*(If second due, assist with or supervise overhaul/salvage where needed)

Hook Position

- Ladder the building (generally two ground ladders)
- Perform obvious rescues
- Attempt to locate entrapped victims
- Assist with forcible entry if necessary and perform horizontal ventilation as needed
• Bring hooks or other needed hand tools to fire area
• Set up lights in fire area *
• Perform interior overhaul in fire area **

*(If second due set up lights and fans where needed)
**(If second due perform overhaul/salvage where needed)

Driver

• Perform obvious rescues
• Go to roof, with SCBA, for vertical ventilation and check rear and sides of fire building.
• Check for possible extension
• Assist in setting lights in fire area if not completed*
• Assist in overhaul in fire area **
• If second due assist with other truck functions such as forcible entry, laddering, roof ventilation etc.

*(If second due set up lights and fans where needed)
**(If second due perform overhaul and salvage where needed)

Tiller Position/Tip Position

• Perform obvious rescues
• Go to roof, with SCBA, for vertical ventilation and check rear and sides of fire building.
• Check for possible extension
• Assist in setting lights in fire area if not completed*
• Assist in overhaul in fire area **
• If second due assist with other truck functions such as forcible entry, laddering, roof ventilation etc.

*(If second due set up lights and fans as needed)
**(If second due perform overhaul and salvage where needed)

To eliminate duplication of effort and to conserve resources members of truck companies must coordinate their activities. On many incidents the driver and tillerman of the second due truck will have some latitude depending on the situation. This freedom to choose should be directed to the overall goals of the truck service necessary for the incident and should be coordinated through commanders. All members should immediately assist other members as soon as they have completed their assignment. Any time a member is going into the area involved they should carry some hand tools they believes may be needed rather than wait until the tools are called for. The best premise to work under is that all members go at full speed until the commander says stop. In the interest of safety members should work in pairs as much as possible.
Four Person Truck Company
High Rise above the 3rd Floor

Truck work is rarely predictable, always physically demanding, and requires constant reevaluation of the situation. Most activities need to be carried out simultaneously and close supervision by one person is not possible. In some instances two or more functions may be accomplished by one act. Size up and personnel safety must be an ongoing process done by all members but particularly by the officer in charge. The steps below will meet most typical situations but adjustments will need to be made depending on the conditions presented and must be based on experience and good judgment.

These steps apply to first and second due positions unless otherwise indicated. On basement fires the duties are reversed.

Officer

- Start generator (enroute if possible)
- Size up (front and rear if practical)
- Evaluate safety of personnel
- Bring SCBA, light bag (light(s) and cable reel) and two hooks
- Assist with obvious rescues
- Attempt to locate entrapped victims
- Insure forcible entry is completed and assist if needed prior to performing horizontal ventilation.
- Evacuate the fire area if necessary*
- Assist or supervise with setting up lights in fire area**
- Assist or supervise with interior overhaul in fire area***

* (If second due, assist with evacuation)
** (If second due, assist or supervise setting up lights and fans where needed)
*** (If second due, assist with or supervise overhaul and salvage)

Hook Position

- Bring SCBA, forcible entry tool (rabbit tool), halligan bar, and sledge hammer to fire area
- Perform obvious rescues
- Attempt to locate entrapped victims
- Assist with forcible entry if necessary and perform horizontal ventilation where needed
- Assist with evacuation*
- Set up lights in fire area **
- Perform interior overhaul in fire area ***

* (If second due, assist with evacuation)
** (If second due, set up lights and fans where needed)
*** (If second due, perform overhaul and salvage)
Driver

- Perform obvious rescues
- Go to roof, with SCBA, for vertical ventilation and check rear and sides of fire building. *
- Check for possible extension
- Bring SCBA, fan, and axe
- Assist with evacuation in the fire area**
- Assist with lights in fire area if not completed***
- Assist in overhaul in fire area ****

* (If second due, assist with forcible entry or assist with roof ventilation)
** (If second due, assist with evacuation where needed)
*** (If second due, set up lights and fans where needed)
**** (If second due, perform overhaul and salvage where needed)

Tiller Position/Tip Position

- Perform obvious rescues
- Go to roof, with SCBA, for vertical ventilation and check rear and sides of fire building. *
- Check for possible extension
- Bring SCBA, fan and light
- Assist with evacuation in fire area **
- Assist with lights in fire area if not completed***
- Assist in overhaul in fire area ****

* (If second due, assist with forcible entry or assist with roof ventilation)
** (If second due, assist with evacuation where needed)
*** (If second due, set up lights and fans where needed)
**** (If second due, perform overhaul and salvage where needed)

To eliminate duplication of effort and to conserve resources members of truck companies must coordinate their activities. On many incidents the driver and tillerman of the second due truck will have some latitude depending on the situation. This freedom to choose should be directed to the overall goals of the truck service necessary for the incident and should be coordinated through commanders. All members should immediately assist other members as soon as they have completed their assignment. Any time a member goes to the area involved they should bring some hand tools they believes may be needed rather than wait until they are called for. The best premise to work under is that all members go at full speed until the commander says stop. In the interest of safety members should work in pairs as much as possible.
SECTION II
INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a tool used to manage emergency incidents. The District of Columbia Fire and EMS Department’s Incident Command System is designed to effectively manage and control resources at the scene of emergencies, without interfering with the operation. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) will not change for any unit unless directed by the Incident Commander. The Incident Command System has several primary features that make it an effective management system for the Fire Service. Understanding the general concepts of the Incident Command System will allow for smooth deployment of the system at the scene of emergencies.

THE PRIMARY FEATURES OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

Accountability - Using the Incident Command System increases the accountability for every member of the Fire Service and EMS Department on the scene of an incident. The Accountability System will be in place on every incident and the Incident Commander will be responsible for using the Accountability System. See Section II for the Accountability System.

Adaptability - The ICS is used on all emergency situations, for example fires, haz-mat, mass casualty incidents, etc.

Flexibility - ICS can be adapted to both simple and complex operations. The ICS is easily expandable. The Incident Commander activates only those elements of the ICS necessary to effectively manage the emergency.

Span of Control - Span of Control refers to the number of persons that can be effectively supervised by one (1) individual. When the span of control is exceeded, operational areas can be compromised. When an Incident Commander’s span of control exceeds five (5), it is time to consider dividing the situation into manageable segments and delegating specific responsibilities. The Incident Commander can divide an incident by using sectors and/or branches. This will allow the Incident Commander to concentrate on managing the overall incident.

Unity of Command - This management principle allows for accountability. Orders shall be given to employees by their officers/supervisors, and officers/supervisors shall receive their orders from the Incident Commander, branch leaders, or sector leaders. To violate this principle causes severe disruption to an operation and unnecessarily endangers lives and property. All on-scene personnel must clearly understand and perform their function as defined in the Standard Operating Procedures.
THE FIVE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

The five (5) major functions of the Incident Command System are:

1. Incident Commander
2. Operational Section
3. Logistics Section
4. Planning Section
5. Finance Section

**Incident Commander** - The Incident Commander is in charge of the incident. The Incident Commander assigns and controls the four (4) other functions. The Incident Commander retains the responsibility of each of the other four (4) function positions until he delegates them. Staff positions can be assigned to assist the Incident Commander, i.e., Public Information Officer, Safety Officer, and Liaison Officer. The first due battalion chief will normally be considered the Incident Commander until relieved by a senior officer.

**Incident Commander Responsibilities: Command ___ (Battalion Number)**

1. Establish formal command by notifying communications. i.e., “Battalion 4 is on the scene and establishing Command 4 on ______ Street in front of the incident.”

2. Will give status reports to Communications; i.e., “Primary search on floors 1 & 2 are complete, and negative, unable to perform primary search in basement at this time due to heavy fire conditions.”

3. Retains the other four (4) functions until delegated.

4. Prepares incident objectives.

5. Approves plans for objectives.

6. Requests resources; responsibility may be delegated on larger incidents.

7. Implements functions of the Incident Command System as needed.

Command Vests - To identify those in command of specific functions, vests shall be worn.
THE INCIDENT STAFF POSITIONS:

Public Information Officer (P.I.O.)

Responsible for establishing and maintaining media contact. Example - The following information should be available for the media:

1. Time of dispatch
2. Conditions found upon arrival
3. Number of deaths and/or injuries
4. Time the incident is brought under control or possible time it will take to bring the incident under control.
5. Resources committed to controlling incident. (Personnel and equipment)
6. Extent of damage and possible loss from the incident.

Safety Officer Responsibilities:

1. Assesses hazardous situations.
2. Attempts to remedy hazardous situations.
3. Has authority to suspend or correct immediate unsafe operations.
4. Notifies the Incident Commander of actions, as necessary.

Liaison Officer Responsibilities

1. Acts as point of contact for representatives from assisting agencies.

Operational Section Function Responsibilities:

1. Manages the incident’s tactical operations.
2. Implements plans and strategies to safely resolve the incident.
3. Utilizes resources as necessary to handle the incident. (i.e. companies, sectors, or branches.)
4. Establishes and utilizes Staging Area

5. Utilizes MediVac for victim transport, if necessary.

6. Utilizes Medical Groups, as necessary. Triage, treatment, and transports are examples of some medical groups.

7. Establishes and utilizes a rehabilitation area. Directs EMS Supervisor and others to establish and maintain the Rehabilitation Sector.

**Logistics Section Function Responsibilities:**

1. Provides support to the incident and personnel working on the incident.

2. Utilizes logistical sub-units.

3. Communications base. For example, supply of extra portable radios, portable radio batteries and chargers, cellular telephones, etc.

4. Operational Supplies. For example, fuel for the apparatus, foam, cave-in equipment, other special equipment, etc.

**Planning Section Function Responsibilities:**

1. Collects, evaluates, disseminates incident information.

2. Gathers and analyzes incident data.

3. Develops alternative tactical operation plans.

4. Conducts planning meetings.

5. Prepares action plans.

6. Prepares the incident demobilization plan.

7. Utilizes four (4) primary assistance units:
   a. Resources Unit - Compiles arrival, location, availability of resources.
   b. Situation Unit - Collects, processes, organizes information.
   c. Documentation Unit - Maintains accurate incident files.
   d. Technical Specialists - People or groups who possess special technical expertise related to incident.
**Finance Section Function Responsibilities:**

1. Establishes Time Unit - Keeps personnel/equipment time records
2. Establishes Procurement Unit - Expedites vendor supplies
3. Creates Claim Unit - Handles injury, death, civilian claims
4. Creates Cost Unit - Provides cost estimates/summaries of the incident, cost effectiveness analysis.

**COMPANIES OPERATING ON FIRES AND OTHER EMERGENCIES**

The Incident Commander shall assign units as sector and/or branch leaders when needed. Units assigned to these responsibilities shall retain and use their company number when calling the Incident Commander who will be called Command ____ (Battalion number.)

Example: “Command 4 to Truck 6 and Truck 9. Truck 6 you are the Vent Leader and you have Truck 9 under you”. Truck 6 is now the Vent Leader. This is a responsibility, and when Truck 6 calls the Incident Commander the transmission wording would be, “Truck 6 to Command 4,” and when the Incident Commander calls Vent the transmission wording would be, “Command 4 to Truck 6”. The terms Vent, Attack, Rescue, etc., are responsibilities to be performed, and do not change unit designations. In cases where a company or sector leader needs to contact another sector leader and that sector leader is unknown, they should use their sector plus company number. The called Sector Leader would then respond by giving the sector name plus company. i.e., “Engine 1 Attack, to Vent”, the response from the Vent Leader would be, “Vent, Truck 2, bye”. After identification is made company numbers can be used.

It is imperative that companies perform their duties as described in the Standard Operating Procedures, unless directed by, or with notification to and approval of the Incident Commander.

Example: “Engine 11 to Command 4 we are involved in rescues. We can not cover the exposures”.

When companies are working on incidents where several sectors are performing simultaneous tasks, or are performing in the same geographical area, the Incident Commander may use a Branch concept to increase safety and control. Companies will operate in sectors under a branch leader assigned by the Incident Commander.

Example: The Exposure Sector has expanded during a fire and Exposures 2 and 2/1 are involved in fire. Exposure 2 has 3 engines and a truck company working, and Exposure 2/1 has 2 engines and 2 trucks working. The Incident Commander would assign a company officer or battalion chief to become the Exposure 2 Branch. Exposure 2 Branch would be responsible for both Exposure 2 and 2/1. The radio transmission would be, “Command 1 to Truck 4 you are now going to be the Exposure 2 Branch. You are responsible for Exposure 2 and 2/1. You have Engines 2, 4, & 6 and Truck 3 in Exposure 2 and Engines 9 & 12 and Trucks 4 & 6 in Exposure 2/1.” Truck 4’s officer would
now be responsible for these units. Truck 4’s officer shall assign the personnel of Truck 4 to another company, or designate someone to be in charge of Truck 4’s personnel.

In addition, the Incident Commander can assign companies to sectors or tasks, based on the needs of the incident. For example, the Incident Commander can assign companies to a Roof Sector, Safety Sector, or Evacuation Sector if there is a need to perform such tasks.

In all cases the Incident Commander will be responsible to assign companies to sectors and will designate all sector and branch leaders.

**SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY**

Command will provide sector leaders with the companies assigned to their sectors.

When Command assigns companies to sectors, company officers report to sector leaders.

Sector leaders must be accountable for companies assigned to their sectors.

**SECTOR LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES**

Officers assigned as sector leaders will have the authority required to manage their sectors.

Responsibilities of sector leaders:

1. Monitor work progress.
2. Redirect activities within the sector.
3. Coordinate sector activities with other related activities.
5. Request additional resources as needed.
6. Communicate with Command or other sector leaders as necessary.
7. Re-allocate resources within the sector.

**COMMUNICATIONS**

Individual companies will communicate with the Incident Commander until they are assigned to a sector or branch. When sectors are assigned by Command, the sector leaders will communicate with Command using their company number or battalion number.
Communication within sectors should be face to face. Radio use in sectors should be a last resort.

Status reports from sector leaders to Command should occur at approximately ten (10) minute intervals or when:

1. Information is requested by Command
2. Assigned objectives or tasks are completed
3. Assigned objectives or tasks can not be completed, along with the reason why
4. Request for additional resources
5. There is a safety problem

Any company or sector officer can communicate with the Incident Commander when an emergency exists or it is necessary to communicate significant information. These will be considered priority messages.

Priority messages will be direct to Command, using the word “PRIORITY” before the message.

**Example:** “PRIORITY! ENGINE 6 TO COMMAND 1, THE REAR PORCHES COLLAPSED AND TWO FIREFIGHTERS ARE TRAPPED”. “COMMAND 1 TO ENGINE 6, YOUR PRIORITY MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED”

AT THIS TIME COMMAND 1 WOULD NOTIFY ENGINE 6 AND OTHER COMPANIES OF THE STEPS BEING TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. ALL COMPANIES SHOULD REMAIN OFF THE RADIO WHILE THE PRIORITY MESSAGE IS BEING HANDLED. COMMAND WILL NOTIFY COMPANIES WHEN NORMAL RADIO TRAFFIC CAN RESUME.

**COMMAND PROCEDURES**

Command is defined as: taking charge of an emergency incident, in a positive manner, developing strategy, identifying goals, and making decisions to implement specific actions that will bring the emergency under control.

Every incident requires a strong command role and an organized system for Command to function.

During emergency operations, not knowing the role of the Incident Commander creates more confusion than any other management problem. Lack of a strong centralized command coupled with unreported deviation from standard operating procedures (SOP’s) will cause the incident to quickly deteriorate into an unsafe, out of control, and chaotic situation which cannot be tolerated.

In order to develop a plan or strategy for the incident the Incident Commander must be aware of the available resources and have a complete overview of the incident.
Effective Command requires:

1. Receiving a complete size-up report from the first arriving companies in the front and rear. (Sides 1 and 3, respectively.)
   a. Company (Type and number) on the scene.
   b. Side 1,2,3,4
   c. Height of building in stories
   d. Type of building and occupancy
   e. Type of construction
   f. Fire location with quadrant A,B,C,D,E
   g. Any other information necessary, (Layout information for engine companies)

2. Having adequate resources to develop a plan (Resources are the personnel and equipment that is responding on the emergency).

3. Developing the strategy.

4. Directing companies when necessary to utilize specific tactics. (Something outside their normal SOP for the type of emergency)

5. Maintaining control and coordination of companies until they are assigned to sectors.

For example, if the first arriving unit reports fire in the basement of a two-story row house, the responding battalion chief could direct the second and fourth due engines to a rear attack position. However, if the size-up report is incomplete, such as fire showing, no plan can be started by either the battalion chief or other responding units. It is critical that the Incident Commander gets a fast and accurate size-up report. Preliminary reports from companies are also critical to the Incident Commander for deployment of companies. i.e., “Engine 11 to Battalion 4, the fire is in apartment 920 and the ninth floor is full of smoke”. This information assists the battalion chief in directing of companies for tasks of search and rescue, exposure protection, fire attack and extinguishment, ventilation, salvage and overhaul.

ESTABLISHING COMMAND

Command at the scene of an emergency commences with the first officer to reach the scene, and passes to the first arriving officer of superior rank.

There will be no formal transfer of command between company officers and battalion chiefs, with one (1) exception: When a company officer is placed in command of a working incident by a battalion chief due to the battalion chief having a prolonged response.

Battalion chiefs must assign a company officer to the position of Incident Commander when it appears their arrival on the scene will be delayed, and that a delay in establishing command would cause safety problems for companies on the scene.
If this should occur the officer of the company given the responsibility of Incident Commander will use the procedures for establishing command of the incident and will use the word Command followed by the number of the battalion chief who placed the officer in command. For example; Truck 6 was placed in command, because of a prolonged response by Battalion Four. When Truck 6 arrives on the scene they would notify Communications. The transmission to Communications would be, “Truck 6 is on the scene and will be establishing Command 4 on 14th Street in front of the incident”. When the battalion chief arrives and assumes command the name of the Command would remain the same.

The battalion chief will normally be considered the Incident Commander.

**COMMAND POST** - the Command Post should be in a position to provide the Incident Commander with an overall view of the emergency. The Command Post is the unit or location where the Incident Commander is located.

Prior to leaving the Command Post, the Incident Commander must first have the Command Post staffed with another officer. The Incident Commander is still in command and must maintain radio contact with the Command Post.

A tactical work sheet will be maintained in the Command Post. It will be used to record the incident information and allows the Incident Commander to account for companies. The tactical work sheet will be part of the process when the incident command is transferred to a Senior Department Official.

The Command Post should meet the following requirements:

1. Have minimum communications capabilities of a mobile radio with all fire channels, telephone, and at least two (2) portable radios with chargers.
2. Be situated in a position to observe the incident.
3. Have sufficient lighting to allow for writing and recording information.
4. Provide adequate isolation to allow for decision making.

On an expanding incident a stationary Command Post allows for smoother implementation of the Operations Section, Logistics Section, Planning Section, and Finance Section. The stationary Command Post improves coordination with the medical sector.

**TRANSFER OF COMMAND**

Transferring Command from a battalion chief to a Senior Department Official is to be accomplished through a face to face meeting. Some items to be discussed in the face to face meeting would be:

1. Fire location, extent and condition. Success of control efforts.
2. Deployment and assignment of operating companies and recommendation of needs for additional resources.

3. Tactical work sheet will be explained and turned over to the new Incident Commander.

4. Communications will be notified when the transfer of command process is completed.

5. Communications will announce the transfer of command on all radio channels being utilized.

When the transfer of command is completed the person assuming command would become Command __ (battalion number of initial battalion chief). The initial battalion chief could be reassigned. The initial battalion chief would revert to his/her normal radio designation.

Example: The Deputy Fire Chief - FFD assumes command of a fire from Battalion 4. The Deputy Fire Chief - FFD would now have the radio designation of Command 4. Battalion 4 would revert to his normal designation of Battalion 4.

WORKING FIRE DISPATCH

On working structure fires the Incident Commander should request a Working Fire Dispatch (WFD). The response will consist of a battalion fire chief, engine company, air unit, fire investigator and EMS unit.

The engine company dispatched on a WFD shall serve primarily as the Safety Company but may be assigned other duties as the Incident Commander deems necessary. Upon arrival at the incident this company will:

1. Park apparatus away from the immediate incident scene but in-line of approach; and

2. Unless otherwise directed, report to the Command Post with all personnel in full personal protective equipment (including SCBA), and their Unit Designator Card with all PATs attached.

When directed by the incident commander, the Safety Company shall conduct an Exterior Safety Survey, establish a collapse zone, if needed, and secure the incident scene using “fire line” tape. The survey should include, but not be limited to, the following items:

- Falling glass
- Poorly placed ladders and equipment
- Potential structure failures (including cracks in walls)
- Hoselines twisted, kinked
- Utilities (confirm shut-off or problems with shutting-off)
- Members wearing appropriate PPE
In each case where a problem is found, notify Command and recommend and/or take corrective action as necessary.

The Safety Company shall draw an aerial view of the incident scene to include:

1. Building - size, where Department personnel entered, other entrance and exit points, ladder placement and if the building construction changes (i.e., a brick row house with wooden back porch).
2. Apparatus - type, location, function (i.e., parked idle or pumping water), if large diameter hose is being used.
3. Hydrants - location and whether in use or not.
4. Hose layouts, noting if large diameter hose is used.
5. Any other pertinent information.

**CALLING FOR ASSISTANCE**

When calling for assistance on an emergency, the Incident Commander should establish a Staging Area. The Staging Area will be used to control and manage units in an escalating emergency. The Staging Area should be somewhat remote from the operational area of the incident, and large enough to allow fire apparatus and EMS units sufficient room to maneuver for gaining access and departing the incident scene.

**STAGING**

The three (3) levels of staging are defined as follows:

**Level I Staging**

The first and second due engines will layout and report to their position unless directed otherwise by the Incident Commander. The first due truck will report to the front. These companies will follow Standard Operating Procedures. The second due truck will position apparatus to cover the rear position. Personnel will remain on apparatus unless directed otherwise by the Incident Commander. The remaining companies will slow their response, stage in line of approach, remain on apparatus, and monitor both Fire Channel 1 and the Fireground Channel.

In order for Level I staging to be effective company officers must give complete, accurate size up reports, preliminary reports, and progress reports, as they acquire information.

A size-up report of nothing showing (front and rear), an odor of food, trash outside of building, or fire out on arrival are examples of situations where the Incident Commander shall utilize “Level I Staging”.

A-45
Until the Incident Commander advises companies to “Level I Stage” it is imperative that companies perform their duties described in the Standard Operating Procedures. Deviation by companies from the SOPs is only acceptable when directed by, or with notification to and approval of the Incident Commander.

If Level I staging is in effect, the Incident Commander will advise companies on the Fireground Channel when they should resume standard operating procedures, giving the verified location of the fire and if necessary directing companies to specific assignments.

**Level II Staging**

The Incident Commander designates a staging area where companies are to report. Companies arriving at the staging area will notify Command by radio of their arrival, on the Fireground Channel, and await instructions from the Incident Commander.

**Level III Staging**

The Incident Commander assigns a location and staging officer. When Level III Staging is in place Communications will be notified, and an announcement will be made on the Vocalarm, Fire Channel 1, and the Fireground Channel that Level III staging is in effect for the incident and giving the location of the Staging Area. In Level III Staging companies arriving at the staging area will make no radio transmissions. Radios should monitor the Fireground Channel. The officers of companies dispatched to the staging area will report in person to the Staging Officer.

The Staging Officer will perform the following duties:

1. Notify the Incident Commander that they are at the Staging Area, and verify the companies and units available at the staging area.

2. Determine if the Incident Commander would like a minimum complement of units maintained in the Staging Area. If so the Staging Officer will contact Communications on Fire Channel 1 for additional companies and units.

3. Give assignments to companies and units. Companies and units should be given the following information:
   a. Where and to whom they are to report
   b. The sector or branch to which they are assigned
   c. Other special instructions

4. Maintain a list of companies currently in the staging area, and a list of companies (and their instructions) sent to the incident from the staging area.
THIRD ALARM CALL BACK OF SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

Following the dispatch of a Third Alarm, the Third Alarm Chief responds and assists the Incident Commander as the Planning Officer.

After the dispatch of a Third Alarm (or equivalent), a call back of the following Senior Department Officials will take place and they will be assigned the following responsibilities:

- Training Deputy Planning, Fleet Maintenance Deputy, Logistics
- Fire Prevention Deputy, Fire Investigation
- Department Administrator, Finance
- Research and Development, Communications Division
- Professional Standards Officer, Safety, and Quality Control

CONCLUSION

Standard Operating Procedures must be followed to allow the Incident Command System to be implemented smoothly on the scene of any incident.

The Incident Command System is not designed to hinder operations. It is designed to allow for improved safety and accountability on the scene regardless of whether the incident is escalating or de-escalating. Using the Incident Command System allows the Department to have an easier transformation from the normal intra-agency operation to a multi-agency or multi-jurisdictional operation.
REHAB SECTOR

1. Rehab Sector is supervised by the ACIC of an ALS unit.
   a. To provide the highest level of assessment of Department members.
      i. V.S., ECG, pulse, ox.
      ii. Provide ALS measures as needed.
      iii. Direct proper rehydration.

2. Identify suitable location.
   a. Far enough away not to be exposed to incident by-products, but close enough
      not to cause further exhaustion.
   b. Near roadway for Car-5, ARC easy access.

3. Ensure, through the Med Op’s/IC, that sufficient water and nourishment is available.

4. Rehab Sector ALS provider has same authority as the Safety Officer.
   a. Ensures that all members receive complete assessment as conditions dictate.
   b. Monitors all personnel in the area.
      i. Looking for exhaustion, hypothermia or hyperthermia.
      ii. Inhalation injuries.
      iii. Injuries.
   c. Make patient care decisions.
      i. Determine by assessment the need to transport members to appropriate
         hospital.

5. Maintains accountability of units.
   a. Units report as a group and depart as a group unless a transport occurs.
SECTION III
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

This procedure identifies a system of incident site fire fighter accountability. The purpose is to account for all firefighters, at any given time, within a small geographic area, within the “Hazard Zone” of an incident. Use of the system will provide enhanced personal safety for the individual fire fighter, and will provide the Incident Command System staff an improved means to track and account for all personnel working in the hazard zone.

The Personnel Accountability System will be implemented when the first unit arrives on the scene and continue until the Incident Commander determines it is no longer necessary. Accountability responsibilities will expand with the Incident Command System. During the course of an incident, the Incident Commander will be able to account for all personnel at any given time.

The accountability system will in no way reduce the company officer’s primary responsibility to closely supervise crew members, provide for their safety, and maintain communication with Command. A minimum crew operating in a hazard zone shall be two (2) firefighters with a portable radio.

PURPOSE

To establish a procedure to efficiently account for personnel at the scene of an emergency incident.

SCOPE

The Personnel Accountability system gives Incident Commanders a fast and efficient means to account for all Department personnel at the scene of an emergency.

DEFINITIONS

Hazard Zone - The hazard zone will be defined as any area that requires a SCBA or in which a fire fighter is at risk of becoming lost, trapped, or injured by the environment or structure. This would include entering a structure reported to be on fire, operating in close proximity to the structure during exterior operations, confined space, trench rescue, etc.

OIC - Member in charge of a unit

PAT(s) - Personnel Accountability Tag(s)

UDC - Unit Designator Card
SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. The system will be implemented on all emergency incidents requiring the use of SCBA, or at the discretion of the Incident Commander.

2. Every member of the Department that could be called to an emergency incident will be issued a Personnel Accountability Tag (PAT) constructed similarly to the Fire and EMS Department’s I.D. Card. This tag will have the same information as the I.D. Card engraved on it. The PAT’s will be color coded in the following manner:
   
a. **White** - Officers and EMS Supervisors  
b. **Yellow** - Firefighters  
c. **Orange** - EMS Non-Supervisory Personnel  
d. **Blue** - Fire Inspectors  
e. **Red** - Cadets

Each member shall carry the PAT on their turnout coat when not assigned to a piece of apparatus.

UNIT DESIGNATOR CARD (UDC’S)

The Unit Designator Cards are approximately 2" x 4" 3/32", plastic cards and will have the unit’s number and work assignment of each member currently on duty with the unit. The UDC will be located on a hook inside the cab on the officers side of all apparatus.

**Color Designation of UDC’s**

- **Red** - Engine Company  
- **Green** - Truck Company  
- **Black** - Rescue Squad  
- **Orange** - EMS Units (BLS and ALS)  
- **White** - Chief’s Buggy, EMS Supervisors and Misc. Units (Haz Mat, Fire Boat, Air Unit, etc.)

CHIEF OFFICER’S COMMAND BOARD

The Command Boards shall be retrofitted with hooks to hang the UDC’s in the proper sectors.

MAKE-UP PAT

In the event that a member does not have his/her PAT (lost, stolen, forgotten, etc.) then their official Fire and EMS Department I.D. Card shall be used in place of the PAT. An official journal entry will be made by the platoon commander and that member will be ordered to submit a special report, with the particulars, as to why the member reported for duty without his/her PAT. It will be the responsibility of the member to replace his/her PAT by the member’s next scheduled tour of duty.
RESPONSIBILITY

1. To ensure the safety of personnel, Communications will announce the duration of the incident every 10 minutes. The event timer will be started when the first unit arrives on the incident scene. Example: “Communications to Command 1, Incident duration 10 minutes”.

2. Incident Commanders shall initially account for welfare of personnel under their command at the **30 minute** interval of the incident, and at **20 minute** intervals thereafter (the term for this will be ROLL CALL).
   
a. The Incident Commander shall acknowledge the 30 minute notification and initiate a roll call. Example: “Command 1 to all sectors, stand by for roll call”. This will be repeated at 20 minute intervals.
   
b. Sector leaders shall then order roll call from unit commanders assigned to their sectors.
   
c. Unit commanders shall account for personnel operating under their supervision in the hazard zone and report roll call to their sector leader.
   
d. Any member normally operating outside of a hazard zone (drivers, etc.) shall notify their OIC before they enter the hazard zone.

Example: “Command 1 to Engine 1 (Attack Sector leader), accountability report”...“Engine 1 to Command, Attack is EVEN”. This example indicates that all personnel in the Attack Sector are accounted for.

Example: “Command 1 to Engine 1 (Attack Sector leader), accountability report”...“Engine 1 to Command, Engine 2 is MINUS 1”. This example indicates that Engine 2, who is assigned to the Attack Sector, has a member unaccounted for.

Example: “Command 1 to Engine 1 (Attack Sector leader), accountability report”...“Engine 1 to Command, Engine 3 is PLUS 1”. This example indicates that Engine 3, who is assigned to the Attack Sector, has one (1) additional fire fighter operating with their unit.

3. After ALL sectors have been heard from, the Incident Commander will document the time and note on the command board that all personnel were accounted for or which personnel were not accounted for.

**NOTE:** An unaccounted for person/crew will not stop roll call. This is because more than one (1) person/crew may be unaccounted for. If any personnel cannot be accounted for, the sector officer will report the status of missing personnel as “unknown” and give the Incident Commander their last known location. They will then initiate search procedures within their own sector. All other sectors operating on that incident will maintain their current positions and assignments unless otherwise directed by the Incident Commander.
The Incident Commander may call for a roll-call report to check the welfare of personnel anytime deemed necessary. Some situations in which this shall be done include, but are not limited to:

- a. Report of a person/crew missing or trapped.
- b. Whenever a person/crew cannot be contacted in the hazard one, by radio, after three (3) consecutive attempts.
- c. Sudden hazardous change on the incident scene such as a vapor release, collapse, etc.
- d. Incident conditions deteriorate to a point that evacuation is ordered.
- e. A change from an offensive to a defensive mode.

**IMPLEMENTATION**

When assuming duty members will remove their PAT from their turnout coat and hook it on the collector ring of the apparatus on which they will be working, and remove the member’s PAT that they are relieving from the collector ring, and hook that individual’s PAT on their (the relieved member’s) turnout coat.

Unit Commanders shall insure that the PAT’s on UDC’s reflect the names of personnel riding on that unit at all times.

Sector Leaders have the responsibility to advise Command when units are moving between sectors.

Example: “Engine 3 (Attack Sector leader) to Command 1, Engine 1 is leaving the fire floor and going to rehab.” Command will advise the Rehab Sector and make a note that the unit is in route to rehab.

**LEVELS OF ACCOUNTABILITY**

LEVEL I - OIC’s shall insure that all PAT’s on the UDC reflect the names of all personnel assigned to that unit for that tour of duty.

LEVEL II - At the order of the Incident Commander, all UDC’s are to be collected from the apparatus and delivered to the command post.

1. The Incident Commander may designate a company to collect all UDC’s and bring them to the command post.

2. If abandoning the building, each company officer shall bring his/her company’s UDC to the command post.

LEVEL III - When the Incident Commander determines that the incident requires more stringent accountability, they will implement “ENTRY CONTROL” (metro tunnel, haz mat, hi-rise, confined
space, bombings, structural collapse, trench rescue, before mop-up operations after heavy duty operations, etc.).

Entry Control at LEVEL III - When Level III accountability has been ordered, the Incident Commander will notify Communications to implement “Entry Control” and advise the point(s) of entry. Communications will then sound an EXTENDED ALERT TONE and announce that LEVEL III Accountability has been implemented along with the entry location(s).

Example: ALERT TONE SOUNDED. “Attention units operating on 3rd St., Command 1 has implemented LEVEL III Accountability. All units will enter through the main lobby located on Side 1”.

Once LEVEL III Accountability has been established, all units will enter AND exit through the entry control point(s) except in an emergency. The Incident Commander MUST be immediately informed in the event of an emergency (out of air, injury, etc.) requiring members to exit a hazard zone through other than an entry control point.

**COMPLIANCE**

The mechanism to quickly account for personnel must be available to the Incident Commander at any point during the incident. In order to insure the effectiveness of this system and the subsequent safety of all personnel, accountability procedures will be strictly adhered to at all times.

1. The PAT’s shall be considered an issued item of personal protective equipment. “MEMBERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ASSUME DUTY OR RIDE APPARATUS WITHOUT THEIR PAT or FIRE and EMS DEPARTMENT I.D. CARD.”

2. Unit Designator Cards will be considered part of the apparatus inventory and will be maintained as such.

THE FOLLOWING RULES WILL BE ADHERED TO AT ALL TIMES:

1. No one is to operate alone in the hazard zone.

2. No crew is to operate without a portable radio.

3. Crews always go in and come out together.

4. All personnel will be in contact with their OIC by either:
   
   a. Voice.
   
   b. Touch.
   
   c. Sight.
Appendix B

Communications Transcripts
0619:40  C.D.:  FIRE DEPARTMENT, D.C. FIRE.

CALL 1:  ITS A LOT OF SMOKE ON 4TH AND KENNEDY, A FIRE SOMEWHERE, YOU CAN SMELL THE SMOKE, BUT CAN'T SEE THE FIRE.

C.D.:  OKAY, DO YOU KNOW WHERE IT IS COMING FROM?

CALL 1:  AH, ITS COMIN' FROM 4th AND KENNEDY, I DON'T KNOW WHERE, BUT THERE IS A LOT OF SMOKE ALL OVER THE STREET.

C.D.:  ALLRIGHT, I'LL SEND 'EM OUT SIR.

CALL 1:  OKAY.

C.D.:  UH HUH.

0622:20  C.D.:  FIRE DEPARTMENT

CALL 2:  YES, YES SIR, THERE IS A LOT OF SMOKE DOWN AT 4th AND KENNEDY STREET.

C.D.:  4th AND WHAT?

CALL 2:  4th AND KENNEDY. (THEN SOME UNINTELLIGIBLE COMMENT)

C.D.:  LET ME TAKE A LOOK, I THINK WE'RE ON THE WAY DOWN THERE.

CALL 2:  YOU'RE ON THE WAY DOWN HERE?

C.D.:  LET ME TAKE A LOOK, DON'T HANG UP YET.

C.D.:  YEAH, WE'RE GOIN' TO CHECK OUT SMOKE IN THE AREA. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IT IS YET, BUT.... (UNINTELLIGIBLE COMMENT)

0622:40  C.D.:  D.C. FIRE

CALL 3:  YEAH, AH GROCERY STORE ON 4th AND KENNEDY IS ON FIRE.

C.D.:  OKAY WE'RE ON THE WAY SIR.
0623:00  C.D.:    D.C. FIRE

CALL4:    THERE’S A FIRE RIGHT HERE ON 4TH AND KENNEDY STREET, N.W.

C.D.:    OKAY, WHAT DO YOU SEE M’AM?

CALL4:    HUH?

C.D.:    WHAT DO YOU SEE, M’AM?

CALL4:    AH, HUH?

C.D.:    WHAT DO YOU SEE?

CALL4:    WELL, IT’S A, IT’S A, IT’S A…FIRE COMIN’ FROM THE REAR OF SMALL........
0622:30 E22: ENGINE 22 IS RESPONDING.
0622:30 C.D.: OKAY ENGINE 22, SIX TWENTY ONE.
0622:40 C.D.: (TWO BEEPS) LOCAL ALARM, ENGINE 22, TRUCK 11 RESPONDING FOR SMOKE IN THE AREA AT 4TH STREET AND KENNEDY STREET, N.W., SIX TWENTY TWO.
0623:00 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 22.
0623:00 E22: ENGINE 22 BYE.
0623:00 C.D.: ENGINE 22 WE’RE FILLING THE BOX.
0623:40 C.D.: (ONE BEEP) BOX ALARM, ENGINE 22, 24, 14, AND 11, TRUCKS 11 AND 6, BATTALION 4, SQUAD 2, RESPONDING FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF SMOKE, 4TH STREET AND KENNEDY STREET, N.W., AT THE GROCERY STORE, IN THE BASEMENT. SIX TWENTY FOUR.
0624:00 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO 11 ENGINE.
0624:00 E11: ENGINE 11, AH, TRUCK 6 IS AH, RESPONDING ALSO BATTALION 4.
0624:00 C.D.: OKAY TRUCK 6 AND BATTALION 4, SIX TWENTY FOUR.
0624:10 E4: ENGINE FOUR.......(THEN CUT-OFF BY 22) *SOUNDS LIKE 14 GOING*
0624:20 E22: ENGINE 22’S ON THE SCENE, LAYING OUT 4TH AND KENNEDY, GOT SMOKE SHOWING, FIRST FLOOR GROCERY STORE.
0624:30 C.D.: LAST UNIT COULD YOU REPEAT?
0624:30 T11: 22’S ON THE SCENE, THEY GOT, AH, SMOKE SHOWING FROM THE FIRST FLOOR GROCERY STORE.
0624:40 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 22, WHAT’S YOUR LAYOUT?
0624:50 ???: THEY LAYED OUT AT 4TH AND KENNEDY.
0625:00 C.D.: ENGINE 22 LAYED OUT AT 4TH AND KENNEDY.
0625:10 T11: TRUCK 11 ON THE SCENE, SIDE ONE, TWO STORY COMMERCIAL, HAVE AH, SMOKE SHOWING FIRST FLOOR.

0625:30  E24:  ENGINE 24'S SPLIT LAYIN' TO THE ALLEY IN THE REAR.

0625:40  C.D.:  LAST UNIT REPEAT.

0625:40  E13:  ENGINE 13 OFF THE AIR.


0626:00  C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 24, 14, TRUCK 11, AND SQUAD 2, ARE YOU RESPONDING?

0626:00  E14:  ENGINE 14'S RESPONDING

0626:00  ???:  .....ON THE SCENE.

0626:10  C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 24, TRUCK 11 AND SQUAD 2, ARE YOU RESPONDING?

0626:20  RS2:  SQUAD 2'S GOIN'.

0626:30  C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 24 ARE YOU RESPONDING?

0626:50  C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS TO TRUCK 11...........ARE YOU RESPONDING?

0627:20  E8:  TAKE ENGINE 8 OFF THE AIR.


0627:50  T9:  TRUCK 9'S OFF THE AIR.


0628:00  E11:  11'S GOT 24'S LINE.

0628:00  C.D.:  OKAY, ENGINE 11 HAS ENGINE 24'S LINE.

0628:10  B4:  BATTALION 4 ON THE SCENE, ASSUMING COMMAND, FRONT OF THE BUILDING IN MY BUGGY.

0628:20  C.D.:  OKAY BATTALION 4, I HAVE YOU ON THE SCENE.


0628:30  C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 24, ENGINE 24, ARE YOU ON THE SCENE?

0628:40  E11:  24'S ON THE SCENE, AH, 11’S GOT 24’S LINE.

0628:50  E7:  ENGINE 7 TO COMMUNICATIONS.
0629:00: C.D.: LAST UNIT REPEAT.
0629:00: E7: ENGINE 7 TO COMMUNICATIONS
0629:00: C.D.: COME IN ENGINE 7.
0629:00: E7: 1001 SOUTH CAPITOL HAD A FAULTY FURNACE ON THE ROOF, CUT THE ELECTRIC OFF TO SAME, ENGINE AND, AH, TOWER 10 ARE READY.
0629:10 C.D.: OKAY ENGINE 7 AND TOWER 10, SIX TWENTY-NINE.
0630:30 B4: COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS.
0630:30 C.D.: COME IN BATTALION 4.
0630:40 B4: GO AHEAD AND GIVE ME ANOTHER TRUCK COMPANY, AH ALSO GIVE ME A WORKING FIRE DISPATCH.
0630:50 E7: ENGINE 7 OFF THE AIR.
0631:10 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO BATTALION 4.
0631:30 B4: COMMAND 4 TO TRUCK 11 OR TRUCK 6, GET THE GAS CUT OFF.
0632:20 C.D.: (BEEP) SPECIAL ALARM, TRUCK 55 RESPOND ON THE BOX, 4TH AND KENNEDY STREET, N.W., SIX THIRTY TWO.
0632:40 C.D.: (BEEP) WORKIN’...WORKING FIRE DISPATCH, CAR 43, METRO SUPPORT UNIT, RESPOND ON THE BOX...4TH AND KENNEDY STREET, N.W.. SIX THIRTY THREE.
0633:10 E12: 12 ENGINE’S GOIN’ TO 24.
0633:40 E12: 12 ENGINE’S GOIN’ TO 24.
0634:20 T10: TOWER 10’S OFF THE AIR.
0634:40 C.D.: OKAY TOWER 10, SIX THIRTY FOUR.
0634:50 E12: 12 ENGINE’S GOIN’ TO 24 ENGINE.
0635:00 MSU: METRO UNIT, 4TH AND KENNEDY
0635:00 C.D.: OKAY METRO UNIT, SIX THIRTY FIVE.
0635:10 T14: TRUCK 14’S RESPONDIN’.
0635:10 C.D.: OKAY TRUCK 14, SIX THIRTY FIVE.
0636:30  CR44:  44’S ON THE SCENE.
0636:30  C.D.:  OKAY CAR 44, SIX THIRTY SIX.
0636:30  CR43:  CAR 43 ON THE SCENE.
0636:50  B4:  COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS, GO AHEAD AND GIVE ME A TASK FORCE, WE’RE HAVIN’ DELAYED PROBLEMS.
0636:50  C.D.:  OKAY BATTALION 4, SIX THIRTY SEVEN.
0637:00  B4:  WHAT’S THE STATUS ON TRUCK COMPANIES?
0637:10  FFD:  THE FIREFIGHTING DEPUTY’S RESPONDIN’.
0637:10  C.D.:  OKAY FIREFIGHTIN’ DEPUTY, SIX THIRTY SEVEN.
0637:20  B4:  COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS, WHAT’S THE SPECIAL TRUCK?
0637:30  B4:  OKAY, HAVE ‘EM GO TO 4 FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
0637:30  C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS TO TRUCK 14.
0637:30  T14:  TRUCK 14 BYE.
0637:40  T12:  TRUCK 12’S RESPONDING.
0637:50  T14:  TRUCK 14 TO COMMUNICATIONS, WERE YOU CALLING US?
0637:50  C.D.:  UH, NEGATIVE, WE WERE JUST ..........ACKNOWLEDGING YOUR RESPONSE. WE GOT YOU RESPONDIN’. *NEW MALE VOICE IS HEARD ON CHANNEL ONE AT THIS POINT.*
0638:00  ???:  FOUR.....
0638:10  C.D.:  (BEEP) TASK FORCE ALARM, ENGINE’S 12, 4, TRUCK 12, BATTALION 4 RESPONDING ON THE BOX, 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W.. SIX THIRTY NINE.
0638:20  C.D.:  (BEEP) FIREFIGHTING DEPUTY RESPONDING ON THE BOX, 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W. ON BOX 872. SIX THIRTY NINE.
0638:30  T12:  TRUCK 12 COPY AND RESPONDIN’.
0638:30  C.D.:  TRUCK 12, SIX THIRTY NINE.
0638:40  E12:  ENGINE 12 COPIES, RESPONDING.
0638:40  C.D.:  ENGINE 12, SIX THIRTY NINE.
0638:40  E4:  ENGINE 4 RESPONDING.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Call Sign</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0638:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>OKAY ENGINE 4, SIX THIRTY NINE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0638:50</td>
<td>B5:</td>
<td>BATTALION 5'S RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0638:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>OKAY, BATTALION 5, SIX THIRTY NINE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0639:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(BEEP) LOCAL ALARM, ENGINE 23'S RESPONDING FOR AN AUTOMATIC FIRE ALARM 1044 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. SIX FORTY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0639:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(BEEP) MEDICAL LOCAL ENGINE 31, AMBULANCE 8 RESPONDING FOR THE CODE THREE INJURY, AT THE SAFEWAY 5545 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W. SIX FORTY ONE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0640:40</td>
<td>E23:</td>
<td>ENGINE 23'S RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0640:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>23, ZERO SIX FORTY ONE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0641:10</td>
<td>E28:</td>
<td>28'S READY AS 22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0641:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>'KAY, SIX FORTY TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0641:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(BEEP) LOCAL ALARM, ENGINE TWO RESPONDING AN AUTOMATIC FIRE ALARM, 1301 K AS IN KING, N.W. SIX FORTY THREE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0642:00</td>
<td>E16:</td>
<td>ENGINE 16'S READY AS 11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0642:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>16, SIX FORTY THREE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0642:10</td>
<td>DFC:</td>
<td>DEPUTY FIRE CHIEF'S ON THE FIREGROUND ASSUMING COMMAND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0642:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(BEEP) ATTENTION UNITS ON THE FIREGROUND 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W., DEPUTY FIRE CHIEF'S ON THE FIREGROUND ASSUMING COMMAND. SIX FORTY THREE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0642:40</td>
<td>E2:</td>
<td>ENGINE 2'S RESPONDIN’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0642:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>ENGINE 2. SIX FORTY THREE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0643:10</td>
<td>T14:</td>
<td>PLACE TRUCK 14 ON THE SCENE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0644:50</td>
<td>T9:</td>
<td>TRUCK 9'S ON THE AIR ENROUTE TO TRUCK 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0645:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMM.....(BEEP) COMMUNICATIONS TO TRUCK 9, TRUCK 9 RESPOND ON THE TASK FORCE, 5 TH AND KENNEDY STREET, N.W., STAGING AREA. COPY?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0645:10</td>
<td>HMU:</td>
<td>HAZ-MAT'S RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0645:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>OKAY, SIX FORTY SIX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0645:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO TRUCK 9.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
0645:20 ???: *****UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION OR NOISE?*****

0645:30 C.D.: TRUCK 9 DID YOU COPY?

0645:30 C.D.: (BEEP) COMMUNICATIONS TO TRUCK 9.

0645:50 HMU: HAZ-MAT UNIT’S RESPONDING.

0645:50 C.D.: OKAY AT SIX FORTY SIX.

0646:00 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO TRUCK 9, TRUCK 9.

0646:10 ???: THERE’S A HOLE......(FADES) *****UNINTelligible TRANSMISSION*****

0646:40 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS.


0647:10 C.D.: OKAY YOU ARE REQUESTING A SECOND ALARM, OR DO YOU WANT THE SECOND TASK FORCE TO STAGE AT 6TH AND KENNEDY?

0647:20 DFC: THAT’S CORRECT.

0647:30 C.D.: OKAY, WHO DO YOU WANT TO REPORT TO YOU SIR?

0647:30 DFC: LET ME KNOW WHO THE FIRST ARRIVING COMPANY IS AT THE STAGING AREA PLEASE.

0647:40 C.D.: (BEEP) TASK FORCE ALARM, ENGINES 28, 16 AND TRUCK 9, RESPOND ON THE BOX, 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W., STAGE AT 6TH AND KENNEDY, N.W. SIX FORTY EIGHT.

0647:50 E16: ENGINE 16 COPY.

0648:00 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO BATTALION 4.

0648:10 T21: TRUCK 21’S ON THE AIR.

0648:10 C.D.: TRUCK 21, SIX FORTY NINE.


0648:40 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.

0649:00 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>C.D.</th>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0649:30</td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 28, ARE YOU RESPONDING?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0649:40</td>
<td>E28</td>
<td>28’S RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0649:40</td>
<td></td>
<td>ENGINE 28, AH, HAVE YOUR OFFICER REPORT HAVE YOUR ENGINE OFFICER REPORT TO COMM...COMMAND 4 WHEN YOU ARRIVE ON THE SCENE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0649:40</td>
<td>E28</td>
<td>28 COPY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0649:40</td>
<td></td>
<td>ENGINE 16, YOU RESPONDING?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0649:50</td>
<td>E16</td>
<td>16’S RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0649:50</td>
<td></td>
<td>TRUCK 9?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0649:50</td>
<td></td>
<td>(UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION) *THOUGHT TO BE T9 “AFFIRMATIVE”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0649:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>TRUCK 9 ARE YOU RESPONDING ON THE TASK FORCE?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0650:00</td>
<td>E2</td>
<td>ENGINE 2’S ON THE SCENE, MALFUNCTIONIN’ ALARM, NO SERVICE, WE’RE READY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0650:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>TRUCK 9 ARE YOU RESPONDING ON THE TASK FORCE?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0650:00</td>
<td>T9</td>
<td>THAT’S AFFIRMATIVE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0650:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>OKAY, SIX FIFTY ONE. UNIT IN SERVICE?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0650:10</td>
<td>E2</td>
<td>ENGINE 2, NEEDLESS ALARM, WE’RE READY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0650:10</td>
<td></td>
<td>ENGINE 2. SIX FIFTY ONE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0650:40</td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0651:30</td>
<td>E23</td>
<td>ENGINE 23 TO COMMUNICATIONS. UNABLE TO DETECT AN ALARM UNABLE TO DETECT ANY HAZARD, ENGINE 23’S READY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0651:40</td>
<td></td>
<td>ENGINE 23, SIX FIFTY TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0651:40</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>FIELD COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0652:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0652:10</td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SAFETY OFFICER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0652:10</td>
<td>SAFE</td>
<td>SAFETY OFFICER RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0652:20</td>
<td></td>
<td>SIX FIFTY THREE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0652:30</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>FIELD COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0652:30</td>
<td></td>
<td>FIELD COMMAND UNIT.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
0652:40 DFC/A: HOW ’BOUT CONTACTING, THE AH... COMMAND 4 AND FINDING OUT WHERE THEY WANT ME?:


0654:10 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COMMAND UNIT.

0654:10 DFC/A: COMMAND UNIT.

0654:20 C.D.: COME UP LONGFELLOW AND TAKE THE ALLEY BETWEEN 4TH AND 5TH STREETS.

0654:40 DFC/A: COME IN OFF OF LONGFELLOW?

0654:40 C.D.: THAT’S WHERE YOU RIDE SOUTHBOUND IN THE ALLEY ON LONGFELLOW BETWEEN 4TH AND 5TH.

0654:50 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION)

0654:50 B4: COMMUNICATIONS.

0655:00 C.D.: LAST UNIT TRY IT AGAIN.

0655:10 C.D.: LAST UNIT TRY IT AGAIN.

0655:10 B4: GO AHEAD AND GIVE ME THE SECOND ALARM ASSIGNMENT ON CHANNEL ONE.

0655:30 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.

0655:30 B4: COMMAND 4 BYE.

0655:30 C.D.: YOU REQUESTING A SECOND ALARM?

0655:40 B4: (UNABLE TO READ THIS TRANSMISSION, IS CUT OFF)

0655:40 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.


0655:50 C.D.: ENGINE 31’S READY FOR SERVICE.

0656:00 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.

0656:00 B4: COMMAND 4.

0656:10 C.D.: UH, WERE YOU REQUESTING A SECOND ALARM?

0656:10 B4: I GOT THE INITIAL BOX, I GOT THE TASK, FIRST TASK FORCE OF 12, 4, TRUCK 12 AND BATTALION 5. GOT THE RAPID INTERVENTION AND HAZ-MAT. THEN I ASKED FOR A SECOND TASK FORCE TO STAGE, FAR AS I KNOW, I BELIEVE IT WAS 28 AND ENGINE 16 AND TRUCK 9. THAT ALL Y’ALL HAVE AT THIS POINT?

0656:30 C.D.: THAT’S CORRECT.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0656:40</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>I’ve also asked for a second alarm to stage at 6th and Kennedy. Also an additional squad to the rear of the building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0656:50</td>
<td>T9:</td>
<td>T9’s on the scene, staging area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>Communications to Command 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:00</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>Command 4 bye.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>We’re sending the equivalent to third alarm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:00</td>
<td>T8:</td>
<td>Truck 8 is off the air at truck 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>Okay, Command 4 copy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:10</td>
<td>E23:</td>
<td>23 off the air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:10</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>.......’s respondin’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:10</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>Okay 23 off the air, unit responding?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:20</td>
<td>CR77:</td>
<td>Car 77.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:30</td>
<td>RS1:</td>
<td>Squad 1’s responding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0657:40</td>
<td>AFCO:</td>
<td>Operations chief responding, 4th and Kennedy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:00</td>
<td>E21:</td>
<td>21’s goin’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:10</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>(BEEP) Second alarm, engine 17, engine 21, engine 1, engine 9, truck 15, truck 3, rescue squad 1 respond, take the rear position, 400 Kennedy street, N.W.. All other units stage at 6th and Kennedy, 6 and Kennedy, N.W.. Squad 1 take the rear position at 400 Kennedy, N.W.. Six fifty nine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:30</td>
<td>RS1:</td>
<td>Squad 1 copy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:30</td>
<td>E17:</td>
<td>17 okay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:30</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>21?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:40</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>Engine 1 responding?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:40</td>
<td>E1:</td>
<td>ENGINE 1’S RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:50</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>ENGINE 9?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:50</td>
<td>E9:</td>
<td>9’S GOIN’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0658:50</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>TRUCK 15?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:00</td>
<td>T15:</td>
<td>RESPONDIN’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>TRUCK 3?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>TRUCK 3 RESPONDING?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:10</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>TRUCK 3 RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:10</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>ZERO SEVEN HUNDRED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:30</td>
<td>E2:</td>
<td>TAKE ENGINE 2 OFF THE AIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:30</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>..........WHO’S MY RAPID INTERVENTION?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:40</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>ENGINE 2 OFF THE AIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:40</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>LAST UNIT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0659:50</td>
<td>E31:</td>
<td>31’S OFF THE AIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700:00</td>
<td>DFC/A:</td>
<td>FIELD COMMAND UNIT’S ON THE FIRE GROUND..........(UNINTELLIGIBLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>FIELD COMMAND UNIT. SEVEN O ONE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700:10</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS, WHO IS MY RAPID INTERVENTION.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700:20</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>STAND-BY COMMAND 4, ..........(REST IS UNINTELLIGIBLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700:40</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700:50</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND 5, RAPID INTERVENTION WILL BE ENGINE 9, COMMAND 5 COPY?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS ENGINE 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701:10</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>9 BYE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701:10</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>RESPOND AS THE RAPID INTERVENTION UNIT, COPY?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701:10</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>9 COPIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701:20</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>.........COMMUNICATIONS ON 4 PLEASE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND 4, ENGINE 9 WILL BE YOUR RAPID INTERVENTION UNIT. COMMAND 4 COPY?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701:30</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>COPY, AH I’LL BE STAYIN’ ON CHANNEL 4 FOR THE REST OF THE DURATION.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>OKAY, SEVEN O TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0702:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS RESCUE SQUAD 1, COME IN...COME IN TO THE 400 BLOCK. OF KENNEDY STREET, N.W. USING THE ALLEY OFF OF LONGFELLOW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0702:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>SQUAD 1 COPY?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**

THE NUMBER TWO SIDE OF THE FIRST TAPE WAS BAD, SO A SECOND DUBBING WAS REQUESTED. THE SECOND DUBBING IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, IT STARTS AT 070440, RATHER THAN 070240.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0704:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(BEEP) ATTENTION, ALL, ALL UNITS ON THE SECOND ALARM, 400 KENNEDY, ST. N.W., UNITS BE ADVISED, ON EXTERIOR ATTACK. ALL UNITS OUT OF THE BUILDIN’. ALL UNITS SOUND THEIR AIR HORNS, CLEAR THE BUILDIN’. SEVEN O SIX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0705:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(BEEP) SPECIAL ALARM, MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 11 RESPOND ON THE SECOND ALARM, STAGE AT SIXTH AND KENNEDY, ST., N.W.. SEVEN O SIX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0707:30</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0707:40</td>
<td>E11m:</td>
<td>MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 11 ON THE AIR TO SIXTH AND KENNEDY STREET.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0707:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 11, STAGE AT SIXTH AND KENNEDY. SEVEN O NINE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0708:20</td>
<td>SAFE:</td>
<td>SAFETY OFFICER ON SCENE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0708:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>SAFETY OFFICER. SEVEN O NINE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0709:50</td>
<td>E1:</td>
<td>ENGINE 1 ON THE SCENE IN THE STAGING AREA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0711:50</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0712:50</td>
<td>CAN:</td>
<td>CANTEEN UNIT RESPONDING, UH, PROCEEDING RATHER TO, AH, 4TH AND KENNEDY, N.W..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0713:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>WHICH UNIT IS THIS?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0713:00</td>
<td>CAN:</td>
<td>CANTEEN UNIT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0713:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>CANTEEN UNIT. SEVEN FOURTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Channel</td>
<td>Transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0713:50</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>ATTENTION UNITS ON THE FIRE GROUND, 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W., BATTALION 4 ADVISES DOES NOT WANT ANY RELIEF ON FIREGROUND. SEVEN FOURTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0714:40</td>
<td>T10:</td>
<td>TOWER 10 IS READY AS TRUCK 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0714:40</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>TOWER 10, SEVEN FIFTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0715:00</td>
<td>F.C.:</td>
<td>FIRE CHIEF ON THE AIR, RESPONDIN’, AH, TO THE SCENE, OF THE SECOND ALARM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0715:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>FIRE CHIEF. SEVEN SIXTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0715:10</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>(BEEP) FIRE CHIEF RESPONDING ON THE SECOND ALARM, 400 KENNEDY, ST. N.W.. SEVEN FIFTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0715:30</td>
<td>E5:</td>
<td>ENGINE 5 ON THE AIR TO ENGINE 22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0715:30</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>ENGINE 5. SEVEN SIXTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0715:50</td>
<td>F.C.:</td>
<td>CAN YOU ADVISE IF ALL PERSONNEL, ON THAT SCENE, AT THAT SECOND ALARM HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR AT THIS TIME?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0716:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>AH, FIRE CHIEF, BE ADVISED THEY'RE TRYING TO FIND THE LOCATION OF THE OFFICER ON ENGINE 14. GETTING READY TO DO ACCOUNTABILITY SHORTLY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0716:10</td>
<td>F.C.:</td>
<td>OKAY, COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0716:20</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0716:30</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>(BEEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0716:40</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>MEDICAL LOCAL, ENGINE 15 RESPOND, CODE ONE OVERDOSE, APARTMENT 339, 1601 ARGONNE PLACE, N.W., ENGINE 15 COPY?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0717:00</td>
<td>E15:</td>
<td>ENGINE 15 COPY, COULD YOU GIVE ME A CROSS ON THAT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0717:10</td>
<td>E15:</td>
<td>COPY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0717:30</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>(BEEP) MEDICAL LOCAL ENGINE 6, AMBULANCE 19, RESPONDING CODE ONE DIABETIC, TWENTY-SIX FOURTEEN, SHERMAN AVENUE, N.W. SEVEN EIGHTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0717:40</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 11 ON SCENE, SEVEN EIGHTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0718:50</td>
<td>T19p:</td>
<td>P.G. TRUCK 19 TO D.C. FIRE DISPATCH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0719:00</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>P.G. TRUCK 19?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Call Sign</td>
<td>Transcript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0719:10</td>
<td>T19p</td>
<td>YEAH............WE’RE IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFERRING TO STATION 24. IS THAT CORRECT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0719:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>THAT’S CORRECT, TRUCK 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0719:20</td>
<td>T19p</td>
<td>OKAY SIR, WE’LL...WE....WE’LL ADVISE YOU WHEN WE GET THERE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0719:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>OKAY, SEVEN TWENTY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0720:10</td>
<td>???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0720:10</td>
<td>R’HAB:</td>
<td>REHAB UNIT TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0720:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>LAST UNIT, TRY IT AGAIN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0720:20</td>
<td>R’HAB:</td>
<td>THAT’S THE REHAB UNIT. REHAB UNIT WILL BE ENROUTE TO THE SECOND ALARM, 4TH AND KENNEDY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0720:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>REHAB UNIT. SEVEN TWENTY-ONE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0721:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>..........CATIONS TO RESCUE SQUAD 3, YOUR LOCATION.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0721:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO RESCUE SQUAD 3. SQUAD 3, YOUR LOCATION.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0721:30</td>
<td>RS3:</td>
<td>3RD AND F, COMING OUT OF TUNNEL ..........(BROKE OFF AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0721:30</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>..........TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0721:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>YUP, SEVEN TWENTY-TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0724:00</td>
<td>T2:</td>
<td>TRUCK 2 READY AS TRUCK 11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0724:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO THE FIRE CHIEF, CAN YOU CALL 266.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0724:30</td>
<td>F.C.:</td>
<td>FIRE CHIEF, COPY DIRECT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0724:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>SEVEN TWENTY FIVE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0724:40</td>
<td>C.D.: (BEEP) MEDICAL LOCAL, ENGINE 2, MEDIC 5, RESPONDING CODE 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0725:20</td>
<td>D.C.6:</td>
<td>D.C. 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0725:20</td>
<td>D.C.6:</td>
<td>PLACE THIS UNIT ON THE AIR, AH OOOO, THIS UNIT IS RESPONDIN’ TO THE FIRE GROUND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0725:30</td>
<td>C.D.:</td>
<td>D.C. 6. SEVEN TWENTY-SIX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0726:10</td>
<td>AFCO:</td>
<td>OPERATIONS CHIEF ON THE FIRE GROUND, BUT NOT IN COMMAND.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
0726:10 C.D.: ..........OPERATION CHIEF. SEVEN TWENTY-SEVEN.

0726:50 T2: TRUCK 2 READY AS TRUCK 11.

0727:00 C.D.: TRUCK 2. SEVEN TWENTY-EIGHT.

0728:50 B2: PLACE BATTALION 2 ON THE AIR.

0728:50 C.D.: BATTALION 2. SEVEN THIRTY.

0729:00 ???: (TWO MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT.

0729:10 E5: ENGINE 5 IS IN ENGINE 22’S AREA.

0729:20 C.D.: ENGINE 5. SEVEN THIRTY.

0729:30 CAR66: CAR 66 TO COMMUNICATIONS.

0729:30 C.D.: LAST UNIT.

0729:40 CAR66: CAR 66.


0729:40 CAR66: I WILL BE RESPONDING TO 400 BLOCK KENNEDY STREET, N.W.

0730:10 D.C.6: D.C. 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS.


0730:10 D.C.6: PLACE THIS UNIT ON THE FIREGROUND.


0730:40 C.D.: (BEEP) LOCAL ALARM, ENGINE 23 RESPOND, AUTOMATIC FIRE ALARM. 1849 C STREET, N.W.. O SEVEN THIRTY- ONE.

0732:10 E23: ENGINE 23’S RESPONDING.

0732:20 C.D.: ENGINE 23. SEVEN THIRTY-THREE.

0733:10 CAR66: CAR 66 TO COMMUNICATIONS.


0733:10 CAR66: CORRECTION, I WILL BE PROCEEDING TO THE 400 BLOCK OF KENNEDY STREET, N.W.


0734:30 E23: ENGINE 23’S ON THE SCENE, NOTHIN’ EVIDENT.
0734:40 C.D.: 23. SEVEN THIRTY-FIVE.
0735:30 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0735:50 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0736:00 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0736:10 C.D.: ..........CATIONS TO COMMAND 4, BE ADVISED, DURATION OF TIME, SIXTY-FIVE MINUTES.
0736:30 E6: ENGINE SIX IS OFF THE AIR.
0736:30 C.D.: OFF THE AIR.
0736:50 E23: ENGINE 23 LAID OUT AT EIGHTEENTH AND VIRGINIA, REPORT OF SMOKE THROUGHOUT THE BUILDIN’.
0737:00 C.D.: 23. SEVEN THIRTY-EIGHT.
0737:00 E23: ENGINE 23 LAID OUT AT EIGHTEENTH AND VIRGINIA, MAKE THAT NINETEENTH AND VIRGINIA, CORRECTION.
0737:10 C.D.: ENGINE 23, TRY IT AGAIN?
0737:20 E23: FILL OUT THE BOX 1849 C , ENGINE 23 LAID OUT AT NINETEENTH AND VIRGINIA.
0737:30 E6: ENGINE 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS.
0737:30 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 23. CAN YOU HANDLE THIS WITH A DOUBLE LOCAL? 23?
0737:40 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 23. CAN YOU HANDLE THIS WITH A DOUBLE LOCAL? ENGINE 23?
0737:50 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 23.
0738:10 E6: ENGINE 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS.
0738:20 E6: ADVISE, I AM ON THE AIR SITTING IN FRONT OF QUARTERS ’TIL YOU FILL THAT BOX, OKAY? LET US KNOW IF WE’RE GOING.
0738:30 C.D.: (BEEP) COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 2, ENGINE 6, RESCUE SQUAD 3. RESPOND ON THE BOX, SMOKE IN THE BUILDIN’, 1849 C AS IN CHINA, N.W.. ENGINE 23 IS ON THE SCENE, LAID OUT AT NINETEENTH AND VIRGINIA. ENGINE 2 COPY? SECOND DUE.
0738:50  E2:        2 COPY.
0738:50  C.D.:      SQUAD 3 COPY?
0738:50  RS3:       SQUAD 3 COPY.
0738:50  C.D.:      SEVEN FORTY.
0739:00  C.D.:      (BEEP) BOX ALARM, ENGINES 23, 2, 13, 6, TOWER 10, TRUCK 55, BATTALION 6, RESCUE SQUAD 3 RESPOND, SMOKE IN THE BUILDIN’. 1849 C AS IN CHINA, N.W.. ENGINE 23 IS ON THE SCENE, LAID OUT AT NINETEENTH AND VIRGINIA. SEVEN THIRTY-NINE.
0739:30  B6:       BATTALION 6 BYE (SIREN IN BACKGROUND).
0739:40  C.D.:      BATTALION SIX. SEVEN FORTY. ENGINE 13 RESPONDING.
0739:40  ????:      (OPEN MIC, BELIEVED TO BE ENGINE 13. SIREN IS HEARD IN BACKGROUND)
0739:40  C.D.:      TOWER 10 RESPONDIN’.
0739:40  E13:       ENGINE 13’S GOIN’.
0739:50  C.D.:      ENGINE 13. TOWER 10 WITH YOU?
0740:10  T21:       TRUCK 21 RESPONDING.
0740:10  C.D.:      TRUCK 21. SEVEN FORTY-ONE.
0740:40  C.D.:      COMMUNICATIONS TO TRUCK 10 ARE YOU RESPONDING?
0740:40  T10:       TOWER 10 RESPONDIN’.
0740:40  C.D.:      COMMUNICATIONS TO TRUCK 10. ARE YOU RESPONDIN’ TOWER 10?
0740:40  T10:       TOWER 10 IS RESPONDING.
0740:40  C.D.:      SEVEN FORTY-TWO.

NOTE: IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE TIME STAMP REPEATED THE TIME 074040 OVER THREE TIMES. IT THEN CORRECTED ITSELF AND SKIPPED AHEAD TO 074110.
0741:10  C.D.:      (BEEP) .......(THEN IS CUT OFF BY....)
0741:00  E5:        ............ENGINE 5’S RESPONDING........(CUT-OFF)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Channel 1</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0741:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>SPECIAL ALARM, ENGINE 5, MONTGOMERY COUNTY TRUCK 19, ENGINE 15, RESPOND ON THE THIRD ALARM. STAGE AT 6TH AND KENNEDY STREET, N.W.. SEVEN FORTY-ONE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0741:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>ENGINE 5, RESPONSE?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0741:20</td>
<td>E5:</td>
<td>ENGINE 5’S RESPONDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0741:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>SEVEN FORTY-TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0741:30</td>
<td>T19m:</td>
<td>MONTGOMERY COUNTY TRUCK 19 OKAY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0741:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>TRUCK 19. SEVEN FORTY-TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0741:40</td>
<td>E15:</td>
<td>15 GOIN’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0741:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>SEVEN FORTY-TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0742:00</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0742:10</td>
<td>E2:</td>
<td>ENGINE 2 ON THE SCENE, E STREET SIDE, NOTHIN’ EVIDENT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0742:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>LAST UNIT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0743:00</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0743:10</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0743:20</td>
<td>E13:</td>
<td>ENGINE 13’S ON THE SCENE, PICKIN’ UP 23’S LINE…. (CUT OFF BY SOME OTHER VOICE SAYING, “PRIORITY”.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0743:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>13, SEVEN FORTY-FOUR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0743:20</td>
<td>T19m:</td>
<td>TRUCK 19 ON THE SCENE, KENNEDY STREET.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0743:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>TRUCK 19, SEVEN FORTY-FOUR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0746:10</td>
<td>B2:</td>
<td>BATTALION 2 OFF THE AIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0746:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>BATTALION 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0746:20</td>
<td>B6:</td>
<td>BATTALION 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0746:30</td>
<td>B6:</td>
<td>…..TEEN FORTY-NINE C, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, WE GOT SOME SMOKE IN THE LIBRARY AREA. FIRST FLOOR, QUADRANT A, UH, WE CAN’T FIND THE SOURCE, AH, WE THINK IT MAY BE, UH, DUCT WORK IN THE BASEMENT. I’M HOLDING ALL UNITS, ESTABLISHING COMMAND 6, SIDE ONE OF THE BUILDING.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0746:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMAND 6. SEVEN FORTY SEVEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0746:40</td>
<td>B6:</td>
<td>ADVISE ME IF YOU WANT ME TO STAY ON, AH, CHANNEL 4 OR GO TO CHANNEL 1 FOR OPERATIONS. OKAY?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
0746:50  C.D.: STAY ON CHANNEL 1.
0746:50  B6: YOU WANT ALL UNITS ON CHANNEL 1?
0746:50  C.D.: .....AT’S CORRECT.
0747:00  B6: OKAY.
0747:00  CAR66: PLACE CAR 66 ON THE SCENE.
0747:10  C.D.: 66. SEVEN FORTY EIGHT.
0747:10  C.D.: (BEEP) ...ATTENTION UNITS ON THE BOX, EIGHTEEN FORTY- NINE C STREET, N.W., COMMAND 6 REPORTS HEAVY SMOKE IN THE LIBRARY AREA, QUADRANT A, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR. CHECKIN’ FOR SOURCE. THEY BELIEVE COMING FROM THE DUCT WORK IN THE BASEMENT, „STABLISHING COMMAND 6, SIDE 1, FRONT OF THE BUILDIN’. SEVEN FORTY-EIGHT.
0747:30  E13: ENGINE 13 TO COMMAND 6. (BELLS HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND)
0747:40  E13: WE HAVE A SLIGHT HAZE ON THE .....(UNINTELLIGIBLE)....TO CHECK IT OUT. (SCBA)
0747:40  B6: WHAT FLOOR IS THAT?
0747:50  T21: TRUCK 21 IS ON THE SCENE.
0747:50  ???: .....COMMAND 6 (INTERRUPTED BY COMMUNICATIONS ACKNOWLEDGING TRUCK 21 ARRIVING ON THE SCENE).
0747:50  RS3: SQUAD 3 BYE.
0748:00  B6: GO DOWN IN THE BASEMENT, QUADRANT A, HELP ‘EM SEARCH FOR.....(UNINTELLIGIBLE)...THINK THEY MIGHT HAVE SOME’ IN THE DUCT WORK.
0748:00  RS3: SQUAD 3 OKAY.
0748:10  B6: COMMAND 6 TO 13, ARE YOU WORKING YOUR WAY UP FOR ME?
0748:10  E13: ENGINE 13 COPY....(UNINTELLIGIBLE, BELLS HEARD IN BACKGROUND).
0748:20  C.D.: .....CATIONS TO COMMAND 6....(FINISHED WITH B6 CUTTING IN SAYING, „TRY IT AGAIN, I DIDN’T COPY”.
0748:30  C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 6.
0748:30  B6: COMMAND 6 BYE.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0748:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>CAN YOU HAVE THE UNITS ON THIS INCIDENT SWITCH TO CHANNEL 2?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0748:40</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>KAY, WOULD YOU ADVISE THEM ON BOTH CHANNELS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0748:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO UNITS OPERATING ON THE BOX, EIGHTEEN HUNDRED, CORRECTION, EIGHTEEN FORTY-NINE C STREET, N.W., ALL UNITS SWITCH TO CHANNEL 2. USE CHANNEL 2 FOR THIS INCIDENT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0749:40</td>
<td>RS8p</td>
<td>PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY RESCUE SQUAD 8 TO D.C. FIRE COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0750:00</td>
<td>RS8p</td>
<td>PRINCE GEORGE RESCUE SQUAD 8 TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0750:20</td>
<td>CAR 9</td>
<td>CAR 9 ON THE FIREGROUND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0750:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>LAST UNIT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0750:40</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>COMMAND 6 TO ENGINE 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0750:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO P.G. COUNTY RESCUE SQUAD 8, GO AHEAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0751:00</td>
<td>RS8p</td>
<td>BE ADVISED WE'RE AT ENGINE COMPANY 15 ON, AH, TRANSFER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0751:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>O SEVEN FIFTY-TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0751:00</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>COMMAND UNIT TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0751:20</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>FIELD COMMAND UNIT TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0751:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COME IN FIELD COMMAND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0751:20</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>UH, COMMAND 4 WOULD LIKE YOU TO ANNOUNCE ON CHANNELS 1 AND 4 THAT ALL UNITS ARE TO GO THROUGH THEIR SECTORS COMMANDS TO MAKE THEIR REPORT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0751:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO THE UNITS ON THE THIRD ALARM. BE ADVISED ALL UNITS GO TO YOUR SECOND, GO TO YOUR SECTOR COMMANDS TO MAKE YOUR REPORT. ALL UNITS ON THE THIRD ALARM GO TO YOUR SECTOR COMMAND TO MAKE AH REPORT. SEVEN FIFTY-TWO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0752:00</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(TWICE, AN OPEN MIC CAN BE HEARD TRANSMITTING AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0752:10</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(A MIC CLICK CAN BE HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0752:20</td>
<td>E23</td>
<td>ENGINE 23 TO BATTALION 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0752:30</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>UNIT CALLING COMMAND 6?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENGINE 23 TO CHIEF, AH, IT’S DEFINITELY COMING OUT OF THE AH, VENTILATION SYSTEM. 6 ENGINE IS IN THE BASEMENT WORKING WITH THE BUILDING MAINTENANCE TO TRY TO CHECK THE DUCT WORK. AS FAR AS I CAN……(UNINTELLIGIBLE)…… DOWN HERE ….(UNINTELLIGIBLE)…… CIPATED, I THINK IT’S PROBABLY BURNED ITSELF OUT BY NOW.

OKAY, AH, BE ADVISED, AH, THEY WANT US TO GO TO CHANNEL 2, SO OPERATE ON CHANNEL 2 FROM NOW ON, OKAY?

OKAY, I HEARD THEM ON CHANNEL 1. I DIDN’T HEAR THEM SWITCH TO CHANNEL 2.

YEAH, I KNOW, YOU’RE BUSY, AH, YOU GOT ENGINE 2 AND ENGINE 6 DOWN THERE TA’ HELP YOU. SQUAD 3 IS ON THEIR WAY DOWN. 13 CHECKING THE UPPER FLOORS, SO FAR THE MOST OF THE SMOKE IS RIGHT THERE ON FIRST FLOOR WHERE YOU FIRST WENT IN, OKAY?

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE TRAINING ACADEMY VEHICLE.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE TRAINING DEPUTY.

COMMUNICATIONS TO DEPUTY OF TRAINING ACADEMY.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE TRAINING DEPUTY.

COMMAND 6…. (UNINTELLIGIBLE).

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, AH, STILL HAVE SOME SMOKE IN QUADRANT A OF THE LIBRARY AREA, BUT IT, AH, SEEMS TO BE DISSIPATING A LITTLE BIT. WE CAN’T FIND THE SOURCE. WE THINK, AH, MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOMETHING IN THE DUCT WORK OR IN THE AIR HANDLING UNITS. AH, WE’RE STILL LOOKING, BUT, AH, SITUATION SEEMS TO BE UNDER CONTROL AT THIS TIME.

COMMAND 6. SEVEN FIFTY-SEVEN.

(A MIC CLICK CAN BE HEARD AT THIS POINT).

(SPECIAL ALARM, ENGINE 31, ENGINE 26 RESPONDING THIRD ALARM, RESPOND TO STAGING AREA, 6TH AND KENNEDY STREETS, N.W. 0 SEVEN-FIFTY EIGHT.

ENGINE 26 GOIN’.

26, SEVEN FIFTY-EIGHT.

FIELD COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Call</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0759:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO ENGINE 31, ARE YOU RESPONDING?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:10</td>
<td>E31</td>
<td>ENGINE 31 RESPONDIN’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>O EIGHT HUNDRED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:20</td>
<td>E6</td>
<td>E6 TO BATTALION 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:20</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>ENGINE 6 WE’RE ON CHANNEL 2 NOW, OKAY?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:30</td>
<td>TBFC</td>
<td>TRAINING OFFICER RESPONDING TO THIRD ALARM, 400 KENNEDY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>TRAINING OFFICER. O EIGHT HUNDRED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:40</td>
<td>T10</td>
<td>TOWER 10 TO TOWER 10’S PORTABLE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:40</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>LAST UNIT TRY IT AGAIN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:50</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>FIELD COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0759:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>FIELD COMMAND, GO AHEAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:00</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>AH, ENGINE 31 IS THE FIRST, AH, UNIT TO REPORT TO. AH, STAGING AREA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>THAT’S CORRECT, ENGINE 31,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:00</td>
<td>DFC/A</td>
<td>WILL YOU HAVE THEM REPORT TO 4TH AND LONGFELLOW AND TAKE THE HYDRANT IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THAT AREA AND WE’LL DIRECT THEM WHERE TO GO FROM THERE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COPY ENGINE 31?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:10</td>
<td>E31</td>
<td>31 BYE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>AH, COMMAND UNIT WANTS YOU TO TAKE HYDRANT AT 4TH AND LONGFELLOW AND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THEY’LL DIRECT YOU FROM THERE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:20</td>
<td>E31</td>
<td>31 COPY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO P.I.O. OFFICER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO P.I.O. OFFICER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800:50</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(TWO MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0801:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO P.I.O. OFFICER?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0801:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO P.I.O. OFFICER?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0802:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>D.C. FIRE COMMUNICATIONS TO MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 61.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Device</td>
<td>Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0802:20</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>D.C. FIRE COMMUNICATIONS TO MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 61, MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 61?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0803:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(BEEP) SPECIAL ALARM, MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 61, RESPONDING THIRD ALARM, 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W., STAGE AT 6TH AND KENNEDY, 6TH AND KENNEDY, N.W., EIGHT O FOUR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0803:30</td>
<td>E61m</td>
<td>MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 61 TO D.C. FIRE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0803:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 61, RESPOND ON THE THIRD ALARM, STAGING AREA AT 6TH AND KENNEDY STREETS, N.W., COPY?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0803:50</td>
<td>E61m</td>
<td>MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 61 COPY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0805:20</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>COMMAND 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0805:30</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>COMMAND 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0805:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COME IN COMMAND 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0805:40</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>18TH AND C, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, WE STILL HAVE SOME SMOKE IN THE DUCT WORK. AH, WE HAVE BEEN WITH THE WELDER, HE'S WELDING ON THE DUCT WORK. MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME DUST OR SOMETHIN' INSIDE THE DUCTS. WE CAN'T FIND THE SOURCE, DOESN'T SEEM TO BE GETTIN' ANY WORSE, I AM GOING TO HAVE TO HOLD THE UNITS FOR A WHILE UNTIL WE, AH, FIND OUT WHAT WE, AH, GOT. OKAY?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0806:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>OKAY COMMAND 6, EIGHT O SEVEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0807:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4, BE ADVISED DURATION OF TIME, ONE HOUR TWENTY-FIVE MINUTES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0809:20</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0809:30</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0810:10</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0811:50</td>
<td>RS8p</td>
<td>PRINCE GEORGES SQUAD 8 TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0811:50</td>
<td>RS8p</td>
<td>PRINCE GEORGES SQUAD 8 TO COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0812:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>LAST UNIT TRY IT AGAIN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0812:00</td>
<td>RS8p</td>
<td>PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY SQUAD 8. WE'RE OFF THE AIR AT ENGINE 15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0812:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>OKAY SQUAD 8, EIGHT THIRTEEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0812:50</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Channel 1 Transcript (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Call</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0813:50</td>
<td>E61m</td>
<td>Montgomery County Engine 61 on the scene in the staging area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0813:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Montgomery County Engine 61, o eight fourteen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0814:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(Beep) Local alarm, engine 8, ambulance 16 responding motor vehicle accident, fourteenth and C as in China, S.E. eight fourteen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0815:00</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>Battalion 6 bye.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0815:10</td>
<td>B6</td>
<td>Battalion 6 bye.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0815:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Command 6 switch to channel 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0815:20</td>
<td>E8</td>
<td>Engine 8’s at fourteenth and C, S.E., find nothing, anything further?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0815:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>All we have is a school bus involved with seven to eight children, nothing further, nothing further.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0815:50</td>
<td>E8</td>
<td>Engine 8’s on the scene, we got it thanks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0818:10</td>
<td>FUEL</td>
<td>Diesel fuel truck’s on the scene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0818:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Unit on the scene?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0818:10</td>
<td>FUEL</td>
<td>Diesel fuel truck.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0819:20</td>
<td>E8</td>
<td>Engine 8 to communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0819:20</td>
<td>E8</td>
<td>Property damage only, cancel E.M.S., engine 8 ready.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0819:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Engine 8, eight twenty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0820:50</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Communications to battalion 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0821:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Communications to battalion 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0822:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>(Beep) Local alarm, engine 7, Montgomery County truck 6 respond, automatic residential fire alarm, 1507 Q as in Quick, N.W. truck 6 go.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0822:20</td>
<td>E8</td>
<td>Engine 8’s off the air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0822:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Engine 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0822:30</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Montgomery County truck 6, are you responding?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0822:40</td>
<td>E7</td>
<td>Engine 7’s goin’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0822:40</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Engine 7, eight twenty-three.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0823:00</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
<td>Montgomery County truck 6, are you responding?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
0824:40  C.D.: MONTGOMERY COUNTY TRUCK 6, DID YOU COPY THE RUN?

0825:30  C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO MONTGOMERY COUNTY TRUCK 6, ARE YOU RESPONDING?

0827:40  ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0827:50  ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0829:30  B6: COMMAND 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS.


0829:40  B6: DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, WE STILL HAVE SOME FIRE IN THE DUCT WORK, WE THINK WE LOCATED IT NEAR FANS IN THE MECHANICAL ROOM. AH, WE’RE IN THE PROCESS OF CHECKIN’ THAT NOW, CONTINUING TO HOLD THE UNITS.


0830:00  

NOTE: AT THIS POINT THE TAPE OF CHANNEL 1 IS FINISHED AND A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DFC RYAN AND DFC/A LYNCH IS HEARD FROM THIS POINT FORWARD.
HEY JIMMY, GO AHEAD, CHARGE THE LINE. I GOT FIRE……….(UNINTELLIGIBLE), CHARGE THE LINE. (SCBA)

ENGINE 22 TO TRUCK 11. (SCBA)

ENGINE 22 TO TRUCK 11. (SCBA)

ENGINE 22 TO TRUCK 11. (SCBA)

……..TO TRUCK 11. (SCBA)

HEY HENRY………………(UNNTTELLIGIBLE)……..GO AHEAD, CHECK UPSTAIRS. LOOKS LIKE WE GOT FIRE IN BETWEEN THE CEILINGS. (SCBA)

ALLRIGHT? (SCBA)

GOT IT. (SCBA)

……..TO COMMAND 4 (UNIT IDENTIFIED BY VOICE RECOGNITION) (SCBA)

ENGINE 22 TO COMMAND 4, PRIORITY. (SCBA)

COMMAND 4 BYE.

HEY CHIEF, WE’VE GOTTA SHUT THE GAS METER OFF, THIS THING’S REALLY CHANGIN’, IT’S A GAS FED FIRE. (SCBA)

NEED YOU TO REPEAT.

DID YOU COPY TO SHUT THE GAS OFF TO THE BUILDING, SHUT THE GAS OFF TO THE BUILDING. (SCBA)

COPY TRUCK 11 AND OR 6, CUT THE GAS OFF.

……..(UNINTELLIGIBLE CLICKS HEARD OVER RADIO)………

COPY TRUCK 6?

HEY LARRY, CUT THE GAS OFF.

ENGINE 24, YELL WHEN YOU NEED WATER. YELL OUT. (WAGON DRIVER)

……..UNINTELLIGIBLE KEYING OF MICROPHONE………
0630:50 ???: ..........CHIEF. (POSSIBLY ENGINE 24 CALLING?)
0630:50 E24: CHIEF, WE CAN’T GET INTO THE BASEMENT ‘TIL WE CUT THE BARS OFF. (POWER SAW HEARD IN BACKGROUND)
0631:00 B4: BATTALION 4 COPY.
0631:00 ???: ..........SEVERAL UNINTELLIGIBLE KEYING OF MICROPHONE, JUST CLICKS...
0631:10 E22: 22 TO THE CHIEF. (SCBA)
0631:10 B4: COMMAND 4 BYE.
0631:20 E22: HEY CHIEF, WERE YOU SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING THE GAS CUT OFF? (SCBA)
0631:20 B4: STILL WORKIN’ ON IT. COMMAND 4 TO TRUCK 11.
0631:30 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO BATTALION 4.
0631:40 E11: JOHN, YOU NEED WATER? (WAGON DRIVER)
0631:40 B4: COMMAND 4 TRUCK 11, TRUCK 6, ONE OF YA’ ACKNOWLEDGE CUTTIN’ THE GAS OFF.
0631:50 B4: GO AHEAD COMMUNICATIONS.
0632:00 B4: COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS GO AHEAD ON CHANNEL 4.
0632:00 C.D.: BATTALION 4 COULD YOU GIVE ME, UM, A EXACT ADDRESS OF THIS LOCATION?
0632:10 B4: SOUTHWEST CORNER 4TH AND KENNEDY. I’LL GIVE YOU AN ADDRESS IN A FEW MINUTES.
0632:20 B4: WHAT’S THE TRUCK COMPANY COMIN’?
0632:20 ???: ..........(UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION)
0632:40 B4: COMMAND 4 TO TRUCK 11.
0632:40 ???: ..........(UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS)
0632:40 B4: COMMAND 4 TO TRUCK 6.
0633:30 B4: COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS, CORRECTED ADDRESS 400. (SEVERAL MIC CLICKS FOLLOW)
0634:00 B4: 400 KENNEDY.
0634:20 E22: E22 TO COMMAND 4. (SCBA)
0634:30 B4: (SEVERAL MIC CLICKS), GO AHEAD 22.
0634:30 E22: CHIEF, WHAT COMPANY DO YOU HAVE WORKING ABOVE US? (SCBA)
0634:40 B4: I HAVEN'T GOTTEN A REPORT BACK, HOLD ON.
0634:50 E24: ...TO THE CHIEF WHAT DO YOU NEED? WE CAN'T GAIN ACCESS INTO THE BASEMENT, COMIN' AROUND TO THE FRONT. (UNIT IDENTIFIED BY VOICE RECOGNITION) (SAW CAN BE HEARD IN BACKGROUND).
0634:50 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION)
0635:00 B4: SEE IF YOU CAN GAIN ACCESS TO THE BASEMENT FROM THE FRONT, GET BACK TO ME. 14 YOU BACKIN' UP 22? (POWER SAWS HEARD IN BACKGROUND)
0635:10 ???: ...(UNINTELLIGIBLE KEYING OF MICROPHONE, SHORT CLICK)
0635:20 B4: GO AHEAD TRUCK 11.
0635:20 T11: AH, STILL WORKIN' ON THAT GAS SHUT FOR YA'. THEY'LL GIVE YOU A HOLLER AS SOON AS IT'S DONE.
0635:20 B4: ¹PPRECiate IT.
0635:30 B4: COMMAND 4 TO 24. LOOKS LIKE IT'S IN THE BASEMENT, AH, 11 BACK 'EM UP.
0635:40 E24: OKAY, 24'S OKAY THERE IS NO ACCESS TO THE BASEMENT FROM THE OUTSIDE.
0635:50 B4: COPY.
0636:50 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS)
0637:20 ???: (ONE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK)
0637:30 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS)
0638:00 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE BRIEF TRANSMISSION)
0638:00 B4: GO 11.
0638:00 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE REPORT GIVEN, ALL HEARD IS STATIC)
0638:00 B4: REPEAT?
0638:10 E11: ......REAR IN THE BASEMENT. (SCBA)
0638:10 B4: ‘APPRECIATE IT. COPY 24?
0638:20 ???: (A SHORT BEEP, PROBABLE BLEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL 1)
0638:30 ???: (TWO SHORT UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD)
0638:40 B4: COMMAND 4 TO TRUCK 14.
0638:50 ???: (ONE SHORT CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)
0639:10 B4: COMMAND 4 TO TRUCK 14.
0639:10 ???: (A LONG SCRATCHY TONE, PROBABLE BLEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL 1)
0639:50 B4: COMMAND 4 TO 14, WHAT IS YOUR POSITION?
0640:00 T14: TRUCK 14, 14TH AND VARNUM.
0640:00 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE PORTABLE IS TALKING THROUGH MASK, CUT OFF BY...)
0640:00 B4: TRUCK 14 GO TO 4TH AND KENNEDY AND, AH, TAKE CARE OF THE SECOND FLOOR.
0640:10 T14: 4TH AND KENNEDY. WE’RE COMIN’ IN.
0640:10 B4: COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS YOU WANNA’ GIVE YU...M..MY TASK FORCE COMPANIES.
0640:20 C.D.: COMMAND 4, YOU HAVE ENGINE 12, ENGINE 4, TRUCK 12, BATTALION 5.

NOTE: AT THIS POINT, COMMUNICATIONS CHANGED TO A MALE VOICE.

0640:20 T11: TRUCK 11......BATTALION 4, PRIORITY! (SCBA)
0640:20 B4: BATTALION 4, CLEAR PRIORITY.
0640:30 T11: ENGINE 14 TRUCK 11 ON THE FIRST FLOOR. WE GOT A BACK UP A LITTLE BIT. WE GOT EXTREME HEAT BUILD-UP. WE CAN’T GET ANY WATER ON IT, WE’RE ON THE WRONG FLOOR. (SCBA)
0640:40 B4: NEED YOU T’ REPEAT.
0640:50 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD, UNINTELLIGIBLE)
0641:00 T11: TRUCK 11 TO BATTALION, QUADRANT C, GOING THROUGH THE FRONT DOOR......(THEN UNINTELLIGIBLE AND CUTS OUT) (SCBA)

0641:10 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD, UNINTELLIGIBLE)

0641:20 B4: COPY QUADRANT C.

0641:20 ???: THAT WAS IT DOUG.

0641:30 B4: COMMAND 4 COMMUNICATIONS, AH, ENGINE 12, WHOSE SECOND DUE ENGINE?


0641:30 B4: COPY

0641:30 E24: 24 TO CHIEF.

0641:30 B4: GO AHEAD 24.

0641:40 E24: CHIEF, THERE IS, JUST TO REPEAT, THERE IS NO ACCESS TO THE BASEMENT FROM THE OUTSIDE.

0641:50 ???: (UNKNOWN TRANSMISSION, DUE TO TONE BLEEDING OVER FROM CHANNEL 1).


NOTE: IT MUST BE NOTED THAT WE FOUND A TOTAL REPEAT OF THE TIME STAMP AT 064150 ANNOUNCED BACK TO BACK AT THIS POINT! THE TIME STAMP THEN CORRECTS ITSELF BY SKIPPING 064200 AND ANNOUNCING THE NEXT STAMP AS 064210.

0642:10 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0642:20 ???: (TONE IS HEARD, PROBABLY BLEEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL 1)

0642:20 E4: ENGINE 4 ON THE SCENE.


0642:20 B4: GO SQUAD 2.

0642:30 RS2: GOT FIRE SHOWING ON THE FIRST FLOOR NOW, PRIMARY'S COMPLETE, NEGATIVE. (LOT OF HOLLERING IS HEARD IN BACKGROUND)

0642:30 B4: COPY PRIMARY NEGATIVE, FIRE GOING THROUGH THE FLOOR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Channel 4 Transcript (Continued)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0642:30</td>
<td>RS2: I GOTA’........(UNINTELLIGIBLE)........... ON THE, AH, FIRST FLOOR. (LOT OF YELLING AND HOLLERING HEARD IN BACKGROUND).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0642:40</td>
<td>B4: COMMAND 4 COPY.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0642:50</td>
<td>E4: ENGINE 4 TO COMMAND.</td>
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<td>0642:50</td>
<td>E4: WE’RE ON THE SCENE, AH, WHATAYA NEED.</td>
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<td>0642:50</td>
<td>B4: I NEED 12, 4, AND TRUCK 12 TA CHECK SECOND FLOOR.</td>
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<td>0643:00</td>
<td>E4: CHECK SECOND FLOOR (LAYOUT IS YELLED IN BACKGROUND), ENGINE 4 OKAY.</td>
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<td>0643:10</td>
<td>B4: COMMAND 4 COMMUNICATIONS ON 4, GIVE ME THE HAZ-MAT FOR, AH, RAPID INTERVENTION.</td>
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<td>0643:20</td>
<td>C.D.: COMMAND 4, YOU REQUESTING THE HAZ-MAT UNIT?</td>
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<td>0643:20</td>
<td>E12: ENGINE 12’S ON THE SCENE.</td>
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<td>0643:30</td>
<td>???: (SEVERAL TONES ARE HEARD, SOUND’S LIKE A TELEPHONE?)</td>
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<td>0644:00</td>
<td>B4: COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS GO AHEAD AND GIVE ME ANOTHER TASK FORCE, STAGE 5™ AND KENNEDY.</td>
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<td>0644:00</td>
<td>C.D.: OKAY COMMAND 4. SIX FORTY FOUR.</td>
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<td>0644:10</td>
<td>B4: COULDN’T COPY, REPEAT.</td>
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<td>0644:10</td>
<td>B4: COULDN’T COPY ABOUT THE BASEMENT.</td>
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<td>0644:10</td>
<td>???: 14’S IN THE BASEMENT! (SCBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0644:20</td>
<td>RS2: SQUAD 2 TO COMMAND 4!</td>
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<td>0644:20</td>
<td>B4: G’HEAD SQUAD 2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0644:20</td>
<td>RS2: BELIEVE THIS GAS FED SIR, WE DON’T HAVE THE GAS OFF YET.</td>
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<td>0644:30</td>
<td>B4: GOT TWO TRUCK COMPANIES WORKIN’ ON IT.</td>
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<td>0644:40</td>
<td>B5: BATTALION 5 TA’ COMMAND 4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0644:50</td>
<td>B4: TAKE INTERIOR.........BATTALION 5, I HAD TROUBLE GETTIN’ TO THE BASEMENT. ALSO, GAS PROBLEMS.</td>
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<td>0645:00</td>
<td>B5: REPEAT THAT DOUG, TAKE THE INTERIOR WHAT?</td>
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<td>0645:00</td>
<td>DFC: TAKE THE INTERIOR ON SIDE ONE.......(CUT OFF)</td>
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<td>0645:00</td>
<td>B5: OKAY.</td>
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**CHANNEL 4 TRANSCRIPT (CONTINUED)**

0645:10 DFC: (CONTINUES).....COORDINATE AN ATTACK, AH, THROUGH THE FRONT DOOR. ALSO, HAVE 'EM, BE AH, LEERY OF A PROBLEM IN THE BASEMENT, WE HAVEN'T FOUND OUT ANYTHING ABOUT THE BASEMENT YET.

0645:20 B5: BATTALION 5 OKAY.

0645:20 ???: (A SHORT INTELLIGIBLE BUMP OR CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT.)


0645:20 E22: AH, 22 TO COMMAND 4. (SCBA)

0645:30 DFC: COMMAND 4 BYE.

0645:40 E22: HEY CHIEF, ........(SCBA)

0645:40 ???: ..........GET OUT.........(THIS TRANSMISSION IS VERY BRIEF AND SCRATCHY) (SCBA)

0645:50 DFC: DID YOU SAY YOU HAD A TWO AND A HALF?

0645:50 ???: THAT'S CORRECT, WE'RE GONNA' HAVE TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT FROM HERE......(REST OF TRANSMISSION IS UNINTELLIGIBLE) (SCBA)

0645:50 DFC: THROUGH THE FRONT DOOR?

0645:50 T14: TRUCK 14 TO COMMAND 4.

0645:50 DFC: GO AHEAD TRUCK 14.

0646:00 T14: CHIEF, WE CAN'T EVEN GO IN ENTRANCE, WE CUT OUT FROM THE SECOND FLOOR AT THIS TIME.

0646:10 DFC: ALLRIGHT, THEN, AH, DON'T LET ANYBODY GO IN THE FRONT DOOR. HOLD IT RIGHT THERE, DID YOU COPY, AH, BATTALION 5? REPORTING HOLES IN THE FLOOR, I DON'T WANT TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT THROUGH THE FRONT DOOR.

0646:20 ???: ENGINE 4, IF YOU WANT WATER.......(CUT OFF)

0646:20 B5: ........I'M ARRIVING ON THE SCENE AT THIS TIME.

0646:20 DFC: ALLRIGHT, ONCE YOU GET UP FRONT THERE, MAKE SURE NOBODY GOES IN THAT FRONT DOOR.

0646:30 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION)

0646:30 ???: ........STAIRWELL THAT GOES TO THE SECOND FLOOR. (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION)

0646:30 DFC: COMMAND 4 COPY.
0646:40 ???: ENGINE 4, DO YOU WANT WATER?
0646:50 ???: ENGINE 4 ON CHANNEL 4, DO YOU WANT WATER?
0647:00 ???: (A TOTAL OF FOUR UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS OCCUR AT THIS TIME)
0647:10 ???: ENGINE 4 ON CHANNEL 4, DO YOU NEED WATER?
0647:10 E4: LET THE WATER GO, LET THE WATER GO.
0647:30 ???: (SEVERAL MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT)
0647:40 T14: TRUCK 14 TO COMMAND.
0647:40 ???: (MIC CLICK HEARD AT THIS POINT)
0647:50 DFC: COMMAND TO TRUCK 14.
0648:00 DFC: ALLRIGHT, I WANT YOU TO GET UP ON THE ROOF TRUCK 14, AND YOU’RE GONNA’ BE, AH, IN CHARGE OF THE ROOF SECTOR, LET ME KNOW WHAT THE CONDITIONS ARE UP THERE.
0648:10 T14: TRUCK 14 OKAY.
0648:10 DFC: TAKE YOUR WHOLE CREW TO THE ROOF.
0648:10 T12: TRUCK 12 TO COMMAND 4.
0648:10 DFC: GO AHEAD TRUCK 12.
0648:10 T12: GOT ANY ORDERS FOR US?
0648:20 DFC: WANT YOU TO ASSIST, ASSIST, AH, TRUCK 14 ON THE ROOF WITH YOUR ENTIRE CREW. LET ME KNOW WHAT THE CONDITIONS ARE, PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO EXPOSURE TWO.
0648:30 T12: TRUCK 12 COPY.
0649:00 DFC/A: FIELD COMMAND UNIT TO COMMAND 4. (SIREN IN BACKGROUND)
0649:10 E12: ENGINE 12 TO COMMAND.
0649:10 DFC: GO AHEAD ENGINE 12.
0649:20 E12: YES SIR, WE’RE IN EXPOSURE 2, AH, ON THE SECOND FLOOR IT’S CLEAR.
0649:20 DFC: ALLRIGHT, AH, ENGINE 12, WHERE IS YOUR, AH, PIECE. I WANT YOU TO GET OVER HERE AND, AH, SET UP BY, AH, TRUCK 11. GET READY FOR SOME HEAVY DUTY.
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Channel 4 Transcript (Continued)</th>
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<tr>
<td>0649:40</td>
<td>???: ....ENGINE, WE HAVE AH.........ESTABLISHED. (FEMALE VOICE)</td>
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<td><strong>NOTE:</strong> THE FOLLOWING FOUR TRANSMISSIONS OCCUR ON TOP OF ONE ANOTHER AND ARE VERY HARD TO IDENTIFY.*</td>
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<tr>
<td>0649:50</td>
<td>DFC/A: FIELD COMMAND TO THE FIREFIGHTING DEPUTY. (SIREN IN BACKGROUND)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0649:50</td>
<td>DFC: ALLRIGHT, JUST BE PREPARED, JUS’, THAT’S ALL.</td>
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<td>0649:50</td>
<td>DFC/A: WHERE YOU NEED ME AT? (SIREN IN BACKGROUND)</td>
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<td>0649:50</td>
<td>???: ........INSIDE, COPY. (FEMALE VOICE)</td>
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<td>0650:00</td>
<td>???: (ONE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK)</td>
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<td>0650:10</td>
<td>E28: ENGINE 28 TO CHIEF 4.</td>
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<td>0650:10</td>
<td>DFC: COMMAND 4.</td>
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<td>0650:20</td>
<td>DFC: ALLRIGHT, YOU GOTTA PENCIL AND PAPER, JUST WRITE DOWN THE COMPANIES AS THEY COME IN AND LET ME KNOW WHEN THEY GET THERE AND I’LL GIVE THEM THE ASSIGNMENT.</td>
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<td>0650:30</td>
<td>DFC: ALLRIGHT, SEND, AH, TRUCK 9’S MANPOWER TO THE COMMAND POST, WHICH IS LOCATED, AH, JUST IN FRONT OF TRUCK 6.</td>
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<td>0650:40</td>
<td>E28: DO YOU WANNA’ FILL THE STAGING AREA.</td>
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<td>0650:40</td>
<td>DFC: NEGATIVE AT THIS TIME.</td>
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<td>0650:50</td>
<td>DFC: COMMAND 4 TO INTERIOR.</td>
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<td>0650:50</td>
<td>B5: BATTALION 5 BYE (SCBA)</td>
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<td>0651:00</td>
<td>DFC: AH, YOU GOTTA’ TWO AND A HALF GOIN’ IN THE FRONT DOOR. IS THAT CORRECT?</td>
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<td>0651:00</td>
<td>B5: I HAVE EVERYBODY OUTTA’ THE BUILDING, OUTSIDE NOW. YOUR LAST COMMAND WAS TO KEEP EVERYBODY OUTSIDE OF THE BUILDING.</td>
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<td>0651:10</td>
<td>DFC: BUT I WANT SOME WATER FLOWIN’ IN THE FRONT DOOR WITH A TWO AND HALF INCH HOSELINE, AT THE FRONT DOOR!</td>
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<td>0651:10</td>
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<td>0652:40 E24:</td>
<td>THAT'S CORRECT, IN FROM THA, IN FROM THE SIDE CHIEF. WE CAN FEEL THE WATER THAT’S SOMEBODY’S ..........(BROKE OFF AT THIS POINT). (SCBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0652:50 DFC:</td>
<td>ALLRIGHT YOU GOT ANY FIRE IN THE BASEMENT?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0652:50 E24:</td>
<td>IT SOUNDS LIKE THEY’RE HITTIN’ IT NOW WITH THAT TWO AND A HALF. (SCBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:00 DFC:</td>
<td>ALLRIGHT, BUT DO YA’ HAVE ANY FIRE IN THE BASEMENT 24?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:00 E24:</td>
<td>THAT’S CORRECT. (SCBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:10 DFC:</td>
<td>ARE YOU UP IN IT, ARE YOU, AH, HITTIN’ IT ALL.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:10 E24:</td>
<td>TELL ’EM TO HOLD UP ON THAT TWO AND HALF A MINUTE. (SCBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:10 DFC:</td>
<td>COMMAND 4 TA’ BATTALION 5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:10 B5:</td>
<td>BATTALION 5. (SCBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:20 DFC:</td>
<td>HOLD UP ON THE TWO AND A HALF FOR A MINUTE ‘TIL, AH, 24’S HITTIN’ IT IN THE BASEMENT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:20 B5:</td>
<td>BATTALION 5 OKAY. (SCBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:20 DFC:</td>
<td>COMMAND 4 TO ENGINE 4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:30 E4:</td>
<td>ENGINE 4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:30 DFC:</td>
<td>GET IN THAT THERE, BACK UP, AH, ENGINE 24, RIGHT THERE IN THE REAR. YOU’RE JUST WALKIN’ AWAY FROM ‘EM. GET DOWN THERE BACK ‘EM UP!</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:40 C.D.:</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:40 DFC:</td>
<td>COMMAND 4 ON 4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:40 C.D.:</td>
<td>WHERE DO YOU WANT THE COMMAND UNIT?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0653:50 E16:</td>
<td>ENGINE 16’S AT STAGING.</td>
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<td>0654:00 DFC:</td>
<td>HAVE ‘EM COME IN LONGFELLOW AND TAKE THE ALLEY BETWEEN, AH, COME SOUTHBOUND IN THE ALLEY BETWEEN, AH, 4TH AND 5TH, OFF OF LONGFELLOW.</td>
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<td>0654:10 C.D.:</td>
<td>OKAY.</td>
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<td>0654:10 ???:</td>
<td>(UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0654:20 HMU</td>
<td>HAZ-MAT UNIT’S AT THE STAGING AREA.</td>
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<td>0654:20 DFC:</td>
<td>COMMAND 4 TO, AH ROOF SECTOR.</td>
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<td>0654:20</td>
<td>T14:</td>
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B-41

CHANNEL 4
TRANSCRIPT
(CONTINUED)

0657:30 B5: THE CREW MEMBERS OF ENGINE 14 ARE TELLING ME THAT THEY CAN’T FIND THEIR SERGEANT, SERGEANT CARTER. HAVE YOU CHECKED ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF HIM? (SCBA)

0657:40 B4: COMMAND 4 TO SERGEANT CARTER, ENGINE 14?

0657:40 ???: (ONE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0657:50 B4: COMMAND 4 TO SERGEANT CARTER, ENGINE 14.

0658:00 B4: COMMAND 4 TO 24 OR 4...(TELEPHONE RINGING IN BACKGROUND) GIVE ME A, AND THE SQUAD SHOULD WE NEED TO GO IN THE BASEMENT TO LOOK FOR PERSONNEL.

0658:10 B5: BATTALION 5 TO COMMAND 4, THERE’S (TONE IS HEARD AT THIS POINT BLEEDING OVER FROM CHANNEL ONE)…..THEY WERE, AH, HITTIN’ THE FIRE BEFORE WE BACKED EVERYBODY OUT. (SCBA)

0658:20 B4: COPIED. (VOICES HEARD YELLING IN BACKGROUND)

0658:20 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0658:30 B4: COMMAND 4 BYE (LOT’S OF BACKGROUND TALK)

0658:30 ???: (VERY BROKEN TRANSMISSION HEARD. UNINTELLIGIBLE)

0658:30 B4: GET UP THERE, HAVE A TRUCK COMPANY WITH YA’.

0658:40 ???: OKAY, TRUCK 12 SHOULD BE RIGHT HERE WITH ME SIR.

0658:50 B4: MAKE SURE YOU GOT ‘EM BEFORE YOU GO IN.

0658:50 T12: AH, TRUCK 12 TO COMMAND 4, BE ADVISED OUR POSITION’S ON THE ROOF. THE ROOF AT THIS TIME IS SOLID, AH, IT IS VENTED UP HERE AS MUCH AS WE CAN.

0659:00 DFC: TRUCK 12, OKAY TRUCK 12. YOU’RE WORKING WITH TRUCK 14 IS THAT CORRECT?

0659:10 T12: THAT’S AFFIRMATIVE.

0659:10 DFC: ALLRIGHT, JUST STAY IN POSITION RIGHT NOW.

0659:10 ???: (ONE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0659:20 DFC: ANYBODY ON THE FIREGROUND THAT KNOWS THE WHEREABOUTS OF SERGEANT CARTER, ENGINE 14, NOTIFY THE COMMAND POST PLEASE.

0659:30 ???: (ONE SHORT UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0659:30 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO ENGINE 24.
0659:30  ???:  (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0659:30  DFC:  HOW YA’ DOIN’?
0659:40  DFC:  YA’ BACKIN’ OUT?
0659:40  DFC:  ARE YOU BACKIN’ OUT ENGINE 14?
0659:50  DFC:  COMMAND 4 TO ENGINE 24.
0700:00  T14:  TRUCK 14.
0700:00  ???:  HEY LIEU, AH, DID YOU…….(THREE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD NOW)
0700:10  DFC:  COMMAND 4 TO ENGINE 24!!!!
0700:10  ???:  …….HEY, I NEED YA’ AT THE BASE OF THAT LADDER, GEORGE.
0700:20  E4:  ENGINE 4 TO COMMAND.  (SCBA)
0700:20  E4:  ENGINE 24 AND ENGINE 4 JUST BACKED OUT OF THE BASEMENT.  (SCBA)
0700:20  DFC:  ALLRIGHT, IS EVERYBODY OUT?
0700:30  E4:  AH THAT’S AFFIRMATIVE RIGHT NOW, AH, TAKIN’ ACCOUNT.
0700:30  DFC:  OKAY, COMMAND 4 TO BATTALION 5.
0700:30  B5:  GO AHEAD.
0700:40  DFC:  OPEN UP FROM THE FRONT.
0700:40  B5:  OKAY, HAVE WE LOCATED SERGEANT CARTER YET? WHAT DO YOU WANNA’ DO ABOUT THAT SITUATION?
0700:50  DFC:  I WANNA’ KEEP LOOKIN’ FOR HIM, BUT WE HAVE, WE GOTTA’ OPEN UP FROM THE FRONT.
0700:50  B5:  OKAY,...........(UNINTELLIGIBLE) YOU WANNA’ OPEN FROM OUT FRONT?
0700:50  DFC:  EVERYBODY SHOULD BE OUT, WE’RE PULLIN’ ‘EM OUT FROM THE REAR RIGHT NOW.
0701:00  B5:  OKAY.
0701:00  ???:  (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)
0701:10  ???:  (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)
0701:20 ???:  (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0701:30 B4:  COMMAND 4 BYE.

0701:30 E24:  CHIEF, ENGINE 24’S OUT OF THE BASEMENT ALONG WITH 4 ENGINE.

0701:40 B4:  COMMAND 4 COPY.

0701:50 B4:  COMMAND 4 COMMUNICATIONS, GO AHEAD AND GIVE ME MY SECOND ALARM ASSIGNMENT IN THE STAGING AREA.

0702:00 C.D.:  COMMAND 4, SECOND ALARM YOU HAVE....(PAUSE)....ENGINE 17, 21, ENGINE 1, ENGINE 9 RAPID INTERVENTION, TRUCK 15, TRUCK 3 AND RESCUE SQUAD 1.

0702:10 B4:  GO AND HAVE SQUAD 1, COME, AH, 400 BLOCK OF KENNEDY, TELL ‘EM USE THE ALLEY OFF OF LONGFELLOW.

0702:20 C.D.:  OKAY.

0702:20 ???:  (THREE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0702:30 ???:  ........(UNINTELLIGIBLE) .....COMMAND FOUR, WE’RE ALL SET.

0702:40 RS1:  SQUAD 1 COPY.

0702:40 C.D.:  SQUAD 1, SEVEN O THREE.

0703:00 B4:  COMMAND 4, THE SECOND ALARM WAS 17, 21, 1, AND WHO WAS FOURTH DUE ENGINE?

0703:00 C.D.:  AH, ENGINE 9 COMMAND 4.

0703:10 B4:  KAY, AH, YOU TOLD ME THEY WERE RAPID INTERVENTION.

0703:10 C.D.:  UH, THAT’S CORRECT THEY ARE RAPID INTERVENTION. YOU WANT A FOURTH UNIT, ENGINE ON THAT?

0703:10 B4:  THAT’S CORRECT.

0703:20 T9:  TRUCK 9 TO BATTALION 4.


0703:20 T9:  YEAH, WE WERE TOLD TO COME DOWN TO THE FIREGROUND, WHAT INSTRUCTIONS DO YA’ HAVE?

0703:30 B4:  REPORT TO THE BUGGY.

0703:30 E21:  ENGINE 21.........AT THE STAGING AREA. ENGINE 21’S ON THE SCENE AT THE STAGING AREA.

0703:40 C.D.:  21, SEVEN O FOUR.
0703:40 E12: ENGINE 12 TO COMMAND. (SCBA)
0703:50 B4: COMMAND BYE DID NOT COPY YOUR UNIT.
0703:50 E12: ENGINE 12 TO COMMAND. (SCBA)
0703:50 B4: GO AHEAD 12.
0704:00 B4: MAKE SURE OF THE WALLS.
0704:10 B4: COMMAND 4 BYE.
0704:10 C.D.: YOUR FOURTH UNIT ON THE SECOND ALARM IS GONNA’ BE MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 11.
0704:40 ???: (TONE HEARD, BLEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL 1)
0705:20 C.D.: ATTENTION ALL UNITS ON THE BOX 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W., UNITS BE ADVISED THEY’RE ON EXTERIOR ATTACK. ALL UNITS SOUND YOUR AIR HORNS AND CLEAR THE BUILDING. ALL UNITS ARE TO CLEAR THE BUILDING. SEVEN O SIX.
0705:30 ???: (TONE HEARD, BLEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL 1)
0705:40 E9: ENGINE 9 ON THE SCENE……(UNINTELLIGIBLE)……
0705:50 E17: ENGINE 17 ON THE SCENE IN THE STAGING AREA.
0705:50 C.D.: 17, SEVEN 0 SIX.
0706:00 B4: COMMAND 4 TO ENGINE 9, COME UP TO THE BUGGY IN THE ALLEY FOR RAPID INTERVENTION. STAND-BY.
0706:00 E9: 9 COPY.
0706:40 E28: STAGING OFFICER TO COMMAND 4.
0706:40 DFC: GO AHEAD STAGING OFFICER.
0706:50 E28: STAGING OFFICER TO COMMAND 4.
0707:50 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO AH, STAGING.
0707:50  ???:  (UNINTELLIGIBLE RESPONSE FROM SOMEONE).

0708:00  DFC:  SEND ENGINE 17, FOUR PEOPLE WITH THEIR MASKS TO THE COMMAND POST.

0708:00  E28:  THEY’RE ON THE WAY.

0708:10  B5:  BATTALION 5 TO COMMAND.  (SCBA)

0708:10  DFC:  COMMAND BYE.

0708:10  B5:  DID YOU GIVE AN OKAY FOR MEMBERS TO ENTER HERE? (SCBA)

0708:20  DFC:  SQUAD TWO’S GONNA’ TAKE IT, SEE IF THEY CAN MAKE A CHECK ON THE INSIDE, WITH ENGINE 22 AND I’M GONNA’ SEND SQUAD ONE DOWN TA’ BACK ‘EM UP.

0708:20  B5:  OKAY, HOW MANY PEOPLE DID YOU WANT IN? (SCBA)

0708:30  DFC:  GONNA’ HAVE TWO TEAMS OF FOUR EACH.

0708:30  B5:  TEAM TWO’S BACK UP, IS THAT CORRECT? (SCBA)

0708:30  DFC:  THAT’S CORRECT.

0708:40  B5:  HAVE SQUAD ONE REPORT TO ME AT THE FRONT OF THE BUILDING. (SCBA)

0708:40  RS1:  SQUAD 1 TO COMMAND 4.

0708:40  DFC:  GO AHEAD SQUAD 1.

0708:40  RS1:  CHIEF, WHAT YOU NEED?


0708:50  RS1:  SQUAD 1 COPY.

0709:10  E9:  ENGINE 9 TO COMMAND 4.

0709:20  B4:  COMMAND 4 BYE.

0709:20  E9:  WHAT’S YOUR LOCATION? WE’RE RAPID INTERVENTION.

0709:20  B4:  BY SQUAD 2, TRUCK 6, 400 BLOCK OF KENNEDY, A HUNDRED FEET WEST OF 4TH STREET.

0709:50  T12:  TRUCK 12 TO, AH, COMMAND 4.

0709:50  DFC:  GO AHEAD TRUCK 12.

0709:50  T12:  CHIEF, AH, IF YOU COULD SPARE AN ENGINE COMPANY, AH, WE’RE OPENIN’ UP THIS ROOF HERE, WE’RE PROBABLY GONNA’ NEED A LINE UP HERE EVENTUALLY.
0710:00 ???:  (SHORT MIC CLICK IS HEARD)..........FOUR.

0710:00 C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.

0710:10 E12:  ENGINE 12 IS TAKING A CREW IN ON THE SECOND FLOOR FOR A SEARCH IS THAT OKAY?

0710:10 DFC:  NO, THEY GOTTA’ CLEAR THAT WITH AH, BATTALION 5 AT THE FRONT DOOR.


0710:20 B4:  COMMAND 4 BYE.

0710:30 C.D.:  AH, COMMAND 4 HAVE YOU FOUND THE OFFICER FROM ENGINE 14?

0710:30 B4:  WE’RE CHECKIN’ NOW.

0710:30 C.D.:  COMMAND 4, BE ADVISED DURATION OF TIME FORTY MINUTES.

0710:40 B5:  BATTALION 5 TO COMMAND 4! (SCBA)

0710:50 DFC:  GO AHEAD BATTALION 5.

0710:50 B5:  CHIEF, WE HAVE ALL KINDS OF HOLES IN THE FLOOR INSIDE THE BUILDING. THE TEAM IS OUT, THEY’RE STAYIN’ OUT. (SCBA)

0711:00 DFC:  OKAY, LET’S GO AHEAD WITH AH, EXTERIOR ATTACK THEN AGAIN. GO AHEAD AN OPEN UP.

0711:00 B5:  OKAY, BILL.

0711:10 DFC/A:  FIELD COMMAND TO AH, BATTALION 4.

0711:20 DFC/A:  FIELD COMMAND TO COMMAND 4.

0711:20 DFC:  GO AHEAD FIELD COMMAND.

0711:30 DFC/A:  AH, YEAH CHIEF, YOU WANNA’ DO IT, AH, WHEN YOU WANNA DO YOUR ACCOUNTABILITY.

0711:30 DFC:  AH, WE’RE GONNA’ GET READY TA’ DO IT IN JUST A MINUTE.

0711:40 DFC/A:  OKAY.

0711:50 DFC:  COMMAND 4 TO AH, BATTALION 5.

0712:00 DFC:  COMMAND 4 TO BATTALION 5.

0712:00 B5:  BATTALION FIVE BYE.
0712:10 DFC: GO AHEAD AND COMMENCE WITH THE EXTERIOR ATTACK AGAIN. WE CAN, AH, PUT LINES IN THE BASEMENT WINDAHS AND THROUGH THE WINDAHS, AH, ON THE FIRST FLOOR.

0712:10 B5: OKAY, WE'RE GETTIN’ READY OPEN A TWO AND A HALF RIGHT NOW.

0712:20 E12: 12 ENGINE TO COMMAND.

0712:20 DFC: GO AHEAD ENGINE 12.

0712:20 E12: WE'VE MADE ENTRY TO THE SECOND FLOOR, WE HAVE FIRE ON THE SECOND FLOOR, WE'RE GETTIN' TO IT RIGHT NOW. (SCBA)

0712:30 DFC: ARE YOU, AH, IN THE FIRE BUILDING?

0712:30 E12: ...(UNINTELLIGIBLE)..........SIR.

0712:30 DFC: ALLRIGHT, WE'RE BACKIN’ OUT OF THE FIRE BUILDING, YOU SHOULD NOT BE ON THE SECOND FLOOR.

0712:40 E12: ALLRIGHT, WE'RE GONNA’ BACK OUT THEN. (SCBA)

0713:30 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0713:40 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS.


0713:40 DFC: AH, MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON, AH, CHANNEL ONE AND CHANNEL FOUR, I DO NOT WANT ANY RELIEF ON THE FIREGROUND. THAT IS, THE EXCHANGE OF PLATOONS.

0713:50 C.D.: COMMAND 4, SIX FOURTEEN. (THE DISPATCHER SAYS “SIX”)

0714:00 C.D.: ATTENTION THE UNITS ON THE BOX, 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W., BATTALION 4 ADVISES HE DOES NOT WANT ANY RELIEF ON THE FIREGROUND. SEVEN FOURTEEN.

0714:20 T11: TRUCK 11 COMMAND.

0714:20 DFC: GO AHEAD TRUCK 11.

0714:20 T11: WE NEED A WATER SUPPLY HERE.

0714:30 DFC: DID YOU SAY YOU NEED A WATER SUPPLY?

0714:30 T11: THAT'S CORRECT.

0714:40 DFC: COMMAND TO STAGING.

0714:40 E28: STAGING BYE
0714:50 DFC: HAVE A ENGINE COMPANY COME, AH, SOUTH ON, AH, 4TH STREET, FROM, AH, LONGFELLOW AND LAY A SUPPLY LINE INTO TRUCK 11 WHICH IS LOCATED AT 4TH AND KENNEDY.

0715:00 E28: OKAY.

0715:00 ???: (TONE IS HEARD, PROBABLE BLEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL ONE)

0715:10 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO, AH, BATTALION 5.

0715:20 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0715:50 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0716:00 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0716:10 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0716:30 ???: (TONE IS HEARD, PROBABLE BLEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL 1)

0716:40 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0717:00 DFC: COMMAND TO ENGINE 12.

0717:10 DFC: COMMAND TO ENGINE 12!

0717:10 DFC: GET READY TO OPEN UP, AH, THROUGH THE SECOND FLOOR WINDAHS WITH YOUR PIECE OUT THERE.

0717:10 E12: ALLRIGHT, SIR YOU GOT IT.

0717:20 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0717:40 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0718:20 ???: (SHORT MIC TRANSMISSION IS HEARD, NO VOICE, HOWEVER).

0718:50 ???: (SHORT UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0719:10 DFC/A: FIELD COMMAND TO, AH, COMMAND 4.

0719:10 DFC: GO AHEAD FIELD COMMAND.

0719:20 DFC/A: YEAH, CHIEF, I GOT, AH, 14'S CREW HERE ALL BUT........(UNINTELLIGIBLE)

0719:30 DFC: OKAY, CAN YOU SEND THEM TO, AH, THE, AH, 4TH BATTALION CHIEF'S BUGGY, ALONG SIDE OF TRUCK 6.

0719:30 ???: (A TRANSMITTER IS HEARD STUCK OPEN AT THIS POINT, NO VOICE).
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<tr>
<td>0720:20</td>
<td>DFC: COMMAND 4 TO STAGING.</td>
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<td>0720:20</td>
<td>E28: STAGING BYE.</td>
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<td>0720:20</td>
<td>DFC: SEND ME ONE ENGINE COMPANY AND ONE TRUCK COMPANY, AH, PERSONNEL ONLY TO, AH, EXPOSURE TWO AND LET ME KNOW WHO IT IS.</td>
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<td>0720:30</td>
<td>E28: COPY.</td>
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<td>0720:50</td>
<td>DFC: COMMAND TO STAGING.</td>
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<td>0721:00</td>
<td>T11: TRUCK 11 TO COMMAND 4 WE NOW HAVE FIRE ON THE SECOND FLOOR, QUADRANT A. (SCBA)</td>
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<td>0721:00</td>
<td>E21: HEY JAY, LAY DUAL LINES AND COME ON DOWN.</td>
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<td>0721:10</td>
<td>T9: TRUCK 9 BATTALION 5.</td>
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<td>0721:20</td>
<td>B5: BATTALION 5 TO COMMAND.</td>
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<td>0721:20</td>
<td>???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT)</td>
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<td>0721:30</td>
<td>???: (WEIRD NOISE LIKE TRANSMISSIONS STEPPING ON EACH OTHER)</td>
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<td>0721:30</td>
<td>B5: BATTALION 5 TO COMMAND.</td>
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<td>0721:40</td>
<td>B4: (TRANSMITTED PAUSE).....GO AHEAD, TO COMMAND, BATTALION 5.</td>
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<td>0721:50</td>
<td>B5: BE ADVISED WE DO HAVE AN INCH AND HALF LINE INTO EXPOSURE TWO, AND IT’S NOT BEING MANNED AT THIS TIME.</td>
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<td>0722:00</td>
<td>B4: COMMAND 4 TO 21, REPORT TO THE COMMAND, ER, BATTALION 5 IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING. THAT WAY YOU CAN, AH, USE THE INCH AND A HALF IN EXPOSURE TWO.</td>
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<td>0722:00</td>
<td>T12: TRUCK 12 TO COMMAND 4.</td>
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<td>0722:00</td>
<td>???: (TWO MIC CLICKS, FOLLOWED BY)..........TWO.</td>
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<td>0722:10</td>
<td>???: 24 STEP UP ON THE PRESSURE.</td>
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<td>0722:20</td>
<td>T11: TRUCK 11 TO ENGINE 14, WHERE ARE YOU LOCATED AT?</td>
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<td>0722:40</td>
<td>T12: TRUCK 12 TO COMMAND 4.</td>
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<td>0723:00</td>
<td>???: 24 INCREASE THE PRESSURE.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0723:00</td>
<td>???: 24 INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE TWO AND A HALF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0723:10</td>
<td>???: YOU GOT IT.</td>
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0723:20 ???: ENGINE 24 INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE TWO AND A HALF!!

0723:30 DFC: COMMAND TO STAGING.

0723:40 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO STAGING.

0723:40 E28: STAGING BYE.

0723:50 DFC: SEND DOWN A AH, COMPANY TO, AH, 5TH AND JEFFERSON TO PICK UP ENGINE 16’S LINE, IT'S AT, SHOULD BE AT THE ALLEY.

0724:00 E28: OKAY.

0724:00 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4.

0724:10 DFC: COMMAND 4 ON 4:

0724:10 C.D.: BE ADVISED, WE GOT CAR 9 AND LUBE TRUCK, EH, ARE ENROUTE. WE'RE TRYIN’ TO CONTACT THE TRAINING ACADEMY TO GET THE FUEL TRUCK. COPY?

0724:20 DFC: COMMAND 4’S OKAY.

0724:20 C.D.: COMMAND 4, BE ADVISED DURATION TIME, FIFTY MINUTES.

0724:40 ???: (TONE FROM BLEEDOVER AND MIC CLICK HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0724:50 ???: (UNKNOWN KEYING OF MIC HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0725:20 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0725:40 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO FIELD COMMAND UNIT.

0726:00 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0726:00 E6: ENGINE 6 TO COMMUNICATIONS, AMBULANCE 19 SAYS THEY CAN HANDLE THE PATIENT. IT'S A CHILD, ENGINE 6 READY.

0726:10 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION FINISHES OFF WITH)……TWO.

0726:10 C.D.: OKAY ENGINE 6, SEVEN TWENTY SEVEN.

0726:10 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE AND HARD TO HEAR)…………IN THE BASEMENT.

0726:10 B4: COMMAND 4 BYE.
0726:20  T11:  COMMAND 4, WE’RE NOW HAVE WATER SUPPLY AND IN POSITION. WE CAN PUT SOME WATER ON TO THIS THING ON SIDE ONE, THROUGH THOSE LOWER WINDOWS WITH YOUR PERMISSION.

0726:30  B4:  WHOSE THIS?

0726:30  B4:  WHAT UNIT’S THIS?

0726:40  T12:  TRUCK 12 TO COMMAND 4.

0726:40  B4:  GO AHEAD TRUCK 12.

0726:40  T12:  AH, BE ADVISED THE, AH, ROOF IS STARTING TO DETERIORATE A LITTLE BIT, AH, WE’RE GONNA’ NEED A LINE UP HERE EVENTUALLY. AH, JUST AN EXPOSURE LINE.

0726:50  B4:  COMMAND 4 COPY.

0727:00  B4:  COMMAND 4 TO STAGING.

0727:00  E28:  STAGING BYE.

0727:10  B4:  HAVE ENGINE 1 AND AH, TRUCK, YOU GOT TRUCK 15 UP THERE?

0727:20  E28:  CHIEF, TRUCK 15’S THE ONLY THING LEFT IN THE STAGING AREA. EXCEPT FOR ENGINE 28. ENGINE 1 IS HEADED FOR ENGINE 16’S LINE. THEY’RE GONNA PICK THAT LINE UP.

0727:20  B4:  SEND 28, TRUCK 15, AH, TO HANDLE THE ROOF.

0727:30  E28:  OKAY, THAT WILL, AH, EFFECTIVELY SHUT DOWN THE STAGING AREA.

0727:40  B4:  OKAY, MONTGOMERY COUNTY 11’S NOT THERE?

0727:50  E28:  THERE ON SIDE TWO WITH, AH, TRUCK 3.

0727:50  B4:  COMMAND 4 COPY.

0728:10  B5:  I WANNA’ MAKE SURE THE PARAPET’S IN GOOD CONDITION, THAT IT’S NOT GONNA’ FALL OUT ON US.

0728:30  RHAB:  REHAB UNIT TO COMMAND.

0728:30  B5:  BATTALION 5 TO COMMAND 4.

0728:40  DFC:  COMMAND 4 TO, AH, ENGINE 12.

0728:50  DFC:  COMMAND 4 TO ENGINE 12.

0729:00  E12:  ENGINE 12 BYE. (SCBA) (NOTE, FEMALE VOICE)

0729:00  DFC:  YEAH, UH, GET THAT LADDER UP AND GET READY TO USE IT. I WANT THAT LADDER OUT.
0729:10 E12: OKAY. (SCBA)
0729:10 RHAB: REHAB UNIT TO COMMAND 4 IS THERE A REHAB SECTOR?
0729:20 RHAB: OKAY, DO YOU KNOW WHERE AT WHAT INTERSECTION THAT’S AT.
0729:30 DFC: 4\textsuperscript{TH} AND KENNEDY.
0729:30 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO ENGINE 12.
0729:40 DFC: REPORT TO THE COMMAND POST.
0730:00 ????: WE GOT FIRE COMIN’ THROUGH THE ROOF.
0730:20 E9: ENGINE 9 TO TRUCK 12. (SCBA)
0730:20 ????:…..(UNINTELLIGIBLE)…..WE GO BETWEEN THE TWO BUILDINGS. (SCBA)
0730:30 B5: OKAY, MY FIRST CONCERN IS DO YOU HAVE, AH, THE EXPOSURE BUILDING COVERED. THEN WE’LL TRY TO GET A LINE UP THERE. (SCBA)
0730:40 ????: (ALERT TONE IS HEARD. BLEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL ONE).
0730:40 B4: BATTALION 4 TO COMMAND, ER, AH, BATTALION 5, YOU SHOULD HAVE ENGINE 21, TRUCK 3 TO EXPOSURE TWO.
0731:10 ????: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0732:10 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO ENGINE 16.
0732:10 E16: ENGINE 16.
0732:10 DFC: DID YOU GET YOUR WATER SUPPLY STRAIGHTENED OUT?
0732:20 E16: AH, LAST I CHECKED THEY WERE STILL WAITING FOR SUPPLY.
0732:20 DFC: COMMAND TO STAGING.
0732:30 DFC: COMMAND TO STAGING.
0732:50 E28: ENGINE 1 IS AT 5\textsuperscript{TH} AND JEFFERSON PICKIN’ UP ENGINE 16’S LINE.
0732:50 C.D.: ENGINE 1, SEVEN THIRTY THREE.
0732:50 RS1: SQUAD ONE TO COMMAND.
0733:00 DFC: GO AHEAD SQUAD 1.
0733:00 RS1: CHIEF, WE'RE WORKIN' IN THE REAR OF THE BUILDIN'. WE NEED ANOTHER LINE IN THE BACK, WE STILL GOT HEAVY FIRE IN THE BASEMENT, HEAVY FIRE 1ST FLOOR.

0733:10 DFC: OKAY, WE SHOULD HAVE LINES GOIN' IN THE WINDAHS, IS THAT RIGHT? AND A LINE IN THE BACK DOOR.

0733:10 RS1: I COULDN'T COPY.

0733:10 DFC: DO YOU HAVE LINES GOIN' IN THE BACK DOOR, JUST AT THE BACK DOOR, NOT IN, IN TO THA BUILDIN'?

0733:20 RS1: NO SIR, BUT WE GOT LINES IN THE FRONT, AH, FIRST FLOOR WINDOWS CHIEF.

0733:30 DFC: OKAY, WE HAVE EVERYBODY OUT OF THE BUILDIN'? 

0733:30 RS1: .....CHIEF.

0733:30 T12: TRUCK 12 COMMAND 4.

0733:40 DFC: GO AHEAD TRUCK 12.

0733:40 T12: BE ADVISED WE GOT FIRE IN THE ATTIC HERE. IT'S ABOUT A THREE FOOT, AH, ATTIC ER CRAWLSPACE, AH, ON SIDE ONE. AH, WE GOTTA' SOLID BRICK, AH, FIRE WALL, GOIN' UP, AH, WITH ABOUT, AH, A TWENTY-FOUR INCH PARAPET UP HERE. WE WILL NEED A LINE UP HERE EVENTUALLY.

0734:00 DFC: ALLRIGHT, WHY DON'T YOU COME ON DOWN AND START WORKIN' ONE UP THERE.

0734:00 T12: YOU GOT IT.

0734:00 T11: TRUCK 11 TO COMMAND.

0734:00 DFC: GO AHEAD 17.

0734:10 T11: ..........(UNINTELLIGIBLE WORDS) THE LADDER PIPE, WE NOW HAVE FIRE THROUGH THE ROOF, SIDE 1, QUADRANT A.

0734:20 DFC: COMMAND 4 COPY. COMMAND TRUCK 3.

0734:20 T3: TRUCK 3 BYE.

0734:20 DFC: HOW'S EVERYTHING IN EXPOSURE TWO.

0734:20 T3: EXPOSURE TWO'S CLEAR. WE HAVE SOME, UH, PEEK-THROUGH HOLES IN THE, UH, COCKLOFT IT'S ALL, IT'S ALL OKAY NO SMOKE.

0734:30 DFC: ALLRIGHT, WE HAVE HEAVY FIRE THROUGH THE ROOF NOW, SO MAINTAIN YOUR POSITION THERE.

0734:30 T3: OKAY.
0734:30  ???:  (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE BRIEF KEYING OF MIKES IS HEARD, WITH THE SECOND FINISHING WITH THE WORD)...TWO.

0734:30  DFC:  GO AHEAD 17.

0734:40  E17:  CHIEF, WE GOT A LINE IN THE BASEMENT ON SIDE FOUR THROUGH THE WINDOW.

0734:40  DFC:  OKAY.

0734:50  T6:  TRUCK 6 TO ENGINE 11.


0735:00  T6:  NEED YOU TO CHARGE OUR FOUR INCH LINE GOIN’ TO OUR LADDER PIPE.

0735:00  DFC:  YEAH, YOU CAN GO AHEAD AND GET IT CHARGED, I DON’T KNOW WHO HAS IT.

0735:10  T6:  I BELIEVE ENGINE 11.

0735:10  E11:  ENGINE 11’S OKAY. (WAGON DRIVER)

0735:30  ????:  (A BRIEF KEYING OF A PORTABLE MIC IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0736:00  C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND 4, BE ADVISED DURATION TIME, SIXTY-FIVE MINUTES.’

0736:00  ????:  (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC TRANSMISSIONS, BRIEF, AT THIS POINT).

0736:00  ????:  ........(UNINTELLIGIBLE).......D 4.

0736:00  DFC:  GO AHEAD TRUCK 9.

0736:10  T9:  CHIEF I NEED AN ENGINE COMPANY SUPPLY US A LINE FOR OUR LADDER PIPE, COMING IN OFF OF 3RD STREET AND BACK OUT AGAIN TO A HYDRANT.

0736:30  DFC:  OKAY, YOU SHOULD HAVE MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 11, AH, OUT THERE, SEE IF YOU CAN’T COORDINATE THAT WITH THEM.

0736:30  T9:  OKAY.

0736:40  DFC:  COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS ON 4.


0736:40  DFC:  I BELIEVE, AH, WE’VE DEPLETED THE STAGIN’, THE AH, STAGING AREA, IS THAT CORRECT?


0737:00  T12:  TRUCK 12 TO, AH, COMMAND 4.
0737:00 DFC: GO AHEAD TRUCK 12.

0737:10 T12: ..........(UNINTELLIGIBLE AT START, THEN)..........LADDER PIPE IS, BUT IT’S TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE, WE GOT TWO, INCH AND A HALFS UP HERE..........(THEN, AGAIN IT IS UNINTELLIGIBLE).........

0737:20 DFC: I CAN’T COPY YOUR MESSAGE TRUCK 12.

0737:20 T12: BE ADVISED, TRUCK 11’S LADDER PIPE IS, AH, REALLY NOT EFFECTIVE UP HERE. I GOT TWO, INCH AND A HALFS, I CAN PUT TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY GALLONS OF WATER ON IT.

0737:30 DFC: YOU CAN GO AHEAD AND OPEN UP ON THE FIRE WITH YOUR INCH AND A HALF.

0737:40 T12: YEAH BUT, I NEED TRUCK 11 TO, AH, ADJUST THEIR LINE.

0737:40 DFC: TRUCK 11 CHECK YOUR LADDER PIPE. TRUCK 12 ADVISES YOUR OVERSHOOTIN’ THE BULK OF THE FIRE BUILDIN’.

0737:50 ???: BACK IT DOWN!!

0737:50 T11: TRUCK 11 COPY.

0738:00 DFC: COMMAND 4 TO COMMUNICATIONS ON 4.

0738:00 C.D.: COMMAND 4.

0738:00 DFC: GIVE ME TWO ENGINES AND A TRUCK TO THE STAGING AREA PLEASE.

0738:00 C.D.: OKAY COMMAND 4, SEVEN THIRTY EIGHT.

0738:40 ???: (THREE SHORT MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT)

0739:00 T9: TRUCK 9 TO THE STAGING OFFICER.

0739:10 T9: TRUCK 9 TO MONTGOMERY ENGINE COMPANY 11.

0739:10 ???: (THREE SHORT MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0739:20 E11m: ENGINE 11, GO AHEAD.

0739:20 T9: MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 11, IS THAT CORRECT?

0739:20 E11m: CORRECT.

0739:30 T9: (UNINTELLIGIBLE AT BEGINNING)..........SUPPLY A LADDER PIPE, OKAY?

0739:40 E11m: THEY HAVE ME ON A, AH, HYDRANT SUPPLYING 12 ENGINE RIGHT NOW.

0739:50 T9: ALLRIGHT, THANK YA’.
0739:50  T9:  (BROKEN UP, BUT APPEARS TO BE) TRUCK 9 TO BATTALION 4.
0739:50  DFC:  GO AHEAD TRUCK 9.
0740:00  T9:  MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 11 IS SUPPLYING, A, AH, ENGINE 12 RIGHT NOW. I NEED ANOTHER ENGINE COMPANY FOR MY LADDER PIPE.
0740:10  DFC:  COMMAND 4 COPY.. 
0740:10  T9:  IF YOU CAN, HAVE ‘EM COME IN……(BROKE OFF)
0740:10  E1:  ENGINE 1 TO COMMAND.
0740:50  ???:  (UNINTELLIGIBLE AT START)……..TO COMMAND 4.
0741:10  E1:  (SHORT BLEEDOVER TONE) ENGINE ONE’S IN STAGING.
0741:20  DFC:  COMMAND TO TRUCK 9.
0741:30  DFC:  SEE IF YOU CAN GET, AH, ENGINE 9 TO ASSIST YOU, ASSIST YOU, TO GET A LINE OFF OF ENGINE 16, WHICH IS IN THE ALLEY, AH, ON SIDE THREE OF THE BUILDING. THEY SHOULD HAVE PLENTY A’ WATER.
0741:30  T9:  ……..(UNINTELLIGIBLE)…..SIDE ONE
0741:30  DFC:  I UNDERSTAND THAT. YOU HAVE TO STRETCH A LINE FROM THE REAR TA’ TRUCK 9.
0741:40  T9:  I COPY THAT.
0741:40  E1:  ENGINE 1 TO COMMAND 4.
0741:50  DFC:  GO AHEAD ENGINE 1.
0741:50  E1:  YEAH, AH, COMMAND WE’VE, AH, PICKED UP 16’S ENGINES LINE, WE’RE SUPPLYING THEM, AH, YOU HAVE ANYTHING ELSE FOR US RIGHT NOW?
0742:00  DFC:  NAW, THAT’S IT FOR RIGHT NOW.
0742:00  C.D.:  COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND 4.
0742:00  DFC:  COMMAND 4.
0742:10  C.D.:  TO THE STAGING AREA YOU HAVE ENGINES, ENGINE 5, ENGINE 15 AND MONTGOMERY COUNTY TRUCK 19 ENROUTE.
0742:10  DFC:  ENGINE 5 AND ENGINE 15, IS THAT CORRECT?
0742:20  C.D.: THAT'S CORRECT.
0742:20  DFC: AND THE, MONTGOMERY TRUCK 19, OKAY.
0742:20  E23: ENGINE 23'S WAGON TO THE PORTABLE.
0742:30  E23: DO YOU NEED WATER?
0742:30  E23: BE, AH, POSITIVE, I'M HOOKED UP TO THE STANDPIPE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE BUILDIN'.
0742:40  ????: I DON'T KNOW THAT, UH, CAP, IT'S AH PRETTY, AH, MESSED UP, AH, BOX. I'LL, I'LL GET A BATTALION CHIEF TO LET YOU KNOW.
0743:00  B6: BATTALION SIX TO 23, YOU CALLIN' ME?
0743:00  E23: 23'S WAGON TA' BATTALION SIX, UH, CONTACT THE PORTABLEON, AH, CHANNEL FOUR, LETHIMKNOW WHO'S ON THE BOX, HE WANTS TO KNOW.
0743:10  ????: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0743:20  E23: .......YET, I JUST TRYIN' TO HOOK UP TO THE STANDPIPE. CONTACT HIM PLEASE.
0743:20  B6: BATTALION SIX TO 23.
0743:20  B6: (OTHER UNIT IS HEARD SAYING.....COMMAND, THEN IS CUT OFF BY B6 TRANSMISSION) 23, WHERE ARE YOU AT?
0743:30  DFC: COMMAND 4 TRUCK 3.
0743:40  DFC: COMMAND 4 TA' TRUCK 12.
0743:40  ????: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0743:50  DFC: COMMAND 4 TO TRUCK 3.
0743:50  T12: TRUCK 12 BYE.
0744:00  DFC: TRUCK 12, DO YOU KNOW WHAT...............(UNINTELLIGIBLE ENDING)
0744:00  T12: TRUCK 12 COPY.
0744:00  DFC: COMMAND TO TRUCK 3.
0744:00  T3: TRUCK 3 BYE.
0744:10  DFC: EXPOSURE SECTOR.
0744:10  B6: QUADRANT A, RIGHT?
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Call</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0744:20 B6:</td>
<td>OKAY, BATTALION SIX TO UNITS ON C STREET, WE GOTTA REPORT OF HEAVY, AH, SMOKE IN THE LIBRARY, QUADRANT A OF THE BUILDIN’.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0744:20 T12:</td>
<td>TRUCK 12 TO COMMAND 4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0744:20 B6:</td>
<td>ENGINE 2, DID YA’ COPY THAT?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0744:30 T12:</td>
<td>AH, BE ADVISED WE GOT THE AH, ROOF COLLAPSIN’ IN ON US NOW UP HERE, JUST TO LET YOU KNOW THE CONDITIONS.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0744:30 DFC:</td>
<td>I DIDN’T COPY TRUCK 12.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0744:40 T12:</td>
<td>(UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION THROUGH MASK ON PORTABLE).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0744:40 DFC:</td>
<td>GO AHEAD TRUCK 12.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0744:50 T12:</td>
<td>AH, BE ADVISED WE GOT, AH, ROOF COLLAPSE UP HERE NOW, SO, JUST ADVISIN’ YOU OF CONDITIONS UP HERE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0744:50 DFC:</td>
<td>OKAY..........(INTERRUPTED BY)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0744:50 B6:</td>
<td>GO AHEAD 23 (WHICH IS THEN INTERRUPTED BY).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0744:50 DFC:</td>
<td>..........THE, UH, LADDER PIPES FROM WHERE YOU ARE, IS THAT CORRECT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:00 T12:</td>
<td>THAT’S AFFIRMATIVE, AH, TRUCK 12 TO, AH, TRUCK 11, I NEED BRING THAT PIPE DOWN.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:00 ???:</td>
<td>TRUCK 11, YOU’RE WAY OVER BY A HUNDRED FEET.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:10 B6:</td>
<td>(UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS FOLLOWED BY)......I COPY.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:10 DFC:</td>
<td>YOU GOT ANYTHING DOWN THERE AT ALL?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:10 E17:</td>
<td>17, COMMAND 4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:30 E17:</td>
<td>ENGINE 17 COMMAND 4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:30 B6:</td>
<td>OKAY, BATTALION SIX TO TRUCK 10, DID YOU COPY THAT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:30 ???:</td>
<td>.........CHIEF. (HEARD THROUGH SCBA)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0745:40 B6:</td>
<td>NEED YOU IN THE BASEMENT, AH, FORCIBLE ENTRY TOOLS, THEY THINK SOME INSULATION IN THE DUCT WORK.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0745:50 ???:</td>
<td>(UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK HEARD AT THIS POINT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0745:50 T12:</td>
<td>HOLD IT THERE TRUCK 11, YOU GOT IT.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
0745:50 T14: TRUCK 14, WE PICKED UP.....(UNINTELLIGIBLE AND CUT OFF BY....)

0745:50 ???: ........DO YOU NEED US FOR ANYTHING SPECIAL?

0745:50 B6: YEAH, GO DOWN IN THE BASEMENT AND WORK WITH, AH, ENGINE 23 AND SEE IF YOU CAN HELP 'EM FIND WHAT THEY GOT DOWN THERE.

0746:00 ???: ........(UNINTELLIGIBLE, FOLLOWED BY).....TO THE CHIEF.

0746:00 B6: YEAH, THEY’RE IN QUADRANT A, UH, THEY GOT SOME SMOKE ON THE FIRST FLOOR. THEY THINK THEY MIGHT BE SOME INSULATION IN THE DUCT WORK IN THE BASEMENT. AND THEY’RE DOWN THERE SEARCHIN’. GO DOWN AND HELP ‘EM SEE WHAT YOU CAN HELP.

0746:20 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0646:30 E9: ENGINE 9........(BROKE OFF)

0646:30 E9: ........FROM ENGINE 9 ON CHANNEL 4.

0646:40 E1: ENGINE 1 BYE.

0646:40 E9: UH, 16 NEEDS YOU TO INCREASE WATER PRESSURE TO THE TRUCK COMPANY, IF YOU CAN.

0646:50 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0647:00 E9: ALL YOU CAN SUPPLY, WE GONNA ...(UNINTELLIGIBLE) ANOTHER LADDER PIPE IN SERVICE.

0647:00: E1: ENGINE 1 OKAY.

0747:10 T11: TRUCK 11 TO BATTALION 5.

0747:20 B6: COMMAND SIX TO ALL UNITS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, SWITCH TO CHANNEL ONE FOR OPERATIONS. COMMAND SIX TO ALL UNITS THAT COPY ME, SWITCH TO CHANNEL ONE FOR OPERATIONS.


0747:30 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0747:50 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0748:00 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION IS MADE).

0748:10 E9: 9 COPY, THANK YOU.

0748:20 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0748:30 ???: ..........(UNINTELLIGIBLE)...........ENGINE.
0748:40 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0748:50 C.D.: ATTENTION UNITS ON THE BOX, 1849 C STREET, N.W.. ALL UNITS USE CHANNEL TWO FOR THIS INCIDENT. SWITCH TO CHANNEL TWO FOR THIS INCIDENT. SEVEN FIFTY.
0749:00 ???: (MIC IS KEYED BUT NO VOICE IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0749:10 ???: (MIC IS KEYED BUT NO VOICE IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0749:30 DFC/A: FIELD COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS.
0749:30 C.D.: GO AHEAD FIELD COMMAND.
0749:30 DFC/A: AH, WOULD YOU RAISE, AH, ENGINE COMPANY 15 AND HAVE THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF ENGINE 15 NOTIFIED THAT HE IS THE STAGING OFFICER.
0749:40 E15: ENGINE 15’S DIRECT WERE IN THE STAGIN’ AREA.
0749:40 C.D.: 15, YOU COPY THAT?
0749:40 C.D.: FIELD COMMAND, AH, DID THEY ACKNOWLEDGE YOU?
0749:40 DFC/A: YES THEY DID, THANK YOU.
0749:50 E15: COMMUNICATIONS, I COPIED, WE’RE IN THE STAGING AREA.
0750:00 C.D.: SEVEN FIFTY ONE.
0750:00 T11: TRUCK 11 TO COMMAND.
0750:10 ???: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION IS MADE AT THIS POINT).
0750:10 B4: TRUCK 11 REPORT TO BATTALION 5, INTERIOR.
0750:20 T11: TRUCK 11, BU.....TO COMMAND.
0750:20 B4: TRUCK 11, REPORT UH, TALK TO, AH, BATTALION 5, INTERIOR.
0750:20 ???: BRIEF UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION IS MADE AT THIS POINT.
0750:30 B5: BATTALION 5 BYE.
0750:30 T11: BATTALION 5, COULD WE GET, UH, A PIECE OF PUMPING APPARATUS TO, AH, FOURTH.......FOURTH AND LONGFELLOW, TO PICK UP THAT PLUG THERE?
0750:40 B5: (UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION)
0750:50 T11: PICK UP THE PLUG AT FOURTH AND LONGFELLOW.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Channel 4 Transcript (Continued)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0750:50</td>
<td>B5: SEE WHAT I CAN DO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0751:00</td>
<td>B6: COMMAND 6 TO ENGINE 23.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0751:20</td>
<td>???: (MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0751:50</td>
<td>C.D.: ATTENTION ALL UNITS ON THE THIRD ALARM, 400 KENNEDY STREET, N.W., FIELD COMMAND ADVISES HE WANTS ALL UNITS TO GO TO SECTOR COMMANDS FOR REPORTS. ALL UNITS ARE TO GO TO YOUR SECTOR COMMANDS FOR REPORTS. SEVEN FIFTY TWO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0752:30</td>
<td>???: (A MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<td>0753:10</td>
<td>???: (SEVERAL MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0753:20</td>
<td>DFC/A: COMMAND 4 TO THE STAGING OFFICER.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0753:20</td>
<td>E5: ENGINE 5 BYE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0753:30</td>
<td>DFC/A: ENGINE 5 REPORT TO THE, AH, HAVE YOUR OFFICER REPORT TO THE FIELD COMMAND UNIT PLEASE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0753:30</td>
<td>E5: ENGINE 5 COPY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0753:40</td>
<td>B5: BATTALION 5 TO ENGINE 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0753:40</td>
<td>E5: ENGINE 5 BYE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0753:40</td>
<td>B5: 5 WHAT I WANT YOU TA’ DO IS COME IN KENNEDY STREET OFF OF 3RD STREET, BACK DOWN THE BLOCK, DROP A LINE TO TRUCK 9’S LADDER PIPE AND LAY TO 3RD AND KENNEDY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0754:00</td>
<td>E5: HOOK UP WITH TRUCK 9 AT 3RD AND KENNEDY AND SUPPLY THEIR LADDER PIPE, COPY SIR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0754:00</td>
<td>B5: TRUCK 9’S AT 4TH AND KENNEDY, BUT YOU COME IN FROM 3RD.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0754:10</td>
<td>E5: COPY SIR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0755:00</td>
<td>???: (A MIC IS KEYED AT THIS POINT, BUT NO WORDS ARE SAID).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0755:10</td>
<td>???: (SEVERAL MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0755:40</td>
<td>???: (SEVERAL MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0755:50</td>
<td>E15: STAGING OFFICER COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0756:00</td>
<td>C.D.: STAGING OFFICER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0756:00</td>
<td>C.D.: STAGING OFFICER COME IN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0756:10</td>
<td>E15: ..........COMMUNICATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0756:10</td>
<td>C.D.: STAGING OFFICER, GO AHEAD.</td>
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<td>Time</td>
<td>Call</td>
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<tr>
<td>0756:10</td>
<td>E15</td>
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<td>0756:10</td>
<td>C.D.</td>
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<td>0756:20</td>
<td>B4:</td>
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<td>0756:30</td>
<td>???:</td>
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<td>B4:</td>
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<td>0756:40</td>
<td>E4:</td>
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<td>0757:00</td>
<td>E4:</td>
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<td>0757:00</td>
<td>B4:</td>
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<td>0757:20</td>
<td>???:</td>
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<td>0757:50</td>
<td>???:</td>
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</table>

**NOTE:** AT THIS POINT THE TIME STAMP REPEATS 075810, TWICE. THE FOLLOWING TRANSMISSION OCCURS FOLLOWING THE SECOND VOICED 075810.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>RS1:</th>
<th>Message</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0758:10</td>
<td>RS1:</td>
<td>HEY WILT?</td>
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**NOTE:** AT THIS POINT, THE TIME STAMP CORRECTS ITSELF AND SKIPS 075820 AND STATES THE TIME AS 075830.

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0758:30</td>
<td>RS1:</td>
<td>SQUAD 1 TEAM A TO TEAM B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0758:30</td>
<td>RS1:</td>
<td>GO AHEAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0758:30</td>
<td>RS1:</td>
<td>GO CHECK THE FRONT OF THE BUILDING, NOW!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0758:40</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>COMMAND 4 TO SQUAD 1, KEEP ME UPDATED ON YOUR PROGRESS ALONG WITH ENGINE 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0758:50</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(BRIEF TRANSMISSION THAT IS UNINTELLIGIBLE IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0758:50</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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</table>
0759:00 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0759:10 ???: (TWO UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0759:20 ???: (ONE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0759:30 ???: (ONE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0759:50 ???: (ONE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0800:00 ???: (ONE UNINTELLIGIBLE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0800:10 DFC/A FIELD COMMAND TO THE STAGING OFFICER.

0800:10 E15: STAGING OFFICER BY.

0800:20 DFC/A BE ADVISED YOU’LL ONLY HAVE ENGINE 26 COMIN’ TO YA’, WE’VE ALREADY GAVE 31 AN ASSIGNMENT.

0800:10 E15: COPY.

0800:30 E15: STAGING OFFICER TO COMMUNICATIONS.

0800:40 E15: STAGING OFFICER, OFFICER TO COMMUNICATIONS.

0800:40 C.D.: STAGING OFFICER, GO AHEAD.

0800:50 C.D.: WE’RE GONNA’ NEED AN ADDITIONAL ENGINE.

0801:00 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).


0801:00 C.D.: STAGING OFFICER, COMMUNICATIONS COPY, EIGHT O ONE.

0801:00 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).

0801:30 C.D.: COMMUNICATIONS TO THE P.I.O. OFFICER, P.I.O. OFFICER.

0803:00 DFC: OPERATIONS TO COMMAND.

0803:10 B4: COMMAND 4 BYE.

0803:10 DFC: (TOTALLY UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION FROM DFC AT THIS POINT).

0803:20 B4: REPEAT THE LAST PART, CHECK WITH WHOM?

0803:20 DFC: ROOF SECTOR AND SEE WHAT THE CONDITIONS ARE.

0803:30 B4: COPY, COMMAND ROOF SECTOR, TRUCK 12.
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<th>Channel 4 Transcript (Continued)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0803:30 T12: AH, TRUCK 12 TO COMMAND, BE ADVISED, IT’S AH, WE HAVE NO EXTENSION HERE, FROM THE FIRE BUILDING, FIRE STILL SEEMS TO BE HOLDING, WE’RE GETTIN’ WATER ON IT NOW, WE HAVE ABOUT, THE ROOF COLLAPSED ABOUT HALF WAY DOWN FROM SIDE ONE.</td>
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<td>0803:50 B4: COMMAND 4 COPY.</td>
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<td>0803:50 B4: COPY OPERATIONS?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0803:50 DFC: OPERATIONS COPY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0804:00 DFC: IS THERE ANYMORE VISIBLE FIRE, AH, ROOF SECTOR?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0804:00 T12: YEAH, WE HAVE FIRE IN THE COCKLOFT HERE, PROBABLY ABOUT A THREE FOOT COCKLOFT, AND WE GOT, EH, WE GOT, WE GOT SOME VISIBLE FIRE. WE’RE TRYIN’ TO GET IT NOW, WE’RE MAKIN’ SOME PRESS TO GET TO IT.</td>
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<td>0804:10 DFC: OKAY, LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS, AH, ALL THE VISIBLE FIRE IS KNOCKED DOWN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0804:50 T12: TRUCK 12 TO COMMAND 4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0805:00 B4: GO AHEAD ROOF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0805:00 T12: UH, BE ADVISED, UH, WE GOT TRUCK 6 AND TRUCK 11’S LADDER PIPES WORKIN’ UP HERE, EH, HOWEVER AT THIS TIME WITH THE, AH, ROOF COLLAPSE AND THE ANGLE THEY’RE WORKIN’ ON, UH, THEY’RE, THEY’RE SORT OF INEFFECTIVE UP HERE RIGHT NOW, SO YOU CAN PROBABLY SHUT THEM DOWN. WE’LL PROBABLY HAVE A BETTER SHOT WITH THE HANDLINES UP HERE GOIN’ UNDERNEATH THAT.</td>
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<td>0805:20 B4: DOUBLE CHECK, TRUCKS 9 AND WHO, 6?</td>
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<td>0805:20 T12: IT’S AH, TRUCK 6 AND, AH, LOOKS LIKE TRUCK 11 OUT HERE.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0805:30 B4: COMMAND 4 TO TRUCK 11, TRUCK 6, GO AHEAD AND SHUT YOUR LADDER PIPES DOWN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0805:40 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0805:40 B4: OKAY TRUCK 6?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0805:40 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<td>0805:50 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0806:00 T11: TRUCK 11 COMMAND, YOU WANT TRUCK 6 TO SHUT DOWN TOO?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0806:00 B4: TRUCK 11 AND TRUCK 6 SHUT ‘EM DOWN.</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<td>0806:10</td>
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<td>0808:40</td>
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<td>0809:00</td>
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</table>
0809:50 E15: STAGING OFFICER TO COMMAND.
0810:00 DFC/A: GO AHEAD.
0810:00 E15: AH, BE ADVISED YOU GOT MONTGOMERY COUNTY TRUCK 19 AND ENGINE 26 IN THE STAGIN’ AREA. AND ENGINE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE 61 ENROUTE.
0810:10 DFC/A: OKAY, MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE SIXTY-ONE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY TRUCK 19 AND ENGINE COMPANY 26. UHM, ARE YOU GONNA’ BE, WHY DON’T YOU SEND YOUR CREW DOWN HERE TO THE FIELD COMMAND UNIT.
0810:20 E15: COPY.
0811:00 DFC: OPERATIONS COMMAND.
0811:00 DFC/A: COME IN OPERATIONS.
0811:00 DFC: WE GOT A TEAM INSIDE RIGHT NOW, AH, THEY DOIN’ A SEARCH.
0811:10 B4: WHAT’S THE TEAM?
0811:10 B4: IS THAT ENGINE 4 OR 16?
0811:10 DFC: ENGINE 4.
0811:20 B4: COMMAND COPY.
0811:40 DFC/A: FIELD COMMAND TO STAGING.
0811:40 E15: STAGING BYE.
0811:40 DFC/A: UM, WHAT WAS THAT OTHER ENGINE COMPANY BESIDES 26?
0811:50 E15: WE GOT MONTGOMERY COUNTY ENGINE SIXTY-ONE ENROUTE.
0811:50 E26: UH, 26 IS ON THE SCENE, STAGING AREA.
0811:50 DFC/A: THANK YOU.
0812:40 DFC: OPERATIONS TO COMMAND.
0812:40 B4: GO AHEAD OPERATIONS.
0812:40 DFC: HAVE YA’ TALKED TO E.M.S. AND, AH, GET THEM STRAIGHTENED OUT IN TERMS OF, AH, WHAT WE’RE DOIN’ HERE AND AH, TO GET READY.
0812:50 B4: I’LL GET BACK THE UNIT IN FRONT OF SIDE ONE AND I’LL GET BACK TO YOU WITH A NUMBER.
0813:00 DFC: ALLRIGHT, GET A TEAM READY.
0813:10 B4: OPERATIONS THAT’S MEDIC 17 STATIONED IN FRONT.
0813:50 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0814:00 E15: STAGING TO COMMAND.
0814:00 DFC/A: GO AHEAD.
0814:00 E15: MONTGOMERY SIXTY-ONE’S IN THE STAGING AREA.
0814:10 DFC/A: THANK YOU.
0815:20 ???: CHIEF MOULD.
0815:20 ???: (SEVERAL MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0815:50 B4: COMMAND 4 BATTALION 5, GIVE ME A STATUS ON 14’S REVOLVING DISTRIBUTOR.
0816:00 B5: BATTALION 5 BYE.
0816:00 B4: GIVE ME AN, UPDATED STATUS OF ENGINE 14’S REVOLVING DISTRIBUTOR NOZZLE.
0816:10 B5: WE HAVE ALL LINES IN THE BUILDING SHUT DOWN AT THIS TIME.
0816:20 B4: COPY.
0816:40 DFC: OPERATIONS TO COMMAND.
0816:40 DFC: OPERATIONS TO COMMAND.
0816:50 B4: COMMAND, GO AHEAD OPERATIONS.
0816:50 DFC: WE’RE PULLIN’ EVERYBODY OUT AGAIN, THE, UH, FLOOR IS INSECURE, SO WE’RE GONNA’ HAVE NOBODY INSIDE.
0817:00 B4: COMMAND 4 COPY.
0817:50 B4: COMMAND 4 TO 22, GET YER’ PAT TAGS UP AT THE COMMAND VEHICLE.
0818:10 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0818:20 B4: COMMAND TO 22.
0818:20 E22: GO AHEAD.
0818:20 B4: GO AHEAD AND GET YER’ PAT TAGS UP AT THE COMMAND VEHICLE.
0818:20 E22: EVIDENTLY YOU ALREADY BEEN COLLECTING THE PAT TAGS, OUR HOLDER’S MISSIN’.
0818:40 T12: ROOF TO COMMAND.
0818:40 B4: GO AHEAD ROOF.
0818:50 T12: AH, JUST TO ADVISE ON CONDITIONS UP HERE, WE HAVE FIRE STILL IN THE COCKLOFT, AH, WE’RE STILL TRYIN’ TO CHASE IT DOWN A LIL’ BIT. AH, LADDER PIPES AREN’T GONNA’ DO IT RIGHT NOW, WE JUST GOTTA’ CUT AN GO.
0819:00 B4: COMMAND COPY.
0819:10 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0819:20 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0820:30 DFC: OPERATIONS TO EXPOSURE.
0821:00 FUEL: DIESEL TRUCK TO COMMAND.
0821:10 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0822:00 ???: (TONE IS HEARD, BLEEDOVER FROM CHANNEL ONE).
0822:10 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0822:20 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0822:30 ???: (ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0822:40 ???: (TWO MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).
0823:20 T3: TRUCK 3 TO CHIEF MOULD.
0824:10 ???: DON’T SIT RADIO.
0824:10 T12: AH, JUS, JUST WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT THE, UM, THE ROOF HAS COLLAPSED AND WE’RE HAVIN’ PROBLEMS GETTIN’ THESE SPOTS BACK HERE. AND I SAID, I DON’T KNOW IF THERE’ ANYBODY INSIDE ON THE SECOND FLOOR.
0824:20 B5: LARRY, THERE IS NO ONE IN THE BUILDING.
0824:30 B4: COMMAND TO OPER, OP5.
0824:40 B4: COMMAND 4 TO OPERATIONS.
0825:00 ???: (A RADIO TRANSMITTER IS STUCK OPEN AT THIS POINT FOR A FEW SECONDS.).
0825:00 B4: .... (S UDDENLY CUTS IN) .......CHIEF MOULD.
0825:00 DFC: OPERATIONS BYE.
0825:00 B4: AT THIS POINT, 4 AND 16 ARE OUT?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>User</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0825:10</td>
<td>DFC:</td>
<td>THAT’S CORRECT, THERE’S NOBODY IN THE BUILDIN’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0825:10</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>WHO’S USING HANDLINES ALONG WITH SQUAD 1?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0825:10</td>
<td>DFC:</td>
<td>HANDLINES, DID YOU SAY?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0825:20</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>REPEAT PLEASE.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0825:20</td>
<td>DFC:</td>
<td>I DIDN’T COPY YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT HANDLINES.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0825:20</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>ARE THEY GOIN’ BACK TO USIN’ HANDLINES?</td>
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<tr>
<td>0825:30</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>COPY.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0825:40</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>COMMAND BATTALION 5.</td>
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<td>0825:40</td>
<td>B5:</td>
<td>BATTALION 5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0825:50</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>SEE IF YOU CAN USE THAT INCH AND A HALF REVOLVING, USE IT AGAIN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0825:50</td>
<td>B5:</td>
<td>REPEAT THAT DOUG?</td>
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<td>0826:00</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>GET BACK TO ME IF THAT REVOLVING DISTRIBUTOR NOZZLE’S WORKS</td>
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<td>0826:00</td>
<td>B5:</td>
<td>DO YOU HAVE THAT IN SERVICE?</td>
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<td>0826:10</td>
<td>B4:</td>
<td>YOU DECIDE.</td>
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<td>0826:40</td>
<td>T12:</td>
<td>..........WE HAVE TWO INCH AND A HALFS UP HERE WORKIN’. JUST</td>
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<td>0827:00</td>
<td>B5:</td>
<td>OKAY.</td>
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<td>0827:10</td>
<td>T10:</td>
<td>TOWER 10 COPY.</td>
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<td>0828:00</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(UNINTELLIGIBLE TRANSMISSION MADE AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<tr>
<td>0828:10</td>
<td>E13:</td>
<td>ENGINE 13’S WAGON DRIVER BYE.</td>
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<td>0828:20</td>
<td>E13:</td>
<td>ENGINE 13’S WAGON DRIVER BYE.</td>
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<tr>
<td>0828:30</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(TWO MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<td>0828:50</td>
<td>???:</td>
<td>(TWO MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<td>0829:30</td>
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<td>(TWO MIC CLICKS ARE HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<td>0834:00</td>
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<td>(ONE MIC CLICK IS HEARD AT THIS POINT).</td>
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<td>0834:30</td>
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<td>THIS COPY OF CHANNEL 4 TAPE STOPS AT THIS TIME</td>
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This copy of Channel 4 tape stops at this time.
0621:40  C.D.  (TWO BEEPS) LOCAL ALARM, ENGINE 22, TRUCK 11 RESPOND FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF SMOKE IN THE AREA OF 4TH STREET AND KENNEDY STREETS, N.W. (REPEATED)

0623:10  C.D.  (TWO BEEPS) COMMUNICATIONS FILLING THE BOX ON THE SECOND CALL REPORT OF A GROCERY STORE ON THE CORNER. BOX ALARM, ENGINES 22, 24, 14 AND 11, TRUCKS 11 AND 6, BATTALION 4, SQUAD 2 RESPOND FOR THE GROCERY STORE ON THE CORNER AT 4TH AND KENNEDY STREETS, N.W. ON BOX 872. (REPEATED)
Appendix C

Time Line
The following summarizes the actions and radio exchanges related to tactics at the Kennedy St. fire. Note: An "*" before the time code indicates bleed over radio transmissions from a different incident.

0621 Local Alarm for smoke in the area of 4th and Kennedy Sts., NW.
0623 Box Alarm filled out for building fire. E-22, E-24, E-14, E-11, T-11, T-6, Battalion Fire Chief-4, and RS-2 are dispatched.
0624 E-22 arrives on the scene and notes smoke showing from the first floor grocery store.
0626 E-22 enters the first floor and orders their 1 1/2" attack line be charged.
0628 Battalion Fire Chief 4 arrives on the scene and establishes Incident Command, with his vehicle serving as the Command Post in front of the building. He notes only light smoke showing on the first floor of the grocery store.
0629 E-22 notes blue flames and radios a priority message requesting that the building’s gas be shut off. Command orders Trucks 11 and 6 to shut off the building’s gas.
0630 E-24, assigned to check the basement and shut off utilities, reports that access to the basement is impossible until the bars on the basement’s exterior door are cut.
0630 Command requests a Special Alarm for an additional truck company to speed truck company tasks, such as ventilation, while the on scene truck companies work to shut off utilities.
0630 Command requests a Working Fire Dispatch.
Note: A Working Fire Dispatch assignment includes:
- Fire Investigator
- Air Unit
- Ambulance
- EMS Supervisor
0631 Command requests acknowledgment by T-11 or T-6 that they have been able to cut off the gas.
0633 Command gives the corrected address as 400 Kennedy St. NW.
0634 E-24 advises Command that they are unable to gain access to the basement and are coming around to the front of the building.
0635 Command orders E-24 to attempt access to the basement from the front of the building.
0635 T-14 is dispatched as the additional Truck Company responding on the Special Alarm.
Note: Walter Reed T-55 was dispatched initially, but could not respond because it was inadequately staffed. Walter Reed is a federal fire department that responds on mutual aid.
0635 Command asks E-14 if they are backing up E-22. All that is heard is a microphone click.
0635 Command notifies E-24 that he believes the fire is in the basement of the structure.
0635 E-24 repeats that there is no access to the basement from the outside.
0636 Command requests a Task Force Alarm.
0637 The Deputy Fire Chief of the Fire Fighting Division responds.
0638 The following units respond to the Task Force Alarm: E-12, E-4, T-12, and Battalion Fire Chief 5.
0638 E-11 reports they have made it into the basement.
Note: The conditions on the first floor rapidly deteriorate soon after the rear basement door is forced open.
0640 Command assigns T-14 to the second floor.
0640 T-11 radios a priority message, “E-14 and T-11 are on the first floor, we got to back up a little, we got extreme heat build up. We can’t get any water on it, we’re on the wrong floor.”
0640  T-11 radios a partial message indicating that E-14 and T-11 are exiting the structure through the front door.
0641  E-24 repeats that there is no access to the basement from the outside.
0641  Command informs E-24 that E-11 has found something in the rear and orders E-24 to back-up E-11.
       Note: It is believed that the self-evacuation of all companies on the first floor was occurring at this time and that Sgt. Carter fell through the floor as he, E-14’s lineman, and RS-2’s member made their way to the front door.
0642  Deputy Fire Chief FFD arrives on the fire ground and assumes Command from Battalion Fire Chief-4.
0642  RS-2’s officer reports that fire is showing on the first floor and that the primary search is complete and negative.
0642  Command orders E-12, E-4 and T-12 (the Task Force companies) to cover the second floor.
0643  Command requests a Special Alarm for the Haz Mat Unit to serve as a Rapid Intervention Unit.
0644  Command requests another Task Force Alarm to stage at 5th and Kennedy Sts., NW.
064410 Command requests, “Couldn’t copy, repeat?”
064410 Command requests, “Couldn’t copy about the basement?”
064410 A radio transmission, “14’s in the basement!”
       Note: Command is copying two radio transmissions made at 064410, but the Communications Division receiver is not picking them up. The tape recording does not indicate that there was any radio transmissions, not even a microphone click. Yet, Command was copying something. The third radio transmission, “14’s in the basement,” is believed to have been Sgt. Carter, but no one on the fire ground copied the message.
0644  Command orders Battalion Fire Chief-5 to manage the Interior Sector because of the difficulty gaining access to the basement and shutting off the gas supply. Battalion Fire Chief 5 has not yet arrived on scene.
0646  T-14 reports they cannot gain access to the second floor because they cannot use the corner entrance.
       Note: T-14 is referring to an entrance on Side 2 near the corner of Sides 2 and 3 of the building. An inspection hole cut by T-11 in the foyer of the Side 2 entrance showed fire in the basement. At that time, Command mistakenly believed T-14 referred to the front door to the grocery store at the corner of Sides 1 and 2 of the building.
0646  Command orders, “No one is to use the front door. Battalion Fire Chief-5 is to make no attempt through the front door. There are reports of holes in the floor.”
0646  Battalion Fire Chief-5 arrives on the scene.
0646  Command gives the following radio report, “At the Southwest corner of 4th St. and Kennedy St. NW, we have a grocery store approximately 150 feet by 50 feet. Fire in the basement and on the first floor. I want a Second Alarm to stage at 6th & Kennedy Sts., NW. Have the first arriving unit notify me who they are and I will designate a Staging Officer.”
       Note: Communications Division is confused by the request for the Second Alarm, because the previous Incident Commander (Battalion Fire Chief-4) had requested a second Task Force at 0644 hours on channel 4, the fire ground channel. The request for a Second Alarm made by the Incident Commander at 0646 hours (Deputy Fire Chief) was made on channel 1, the dispatch channel. When Communications Division asks if Command was requesting a second Task Force or a second Alarm, Command replies, “That is correct.” No additional units were dispatched on the second Alarm request.
0647  Task Force Alarm E-28, E-16 and T-9 respond to the staging area at 6th and Kennedy Sts.
0648 Command assigns T-12 and T-14 to be the Roof Sector, with T-14 in charge. Command orders the Roof Sector to keep an eye on exposure 2.

0649 E-12 reports that they are on the second floor of exposure 2 and that it is clear. 

*Note: Exposure 2 is a 2-story apartment house adjacent to the south side of the fire building. There was some confusion regarding the exposure numbers because the fire building’s front door was on a corner. The grocery store had only one attached exposure and that was to the south on 4th St.*

0649 Command orders E-12 to prepare for Heavy Duty Operations, 

*Note: E-12 is an engine company with a 75 foot pre-piped water tower that flows 1,000 gallons per minute. E-12 was located on the 4th St. side (Side 2).*

0650 E-28 is at the staging area; Command assigns E-28’s officer to be Staging Officer.

0650 Command requests T-9’s crew to report from the staging area to the Command Post.

0651 Command orders the Interior Sector to open up with a 2 1/2-inch attack line through the front door.

0651 E-11’s driver requests permission to place a revolving distributing nozzle into the basement from the foyer leading up to the second floor (the entrance on Side 2). Command authorizes placement if it can be done safely.

0652 Safety Officer responding.

0652 E-24 notifies Command they have made it into the basement from a door at the west end of Side 1 of the building. Command orders E-11’s driver to delay placing the revolving distributor nozzle. Command asks E-24 if they made it into the basement. E-24 replies affirmatively. E-24 reports fire in the basement and can feel water from a 2-1/2 inch attack line.

0653 Command orders E-4 to enter the same side door E-24 entered and to back up E-24.

*Note: E-24 entered the side door on Kennedy St. (Side 1) which leads through a storeroom near the rear of the grocery store, down a steep concrete ramp. The heavy smoke conditions, concrete ramp, and piled stock led E-24’s crew to believe that they had entered the basement, however, E-24’s crew was on the first floor behind the deli counter.*

0654 Roof Sector reports the roof is solid with two skylights open.

0654 T-11 reports that T-6 has shut off the gas supply.

*Note: T-6’s officer later stated that the gas was shut off in the first five minutes of the incident, and that he was delayed in reporting the shut off because his portable radio was malfunctioning.*

0655 Command asks Communications Division to give him the units on the Second Alarm. Communications Division asks Command if he is requesting a Second Alarm. 

*Note: Command had requested a Second Alarm at 0646 but Communications Division confused the request for the Second Alarm with a request for a Second Task Force.*

0655 Interior Sector asks Command if he wants them to open up with the 2 1/2-inch attack line form the front door. Command orders the Interior Sector to delay action because E-24 is still in the basement.

0656 Command confirms with Communications Division the units he has at the scene and verifies his request for a Second Alarm. Command also requests an additional Rescue Squad for the rear.

*Note: A Second Alarm assignment is 4 engines, 2 trucks and a Battalion Fire Chief.*

0657 Communications Division notifies Command they are sending the equivalent of a third Alarm.

0657 The Interior Sector Officer, Battalion Fire Chief-5, notifies Command, “The members of E-14 are telling me that they can’t find their Sergeant, Sgt. Carter. Could you check on his whereabouts?”
0657 Command attempts to contact Sergeant Carter.
   “Command to Sgt. Carter?”
   “Command to Sgt. Carter?”
0657 Rescue Squad 1 is responding.
0657 Assistant Fire Chief of Operations responding.
   Note: A third Alarm automatically recalls the Chief Officers of the Department.
0658 Communications Division dispatches the Second Alarm units: E-17, E-21, E-1, E-9, T-15, T-3 and RS-1. All units are instructed stage at 6th and Kennedy Sts. NW, except RS-1. RS-1 is instructed to respond to the rear of the building.
   Note: The Second Alarm was dispatched 12 minutes after it was requested. Communications Division did not dispatch a Battalion Fire Chief on the Second Alarm.
0658 Roof Sector reports roof is solid and vented. Command orders them to hold their position.
0659 Command requests, “Anybody on the fire ground that knows the whereabouts of Sgt. Carter of E-14 notify the Command Post.”
0659 Command asks Communications Division, “Who is my Rapid Intervention Unit?”
0659 Command asks E-24, “How are you doing, are you backing out?”
0659 Command asks, “Are you backing out E-14?”
0700 E-4 notifies Command that they are backing out of the basement, then confirms that everyone is out.
0700 Command orders the Interior Sector to apply water from the front of the building.
0700 Interior Sector Officer asks whether Command has located Sgt. Carter. Command informs the Interior Sector Officer that efforts to locate Sgt. Carter will continue but that everyone should be out and it was necessary to “open up” from the front.
0701 Communications Division assigns E-9 to be the Rapid Intervention Unit.
   Note: Communications Division did not notify the Haz Mat Unit that Command had requested the Haz Mat Unit as a Rapid Intervention Unit at 0643 hours. Lacking specific instructions from Command, the Haz Mat Unit had responded to the staging area and assisted other units in need of staffing.
0701 E-24 confirms that crews from both E-4 and E-24 are out of the basement.
   Note: E-24 and E-4 mistakenly believed they were in the basement though there were on the first floor of the building.
0702 RS-1 is directed to use the alley off of Longfellow St. to get to the rear of the building.
0702 Communications Division gives the Second Alarm assignments to Command. Command requests that Communications Division send an additional engine company to filled the second Alarm since E-9, the fourth due engine company on the second Alarm, was dispatched as the Rapid Intervention Unit.
0703 E-12 reports they are on the second floor opening up the walls and there is no fire on the second floor.
0703 Communications Division notifies Command the fourth due engine on the Second Alarm will be Montgomery County (Maryland) E-11.
   Note: Montgomery County borders the District of Columbia to the north and responds if requested under a mutual aid agreement.
0704 Command announces, “All units on the fire ground 4th and Kennedy St. were are on an exterior attack. Everyone out of the building, exterior attack. Let’s sound the air horns, sound the air horns. Make sure everybody’s out of the building.”
0704 Communications Division repeats the order to evacuate the building on channel 1.
0706 Command requests that E-9 (Rapid Intervention Unit) report to the Command Post and stand by.
0708 Command requests that E-17 report to the Command Post with all personnel wearing SCBAs.
0708 Safety Officer on the scene.
0708 Command authorizes two teams of four members to attempt a rescue. RS-2 is directed to search and E-22 is directed to back up RS-2.
0708 RS-1 is ordered to the front of building by Command.
0709 The Roof Sector requests that a line to the roof be placed.
0710 E-12 notifies Command they are taking a crew to search the second floor. Command orders E-12 not to enter the second floor, but to report to the Interior Sector, Battalion Fire Chief-5, at the front door.

*Note: E-12 was ordered to set up for heavy duty operations at 0649 hours, but was not able to do so because of wires on Side 2.*

0710 Communications Division asks Command if the officer from E-14 has been located. Command informs Communications Division, “We are still looking.”
0710 Interior Sector reports to Command that there are holes in the floor and that rescue crews are out of the building.
0711 Command orders that an exterior attack be resumed.
0711 The Deputy Fire Chief Aide asks Command when he would like to conduct roll call. Command responds that they are getting ready, in just a minute.
0712 Command orders an exterior attack with lines placed in the basement windows and through the first floor windows.
0712 Command orders E-12 out of building.
0713 Command makes an announcement that there will be no exchange of platoons on the fire ground.

*Note: It is a department order that there are no changes in personnel on the fire ground at shift change unless permission is granted by the incident commander. The purpose of the policy is to facilitate personnel accountability and to avoid confusion about which companies are fresh.*

0715 Fire Chief responding (AFCO Floyd Madison was Acting Fire Chief). The Fire Chief asks Communications Division if all personnel at the fire have been accounted for.
0716 Communications Division advises the Fire Chief that on scene personnel are still attempting to find E-14’s officer.
0717 Command orders E-12’s Water Tower to prepare to open up from the 4th St. side (Side 2), on the second floor.
0719 Command orders the members of E-14 to report to the Command Post.
0720 Command requests the personnel from a truck company and an engine company from staging to cover exposure 2.
0722 T-11 radios, “Engine 14, where are you located?”
0725 DC-6, the Communication Officer from the Office of Emergency Preparedness, responds to the scene.
0726 Assistant Fire Chief of Operations on the fire ground, but not in Command.
0726 Roof Sector reports the roof is starting to deteriorate.
0727 Command uses E-28 and T-15 from staging to assist in the Roof Sector, depleting the resources in the staging area.
0729 Battalion Fire Chief of Fire Prevention Division responds to the scene.
0733 RS-1 requests another line in the rear because they still have heavy fire in the basement and heavy fire on the first floor.
0733 T-12 advises Command that there is fire in a 3 foot crawl space.
0734 T-11 reports fire through the roof, Side 1, Quadrant A.
0734 Upon questioning from Command, T-3 reports that exposure 2 is clear with no smoke. Command orders T-3 to maintain that position because there is heavy fire through the roof of the fire building.
0735 T-6 request that their ladder pipe be charged by E-11.
0736 Communications Division notifies Command that incident has been 60 minutes in duration.
0736  E-23 is sent on a local for smoke in a building at 1849 C St, NW. E-23 finds smoke throughout the building, which occupies an entire city block, and orders Communications Division to fill out the Box Alarm.

0738  Command requests 2 engines and a truck to staging.

0739  The Box Alarm is sounded for 1849 C St. NW. E-23, E-2, E-13, E-6, T-10, T-21, Battalion Fire Chief-6, and RS-3 are dispatched.

0742  Communications Division fills the staging with E-5, E-15 and Montgomery County T-19.

0744  T-12 advises Command the roof is collapsing.

0744  Battalion Fire Chief-6 requests Communications Division to designate another fire channel for the C St. fire.

Note: Units assigned to the Box Alarm on 1849 C St. NW were transmitting on channel 4, the same channel used at the Kennedy St. fire, resulting in carry over of some transmission. In fact, transmissions made by mobile units responding to the C St. fire were copied by units at the Kennedy St. fire. At 0746 Communications Division orders all units at the C St. Box Alarm to use channel 1. Then at 0748 Communications Division has all units switch to channel 2

0751  Incident Command requests Communications Division to announce on channel 1 and channel 4 for all units to go through their Sector Officers.

0756  Staging Officer requests 2 additional engines to the staging area.

0757  Special Alarm E-31, E-26 responds to the staging area.

0800  E-31 is assigned to the hydrant at 4th and Longfellow Sts., NW.

0800  Staging requests additional engine to fill staging.

0803  Special Alarm Montgomery County E-61 responds to staging.

0803  T-12 reports that half the roof has collapsed on Side 1.

0805  T-12 requests that the ladder pipe be shut down and that they be permitted to attack the fire from the exposure building with hand lines.

0806  The bulk of the fire was knocked down and the Deputy Fire Chief left the Command Post to supervise entry into the building to locate Sgt. Carter. Battalion Fire Chief-4 remained as the Incident Commander and the Deputy Fire Chief assumed the role of Operations Sector Officer. The Operations Sector Officer requested that all heavy duty devices be shut down so a rescue/body recovery could be attempted from the side door on the west end of Side 1. Entry was made by RS-1, E-16 & E-4. The Incident Safety Officer assisted in the supervision of rescue operations.

0807  Communications Division advises Command that the incident duration is 1 hour and 25 minutes.

0811  Operations Sector Officer reports to Command that the rescue team is inside searching.

0812  Operations Sector Officer requests that EMS be prepared. Command responds that Medic 17 is positioned in front of the building.

0816  Operations reports that the rescue team is out of the building because the first floor had collapsed into the basement. The building is designated to be in an unsafe condition; no one is permitted to reenter at this time.

0824  Roof Sector reports that the roof has collapsed and they are having problems getting to the fire.

0830  Upon looking through the inspection hole cut in the foyer of the Side 2 entrance, a Sgt. assigned to the Safety Sector sees an SCBA bottle floating in the basement in about 6 to 7 feet of water. A chain saw was used to enlarge the inspection hole to access the bottle. Only a fraction of the bottle was visible. When it was lifted, personnel discovered that the SCBA was still attached to Sgt. Carter who was floating, face down. Sgt. Carter was lifted out of the basement and was transported by Medic 17, with CPR in progress, to the Washington Hospital Center Med Star Unit. He was pronounced dead at 0852 hours.
Note: Sgt. Carter was found with his SCBA face piece still in place. The face piece was filled with water to eye level. His Scott 4.5 SCBA shoulder harness was secure, but the waist strap was not buckled. Sgt. Carter was wearing his right glove, but not his left glove. In addition:

- Sgt. Carter was not wearing a Nomex hood.
- Sgt. Carter was not wearing his leather helmet when found.
- Sgt. Carter did not have his portable radio when found.
- Sgt. Carter’s PASS device was not activated.

0910 Small fires continued to smolder in different parts of the building throughout the day.

1030 A representative from the District of Columbia Occupational Safety and Health Administration arrives on scene to investigate the death.

1200 Montgomery County Collapse Team conducts a structural evaluation of the building using Search Cams. The evaluation determined that water could be pumped out of the basement safely. Approximately 6 to 7 feet of water had to be removed.

1225 Department of Public Works Sewer Pump Truck is positioned at the Side 2 doorway and began de-watering operations.

1339 Special Alarm RS-3 and DC Fire and EMS Department’s Cave-In Unit stand by to assist with shoring of the building, as needed.

1445 Members of the Cave-In Unit and Montgomery County Collapse Team enter the basement from the rear to conduct a shoring survey.

1530 Shoring operations are initiated in the area where Sgt. Carter was found. Sgt. Carter’s leather helmet is recovered from the basement approximately 3 feet from where Sgt. Carter was located.

1600 The structure is declared unsafe by the District of Columbia’s Assistant Chief Building Inspector. To ensure that personnel can safely investigate the cause and origin of the fire, the decision is made to raze the building from the top down using a construction crane.

1730 Investigation is ceased for the night.

2058 T-14 boarded up doors and transferred responsibility to secure the scene to the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). MPD assigned two patrol cars to secure the building, one at the front door and one at the rear door.
Appendix D

Cause and Origin of the Fire
The following summarizes the cause and origin of the fire. NOTE: The Reconstruction Committee was not responsible for determining cause and origin of the fire and did not evaluate any conclusions developed by the fire investigators.

Investigators from the DC Fire and EMS Department and the ATF National Response Team concluded that it is highly likely that this fire was caused by a malfunction in the electrical wiring components in the basement that ran through the floor joists. Investigators agreed that origin of the fire was in the ceiling area of the basement near the I-beam at the centerline of the building.

The investigators’ conclusions are supported by the following findings:

- The joists in the ceiling area of the basement near the I-beam at the centerline of the building were completely destroyed
- There was high burning and burn patterns of fixtures and materials in the basement that indicated this area of origin
- There was no low-burning and no other electrical/mechanical appliance or equipment in the area of the origin that could have malfunctioned to cause the fire
- The armored electrical cable in this area had failed

In addition, the Electrical Inspector for the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs found the following.

- 4 Blown 200 Amp fuses
- Several disconnected oversized fuses
- Illegal splices
- Flexible cords through the building
- One 200 Amp 3-phase main lug panel wired with #6 wire
- BX cable was with extensive blow by holes caused by electrical current contacting the metal casing of the BX
- No electrical permits on file for any electrical work for the property

These findings support the conclusion by fire investigators that the fire was caused by faulty electrical components located in the basement.
Appendix E

Protective Clothing and Equipment
The DC Fire and EMS Department provides all fire fighters with the following equipment meeting applicable NFPA standards.

- Fire Fighter’s protective helmet (Note: Sgt. Carter had purchased an NFPA compliant leather helmet)
- Flame-resistant Hood
- Protective Coat of PBI/Kevlar
- Protective Trouser of PBI/Kevlar
- Fire Fighter’s Gloves
- Fire Fighter’s Boots
- Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) device
- SCOTT 4.5 Self-contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) with 60-minute rated air cylinders

In addition, Sgt. Carter carried the VHF Saber Radio assigned to E-14

**SCBA**

Sgt. Carter donned his SCBA prior to entering the grocery store. When Sgt. Carter was found, his face piece was in place, but it was filled with water to eye level. The SCBA was removed and Sgt. Carter was placed on a stretcher for transport to the hospital. The SCBA was taken to the Command Post and placed in the custody of the Safety Officer who immediately inspected the SCBA, along with two sergeants assigned to the Safety Office. Sgt. Carter’s SCBA was then placed in the custody of MPD. The DC Fire and EMS Department also sent the SCBA for independent testing to the National Institute for Occupational Safety of Health. Results of inspections and independent evaluations follow.

**Visual Inspection**

- Signs of heat and smoke damage; the rubber bumper at the base of the cylinder was slightly melted
- Cylinder gauge and remote pressure gauge readings were both 0 psi
- Lens on the remote pressure gauge was discolored and difficult to read
- Discoloration of the face piece lens
- Separation of the face piece lens from the rubber seal approximately 1/4 inch at the left forehead

The face piece worn by Sgt. Carter should not have been in use. The DC Fire and EMS Department had been notified of face piece separation problems by NIOSH in 1989. NIOSH had mandated that all Scott-O-Vista face pieces be retrofitted by placing metal clips on the forehead area and where the lens meets the rubber. Since Sgt. Carter’s mask did not have any metal clips, separation of the lens from the rubber seal may have reduced his air supply and allowed water to enter the face piece.

**Manual Inspection**

The cylinder valve was open and moved freely when turned in both directions. The purge valve was in the closed position (the 12 o’clock position). When the purge valve was turned 180 degrees, no air was released.

**NIOSH Report**

The DC Fire and EMS Department sent Sgt. Carter’s SCBA to NIOSH, Air Supplied Respirator Section, Certification and Quality Assurance Branch, Division of Respiratory Disease Studies. The following is quoted from the NIOSH report:
The SCBA failed to meet the performance requirements listed in 42 CFR Part 84, when tested for positive pressure. The SCBA met the applicable performance requirement for exhalation breathing resistance, static pressure, gas flow, duration, and alarm activation pressure.

Although the SCBA failed to meet the positive pressure requirement of 42 CFR Part 84, the effect, if any, that this performance failure would have been upon the user is not clear. Even though the SCBA failed to maintain positive pressure, air was flowing to the face piece in a sufficient quantity to support moderate ventilation requirements. The possibility of inward leakage into the face piece would be dependent upon the face to face piece seal and the wearer’s ventilation rate at the time of the incident, as well as other factors such as the age, weight and condition of the user. The small constant flow leak through the mask mounted regulator into the face piece could have reduced the duration of the SCBA but should not have otherwise had an adverse impact upon the performance of the SCBA. The intermittent alarm problems, as well as the failure to maintain positive pressure in the face piece, could have been the result of the SCBA being submerged in water after the incident.

In addition, the D.C. Medical Examiner stated that Sgt. Carter’s carboxyhemoglobin level was equivalent to that of a nonsmoker, indicating that the SCBA prevented smoke from entering Sgt. Carter’s face piece. There is, therefore, no indication of a SCBA failure that contributed to Sgt. Carter’s death.

A Surpass 88 PASS device was attached to the left shoulder strap of Sgt. Carter’s SCBA. When Sgt. Carter was removed from the building the PASS device was found in the “off” position. When the PASS device was later tested by the DC Fire and EMS Safety Department, the indicator light operated immediately, and, after 30 seconds of non-movement, the alert sounded. The alert also sounded when PASS device was manually activated in the emergency mode. In both tests, the alert sound did not appear to be as loud and piercing is normal, and this may be attributed to the fact that the PASS device had been submerged in water for a period of time. There is no indication that the PASS would have failed to function as intended if it had been turned on or manually activated in the emergency mode.

Sergeant Carter was wearing a full protective clothing ensemble manufactured by Globe Firefighter Suits, Inc. The coat and pants were like new prior to the Kennedy St. fire. A visual inspection after the incident revealed that there were dirt and debris on the material and some melting of the coat’s reflective trim. There were no signs of melting on the reflective trim of the pants. According to the D.C. Medical Examiner, Sgt. Carter received second degree burns to his back and left thigh, however, burns were not life-threatening. It appears that the protective clothing’s integrity was not compromised. Sgt. Carter had two Nomex hoods in his coat pocket, but was not wearing a hood at the time he was found.

Sgt. Carter had purchased a leather, New Yorker-style helmet that was one-month old. Much of the helmet’s white paint had been removed from the crown area, apparently from heat. The Bourke eye shields were slightly melted. When Sgt. Carter was found he was not wearing his helmet but it was located within 2 to 3 feet from where he was recovered.
### Gloves Evaluation

Sgt. Carter had department-issued gloves manufactured by Tempo Glove. When Sgt. Carter was found, he was wearing only his right glove. Sgt. Carter may have removed the left glove when attempting to transmit over his radio. His left glove was found on the basement floor, approximately 10 to 15 feet away from his body. The Safety Office tested a glove of the same style to determine whether it would float. Since the glove did, in fact, float, it is impossible to determine if Sgt. Carter’s left glove was lost near the place where it was found.

### Radio Evaluation

Sgt. Carter carried the VHF Saber Radio assigned to the officer of Engine 14. This particular radio had been reported as defective the day before the Kennedy St. fire because it was transmitting only intermittently. The radio was not repaired or replaced prior to the Kennedy St. fire. The radio was found near Sgt. Carter’s body. Inspection of Sgt. Carter’s protective coat showed a 4-inch portion of a radio case strap melted to the back of the coat. The strap ran diagonally across the back of his coat, indicating that the strap had been worn over the right shoulder with the radio case worn on the left side under the left arm. The radio was placed into the custody of a MPD Mobile Evidence Technician.

The radio was tested by MPD’s Technical Service Bureau. Their findings are listed below.

- Radio was turned on at full volume
- The channel selected was #4, the fire ground channel
- Battery was discharged completely
- The radio case did not appear to be damaged
- When equipped with a new battery, the radio did not transmit or receive
- Internal inspection revealed water dripping out of the case
- Internal fuse was good
- Hook-up to housing eliminator and power supply showed that the radio was drawing 4.5 amps and that there was a short that would cause the battery to discharge. The radio was still drawing 4.5 amps even after it was turned off, indicating that the water was the probable cause of the short.
- Inspection of the internal front cover containing the speaker and microphone assemblies revealed that a plastic covering with adhesive backing had shifted, blocking the microphone. The portable shop work leader for the MPD stated, “This problem...can cause either very low transmit audio or no transmit audio at all. My inspection showed that although the radio when found and checked was turned on, I cannot say today (November 7, 1997) that this radio was or was not functioning on Friday, October 24, 1997.”

Audio tapes from the Kennedy St. fire include only one radio transmission likely to be from Sgt. Carter, “14’s in the basement,” made at 0644:10 hours. The transmission, believed to be Sgt. Carter attempting to give his position, was not copied by anyone. The weak transmission volume and very heavy radio traffic at the time interfered with message reception. Several unsuccessful transmissions are also recorded at that time, however it cannot be determined if Sgt. Carter made any of these transmissions.
Appendix F

Standard Operating Procedure
Call Back of Chief Officers on Third Alarm
The following summarizes the Standard Operating Procedures regarding the call back of Chief Officers on third alarms.

- Deputy Fire Chief, Fire Prevention Division - Responsible for staffing the Command Post at Police Communication Center and staffing at Fire Department Headquarters

- Deputy Fire Chief, Training Division - Responsible for collecting, evaluating and disseminating incident information

- Deputy Fire Chief, Fleet Maintenance Division - Responsible for providing tank truck for refueling apparatus; buses and other vehicles for transportation of firefighter crews; supplying a mobile service vehicle and tow trucks; and the delivery of food and drinks to the fire scene

- Communications Director - Responsible for the efficient operation of the Communication Division

- Medical Director - Responsible for the efficient operation of the Emergency Medical Services

- Battalion Fire Chief, Research & Development Officer - Responsible for coverage of the department by moving details and company transfers
Appendix G

Kennedy Street Dispatching Log
The following summarizes the dispatch log for the Kennedy Street fire.

0621 Local Alarm, Engine 22 and Truck 11
0623 Fill out Box Alarm: Engines 22, 24, 14 & 11; Trucks 11 & 6; Battalion Fire Chief 4; and RS-2
0631 Working Fire Dispatch - Car 43 (FI), Metro Support Unit (Air Unit), Ambulance 25
0631 Special Alarm additional Truck (T-55) did not respond
0634 Special Alarm additional Truck (T-14)
0637 Task Force Alarm - Engines 12 & 4; Truck 12, Battalion Fire Chief 5 and Deputy Fire Chief
0643 Special Alarm – Haz-Mat Unit as Rapid Intervention Unit
0647 Task Force Alarm - Engines 28 &/16; Truck 9
0655 EMS-3 responding (EMS Supervisor for section of city)
0657 Second Alarm - Engines 17, 21, 1, 9; Trucks 15, 3
0657 Special Alarm - Rescue Squad 1 on the Second Alarm
0657 Special Alarm - Engine 9 as Rapid Intervention Unit
0701 Medic 17 Dispatched
0705 Special Alarm Montgomery County - MC Engine 11 to back-fill Second Alarm for E-9
0718 EMS-5 Chief Supervisor
0739 Box Alarm 1849 C Street - Engines 23, 2, 13 & 6; Trucks 10 & 21; Battalion Fire Chief; and RS 3
0742 Special Alarm - Engines 5 & 15; MC Truck 19 to fill staging area
0757 Special Alarm - Engines 31 & 26 to staging area
0803 Special Alarm – MC Engine 61 to staging area
0834 Special Alarm - MC Rescue 19
0900 Ambulance 1
0917 Special Alarm – MC Truck 33
1034 Special Alarm - D.C. Cave-In Unit
1044 Special Alarm - Reserve Canteen Unit
1104 Special Alarm - Tower 10
1124 Special Alarm - Engines 29 & 18; Battalion Fire Chief 1
1339 Special Alarm - Rescue Squad 3

Notes:

On October 24, 1997, Fire Chief Donald Edwards was on day-off but responded immediately from home when informed of the missing sergeant.

On October 27, 1997, while a construction crane was operating and Fire Investigator and ATF agents were active in the building, a Cave-In Task Force stood by and helped with shoring where needed. Rescue Squad 3, Cave-In Unit, Battalion Fire Chief 3, Medic 20 and Reserve Canteen Unit

Engine 24 was requested for water supply for a decontamination tank and equipment for decontamination before Fire Investigators entered the building. This procedure was to ensure no contaminate were brought into the building on the boots of the investigators. If arson was determined, then the criminal could not claim investigator brought foreign material into the building. Every time an investigator entered the building they passed through the decontamination area.
Appendix H

Vital Statistics
Sergeant John Michael Carter
Sergeant John Michael Carter

Badge: #488
Date of Birth: July 14, 1959
Date of Death: October 24, 1997
Age: 38
Height: 5'8"
Weight: 180 lbs.
Last physical: July 15, 1997 (3 months prior to death)
Pronounced: Dr. B. Paul, Washington Hospital Center MED STAR at 0852 hours
Cause of Death: Asphyxia due to drowning
Carboxyhemoglobin: 1% (normal for nonsmoker)
Ethanol / drugs: Negative

Fire Service Experience:

- Kensington Volunteer Fire Department 1978 - 1983
- Appointed to the Training Academy November 15, 1982
- Assigned to Engine Company 30 February 21, 1983
- Transferred to Truck Company 17 June 4, 1989
- Transferred to Engine Company 20 December 16, 1990
- Promoted to Sergeant, first Battalion September 28, 1997
- Killed in the line of duty October 24, 1997

Prior to his death, Sgt. John Carter worked 6 tours of duty at the rank of sergeant.